HE JAMES SPRUNT STUDIES IN HISTORY
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
ublished under the Direction of the Departments of History and Political Science
of the University of North Carolina

VOLUME 39

STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY

IN MEMORY OF

ALBERT RAY NEWSOME, 1894-1951,

BY HIS FORMER STUDENTS AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

EDITED by

J. CARLYLE SITTERSON

CHAPEL HILL

*

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

1957

THE JAMES SPRUNT STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

No. 1. Personnel of the Convention of 1861. By John Gilchrist McCormick
Legislation of the Convention of 1861. By Kemp P. Battle. } (Out of print.)

No. 2. The Congressional Career of Nathaniel Macon. By Edwin Mood Wilson. (Out of print.)

No. 3. The Letters of Nathaniel Macon, John Steele, and William Barry Grove, with Notes. By Kemp P. Battle.

No. 4. Letters and Documents Relating to the Early History of the Lower Cape Fear, with Introduction and Notes. By Kemp P. Battle. (Out of print.)

No. 5. Minutes of the Kehukey Association, with Introduction and Notes. By Kemp P. Battle. (Out of print.)

No. 6. Diary of a Geological Tour by Elisha Mitchell in 1827 and 1828, with Introduction and Notes. By Kemp P. Battle.

No. 7. William Richardson Davie: A Memoir. By J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton.
Letters of William Richardson Davie, with Notes. By Kemp P. Battle.

No. 8. The Provincial Council and Committees of Safety in North Carolina. By Bessie Lewis Whitaker.

Vol. 9, No. 1. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in the Province of North Carolina. By D. D. Oliver.
Correspondence of John Rust Eaton. Edited by J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton.

Vol. 9, No. 2. Federalism in North Carolina. By Henry M. Wagstaff.
Letters of William Barry Grove. Edited by Henry M. Wagstaff.

Vol. 10, No. 1. Benjamin Sherwood Hedrick. By J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton.

Vol. 10, No. 2. Bartlett Yancey. By George A. Anderson.
The Political and Professional Career of Bartlett Yancey. By J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton.
Letters to Bartlett Yancey.

Vol. 11, No. 1. County Government in Colonial North Carolina. By W. C. Guess.

Vol. 11, No. 2. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776, and 'ts Makers. By Frank Nash.
The German Settlers of Lincoln County and Western North Carolina. By Joseph R. Nixon.

Vol. 12, No. 1. The Governor, Council, and Assembly in Royal North Carolina. By C. S. Cooke.
Land Tenure in Proprietary North Carolina. By L. N. Morgan.

Vol. 12, No. 2. The North Carolina Indians. By James Hall Rand.

Vol. 13, No. 1. The Granville District. By E. Merton Coulter.
The North Carolina Colonial Bar. By E. H. Alderman.

Vol. 13, No. 2. The Harrington Letters. Edited by Henry M. Wagstaff.

Vol. 14, No. 1. The Harris Letters. Edited by Henry M. Wagstaff.

Vol. 14, No. 2. Some Colonial History of Beaufort County. By Francis H. Cooper.

Vol. 15, Nos. 1 and 2. Party Politics in North Carolina, 1835-1860. By J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton.

Vol. 16, No. 1. A Colonial History of Rowan County, North Carolina. By S. J. Ervin. (Out of print.)

Vol. 16, No. 2. The Diary of Bartlett Yancey Malone. Edited by Wm. Whatley Pierson, Jr.
The Provincial Agents of North Carolina. By Samuel James Ervin, Jr.

Vol. 17, No. 1. The Free Negro in North Carolina. By Rosser Howard Taylor.
Some Colonial History of Craven County, North Carolina. By Francis H. Cooper.

Vol. 17, No. 2. Journal of a Tour of North Carolina by William Attmore, 1787. Edited by Lida Tunstall Rodman.

Vol. 18, Nos. 1 and 2. Slaveholding in North Carolina: An Economic View. By Rosser Howard Taylor.

Vol. 19, No. 1. Present Status of Modern European History in the United States. By Chester Penn Higby.

(Continued inside back cover)

THE
JAMES SPRUNT STUDIES
IN HISTORY
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Published under the Direction of
the Departments of History and Political Science
of the University of North Carolina

VOLUME 39

*

Editors

FLETCHER M. GREEN, CHAIRMAN

WILLIAM WHATLEY PIERSON

KEENER C. FRAZER

J. CARLYLE SITTERSON

JAMES E. KING

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/james-sprunt-studies-history_1957_39

F
251
J28
v.39

STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY

EDITED *by*

J. CARLYLE SITTERSON

CHAPEL HILL

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

1957

Copyright, 1957, by
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

Printed in the United States of America
The Seeman Printery, Inc.
Durham, N. C.

PREFACE

In this age of world wars and global politics, historians are understandably broadening the scope of their inquiries. Students of United States history are increasingly attracted to problems of national and even international scope and significance. Yet, historical scholarship will be the loser if in this current emphasis the many unexplored problems in American local and state history are neglected. Certainly, historical research at the regional, national, and international levels, if it is to be sound, must rest upon thorough research of problems limited in both time and geographic area. The late Albert Ray Newsome, fully cognizant of this fact, in his own research and writing and in counsel to his graduate students stressed the significance of that vast but recently neglected area of American history, local and state history.

Newsome's doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan, *The Presidential Election of 1824 in North Carolina* (University of North Carolina Press, 1939), was a model in scholarly research on a subject in state history with important implications for national history. He showed that the political revolution which put Andrew Jackson in the Presidency in 1828 had occurred four years earlier in North Carolina and he described and analyzed the forces which lay at the basis of the later upsurge in the nation of "Jacksonian Democracy."

Albert Ray Newsome was born at Marshville, North Carolina, June 4, 1894, and educated in the local public schools, the University of North Carolina, and the University of Michigan. At the University of North Carolina, Newsome had the good fortune to come under the influence of Joseph G. de Roulhac Hamilton and Henry M. Wagstaff, leaders in the new group of historians who had returned to their native South after graduate study at Columbia and Johns Hopkins to kindle the flames of historical scholarship at Chapel Hill. At Michigan, Newsome studied under the eminent teachers and scholars, Ulrich B. Phillips and Claude H. Van Tyne.

His teaching career included posts in the public schools of Elizabeth City and Wilmington, North Carolina, Bessie Tift Collge, Forsyth, Georgia, and the University of North Carolina (from 1935 until his death in 1951 as chairman of its History Department). Newsome left a position as Assistant Professor of History at the University of North Carolina in 1926 to become Secretary of the North Carolina Historical Commission (now the State Department of Archives and History), a post he retained until 1935 when he returned to the University as Professor and Chairman of the History Department. Newsome's nine years in Raleigh as head of the Historical Commission were exceptionally productive ones. Under his editorship, the *North Carolina Historical*

Review achieved national distinction. Moreover, this publication was enriched by his own numerous articles and book reviews. As Secretary of the State Literary and Historical Association for nine years and its President, 1938-1939, Newsome was a leader in the movement to enlarge the interest of North Carolinians in their history. Because of his original and imaginative work in local and state archives, Newsome soon achieved national distinction in this field. He played a leading role in organizing the society of American Archivists and was chosen as its first president, 1936-1939.

Apart from his archival work, most of Newsome's research, editing, and writing was in the field of state history. The quality of his work in that area was clearly evidenced in the unqualified praise which reviewers bestowed upon H. T. Lefler and A. R. Newsome, *North Carolina: the History of a Southern State* (Chapel Hill, 1954). In addition, his numerous articles in professional journals, his editorial work, and his scores of book reviews attest the continued vitality of his scholarly interests. Newsome's untimely death on August 5, 1951, removed from the historical profession a profound student of American and North Carolina history and a highly esteemed teacher.

It is fitting that this volume of essays in memory of Professor Albert Ray Newsome should have been initiated by the Graduate History Club at the University of North Carolina for his chairmanship of the University's History Department from 1935 to 1951 was an especially fruitful one in the training of large numbers of graduate students, many of whom have since become productive scholars in their own right. The contributors to the present volume all received their doctorates at the University of North Carolina, several of them under his immediate supervision. The others benefited from his constructive criticism as a member of their thesis committee and his stimulating teaching in lectures and seminars.

As a teacher, Newsome was noted for the excellence of his lectures, which were models of organization, thoroughness, and presentation. The depth and range of his knowledge was a source of constant inspiration and his dispassionate treatment of the most controversial aspects of history aroused the envy of many of his less detached students. But, he was far more than a master teacher; he was a wise counsellor and a warmhearted friend. Never too busy to listen to the problems of his students, always kindly in his criticism, Newsome was essentially a gentle person. One of his colleagues wrote of him, and I think correctly: "His dominant traits were sincerity, dignity, kindness, honesty, intellectual courage and steadfast devotion to the right as he saw it." The contributors to this volume are but representatives of the many students who felt his influence in countless ways and who would join in paying tribute to the man, the teacher, and the scholar.

The contributors chose their own subject and their varied scholarly interests are reflected in the wide range of topics extending chronologically from the colonial period to the present. Yet, in each of the essays there is that recognition of the interdependence of state, regional, and national history which was fundamental in the research and writing of Professor Newsome.

James R. Caldwell, Jr., examines the religious life of the people in a Carolina back-country county in the eighteenth century. In contrast to the vicissitudes of the Established Church during this period, the evangelical sects under the leadership of colorful and dedicated ministers experienced a remarkable growth which was hardly impeded by the Revolutionary disturbances.

Charles Grier Sellers' essay explores the organization and tactics utilized by the Whigs in North Carolina to bring their fellow provincials into the independence movement. Although it is well known that the coming of the Revolution cannot be fully understood solely in terms of continental factors, rarely has the interaction of events on the local, provincial, and continental levels been so clearly demonstrated as in Mr. Sellers' study.

Alice Keith's essay on William Blount is a case study on the relationship of business and politics in the Confederation period. In showing how a business man of that period used his knowledge of and participation in public affairs for personal profits, she raises by implication the larger and perennial question of "public service and private gain" that has been ever present throughout American history.

Carolyn Andrews Wallace's study of David L. Swain's leadership in bringing the "Rip Van Winkle" period to an end in North Carolina illustrates the far-reaching consequences of political leadership at the state level. Moreover, in demonstrating that, contrary to the situation in much of the nation, the Whigs in the state were the advocates of change and the Democrats were the party of *status quo,* she raises the larger question of the whole interpretation of the Jacksonian period in American history.

Lawrence F. London's study of literature and publishing in the Confederacy treats a greatly neglected aspect of Confederate history. As would be expected, the war created serious problems for publishers in the South, but the lack of important works in literature, public policy, and economics and the large number of short-lived periodicals that disappeared from lack of support merely continued trends that had been characteristic of the prewar South.

Cornelius O. Cathey examines the problem of the impact of war upon agricultural development in North Carolina. He explains how North Carolina agriculturists adjusted to the needs of the state and the Confederacy during the Civil War and why North Carolina met wartime

food needs better than any other Confederate state. At the same time, the necessities of the war brought to an end a period of constructive developments in the state's agriculture with adverse implications for the postwar era. J. Carlyle Sitterson's study of business leaders in the late nineteenth century demonstrates the continuity of business leadership in North Carolina and by implication discounts the much emphasized constructive effects of the Civil War upon the postwar industrialism of the South. Moreover, other characteristics of the business leaders make necessary a re-evaluation of some long-held assumptions about the rise of the modern South.

Arthur S. Link and Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., throw new light upon the relations of the South to the nation during the Wilson administration. Link's thorough analysis of the cotton crisis in the South during the first year of World War I and of Wilson's efforts to avoid what he considered unwise government support of the cotton market is much more than an essay in the politics and economics of the Wilson period. It is, in the larger sense, a study of the impact of a world-wide crisis upon regional economic interests. In Grantham's essay, Hoke Smith's constructive achievements in banking and currency reform and in aid to agriculture and his lack of sympathy with the new Wilson program of urban social legislation in 1915-1916 illustrate the dichotomy of southern progressivism from the period of the agrarian revolt of the 1880's to the present.

In the concluding essay, Sarah McCulloh Lemmon shows that the conflict of agrarian and urban interests in the Wilson period was still present in the recent Roosevelt era. Governor Talmadge, a product of rural society and a vigorous critic of urban progressivism, faced a difficult problem of political leadership in a state which enjoyed economic recovery largely as a result of New Deal measures. Talmadge's challenge of Roosevelt and the New Deal failed, but it was a harbinger of the later conservative southern Democratic opposition to the New Deal-Fair Deal program of social reform.

I should like to express my appreciation to Professors Fletcher M. Green and James E. King for assistance in the preparation of this volume for the press and to the James Sprunt Studies and the University Research Council of the University of North Carolina for the financial assistance which made possible its publication.

J. CARLYLE SITTERSON

Chapel Hill, N. C.
January 31, 1957

CONTENTS

Preface v

CHAPTER

1. The Churches of Granville County, North Carolina, in the Eighteenth Century 1
   By James R. Caldwell, Jr., Assistant Professor of Social Science, University of North Carolina

2. Making a Revolution: The North Carolina Whigs, 1765-1775 23
   By Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., Assistant Professor of History, Princeton University

3. William Blount in North Carolina Politics, 1781-1789 47
   By Alice B. Keith, Professor of History, Meredith College

4. David Lowry Swain, The First Whig Governor of North Carolina 62
   By Carolyn Andrews Wallace, Curator, the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library

5. Confederate Literature and Its Publishers 82
   By Lawrence F. London, Research Associate, University of North Carolina Library

6. The Impact of the Civil War on Agriculture in North Carolina 97
   By Cornelius O. Cathey, Associate Professor of History, University of North Carolina

7. Business Leaders in Post-Civil War North Carolina, 1865-1900 111
   By J. Carlyle Sitterson, Professor of History, University of North Carolina

8. The Cotton Crisis, The South, and Anglo-American Diplomacy, 1914-1915 122
   By Arthur S. Link, Professor of History, Northwestern University

9. Hoke Smith and the New Freedom, 1913-1917 139
   By Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., Associate Professor of History, Vanderbilt University

10. Governor Eugene Talmadge and the New Deal 152
    By Sarah McCulloh Lemmon, Associate Professor of History, Meredith College

STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY

THE CHURCHES OF GRANVILLE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA, IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

By James R. Caldwell, Jr.

A few years before the outbreak of the Revolutionary War an English traveler, whose allegiance to the king sometimes led to inaccurate reporting upon the American colonies, wrote that the inhabitants of the Granville County, North Carolina,[1] region "seem[ed] to entertain little or no sense of religion, and as little knowledge, or fear of a future state, God, or Devil."[2] Coming as it did from one who was not a resident of the colonies, this observation is extraordinarily interesting; but, at the same time, it directly contradicts the truth, in so far as the early religious development of Granville County and the North Carolina back-country is concerned.

For several years after the county was created there were probably no church buildings, regular ministers, or organized congregations; but there was no lack of people of strong religious convictions. Among the early settlers from Virginia were many Presbyterians and Baptists, who brought their zeal for religion with them and they wasted little time in preparing the way for the establishment of churches in their new environment.[3] The third religious sect represented by the early colonists

[1] Granville County, named for the Lord Proprietor of the Granville District of North Carolina of which it was a part, was formed from Edgecombe County in 1746. At the time of its creation Granville was a frontier county, its territory extending from the western limit of the mother county to the western limit of the province beyond the Appalachian Mountains and from the Virginia line on the north to the Johnston County line on the south. By 1764, however, through the formation of Orange and Bute counties, it had lost by far the greater part of its territory as well as its frontier status.

In spite of the drastic reduction of its territory Granville grew rapidly in wealth and population. In 1800 Granville had a total population of 14,015. Among the sixty counties of the state it ranked third in total population, third in slave population, and fifth in free Negro population. The size of the average land-holding a few years earlier was approximately 620 acres. *Colonial Records of North Carolina* (cited hereinafter as *CRNC*), IX, 349; *State Records of North Carolina* (cited hereinafter as *SRNC*), XXIII, 249-50, 383, 625; *The United States Census Office: Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States, 1800,* pp. 73-75; List of Taxables and Taxable Property, 1789, Granville County Record Book, II.

[2] John F. D. Smyth, *A Tour of the United States of America; Containing an Account of the Present Situation of That Country; the Population, Agriculture, Commerce, Customs, and Manners of the Inhabitants* (Dublin, 1784), I, 82.

[3] William H. Foote, *Sketches of North Carolina, Historical and Biographical, Illustrative of the Principles of a Portion of Her Early Settlers* (New York, 1846), (cited hereinafter as *Sketches of N. C.*), pp. 166, 174; Nannie M. Tilley, "The

was the Church of England or the Established Church. It is indisputable that the Anglicans lacked the fervor of the Presbyterians and Baptists for the propagation of their doctrine; but not all of them, by any means, were indifferent to the welfare of the church. These three churches dominated the religious life of colonial Granville, and all were deeply rooted long prior to the visit of the above-quoted Englishman.

In point of time the Church of England took precedence over the others, since it was established by law in 1746 when the county was formed. At the same time St. John's Parish was created as a coterminous unit, and a vestry was appointed. The parish was endowed with "as many privileges" as were enjoyed by the others in the province; and the vestry was directed to meet at the home of William Eaton (the temporary seat of the county government), qualify according to the law, and proceed with the transaction of parish business.[4] As to the proper definition of the term "parish business" the vestrymen were left to decide for themselves, for no other instructions of any sort were issued. At this time, and for several years thereafter, the Church was established in the legal sense of the word only; for it had neither ministers nor church buildings.

In fact, very few of the parishes in the province had ministers then; and there is no record that any clergymen of the Established Church visited St. John's prior to 1749. In the late summer of that year, however, the Reverend Clement Hall, a representative of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel who was stationed at Edenton, made a trip to Granville. During the performance of his mission in the parish he "rode above 300 miles, preached 7 sermons Churched 50 well disposed women & Baptized 184 children." In reporting upon his work in Granville he noted that, partly as the result of the shortage of ministers, the Church was "despised and neglected" by "too many" of the people throughout the province.[5]

During the next twenty years the parishioners were without the regular services of a minister. This fact unquestionably retarded the progress of the Church seriously. Although services were probably held occasionally by a visiting clergyman or lay reader, the Established Church in Granville could not hope to develop strength comparable to that of the dissenting sects without the unifying influence and inspirational

---

Settlement of Colonial Granville County," *The North Carolina Historical Review* (cited hereinafter as *NCHR*), XI (January, 1934), 15-16; Robert I. Devin, *History of the Grassy Creek Baptist Church, from Its Foundation to 1880, with Biographical Sketches of Its Pastors and Ministers* (Raleigh, 1880), (cited hereinafter as *Hist. of Grassy Creek Baptist Church*), p. 25.

[4] *SRNC*, XXIII, 240-50. The vestry, as originally constituted, was made up of twelve men. It is significant that ten of the twelve were also members of the county court. Minutes of the Granville County Court (cited hereinafter as MGCC), September 2-December 2, 1746.

[5] *CRNC*, IV, 924.

leadership of ministers of its own. Realizing that, so long as this deficiency existed, the Church must remain an impotent force in the lives of the people, both Governor Arthur Dobbs and Governor William Tryon sought earnestly, but unsuccessfully to obtain at least one minister for every parish in the province. As late as 1765 the latter unhappily reported that only five of the thirty-two parishes had ministers. Even if each parish had a clergyman, he said, the number would be "scarce sufficient to perform the marriage and burial services."[6]

Although they lacked a minister for twenty-four years after the Church was established in Granville, the vestry and parishioners were not inactive. Long before they were assigned a rector, they launched an extensive building program. In addition, the old parish of St. John was, in 1758, divided into Granville and St. John's parishes by a line drawn from the point where the Jefferson Road intersected the Virginia boundary to Horse Creek on the Johnston County line. As reconstituted, St. John's Parish included the territory lying to the east of this line, and Granville Parish was composed of the land to the west of the line.[7] The impetus for this movement theoretically derived from "Two Petitions of Several of the Inhabitants . . . Setting forth That the Vestrymen chosen . . . in 1758 were Illegal," but the division was actually effected chiefly through the efforts and influence of a small group of prominent local politicians who expected to profit politically and financially from the creation of Bute County.[8]

Between the years 1746 and 1763 the vestries undertook to erect four church buildings. The first of these, and probably the only one that was completed, was St. John's Church, which was located in the village of Williamsboro. St. John's was probably finished by 1754 and certainly by 1757. Built of wood, the structure was approximately seventy feet long and forty feet wide—a rather large edifice for that day.[9]

The other three proposed churches were Trinity's, St. Michael's, and St. George's. About them very little is known except that plans were laid for their construction. The erection of Trinity Church was undertaken by St. John's Parish in 1755. In that year Benjamin Ward deeded to the vestrymen a tract of land at Pleasant Springs, upon which this church was to be built. Its location, if the plan to build it was ever car-

[6] *CRNC*, V, 314-15; VII, 99, 103; *SRNC*, XXIII, 497.
[7] *SRNC*, XXIII, 497-98, 547, 625-27; XXIV, 227-30.
[8] *CRNC*, V, 1071, 1072; James R. Caldwell, Jr., A History of Granville County, North Carolina: The Preliminary Phase, 1746-1800 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, the University of North Carolina, 1950), pp. 78-83.
[9] Nannie M. Tilley, Studies in the History of Colonial Granville County (unpublished master's thesis, Duke University, 1931), (cited hereinafter as Studies), p. 194. William L. De Rossett (editor), *Sketches of Church History in North Carolina* (Wilmington, 1802), (cited hereinafter as *Sketches of Church History*), pp. 151, 210-11; Charlotte Perkinson, "Oldest Episcopal Church of Diocese Still Is in Service," *The News and Observer* (Raleigh), April 14, 1929.

ried through, can only be conjectured. The histories of St. Michael's Church and St. George's Chapel are almost as obscure as that of Trinity. The erection of St. Michael's was planned by the vestry of the reconstituted parish of St. John about the year 1760. The proposed location was probably near Gideon Macon's estate in what is now Warren County; but it is unlikely that the church was ever completed. In 1763 St. George's was in the process of construction. Six years later it had not been finished. The exact location of this chapel has not been determined, but it is clear that it was situated somewhere in the vicinity of Oxford or Harrisburg.[10]

Apparently anticipating the assignment of a minister at an early date, the wardens of St. John's Church purchased from Robert Harris in 1759 a four hundred acre tract of glebe land, situated between Poplar and Tabb's creeks, about five miles east of Oxford. If a house suitable for use as a manse was not on the land at the time of the purchase, one was erected shortly thereafter.[11] Although this tract was bought by the wardens of St. John's Church, it was evidently intended that it should serve as the glebe for all of Granville Parish.

Having prepared so thoroughly, the parish was by 1767 more than "Able to support & willing to receive a Minister." Yet the prospect for obtaining one through the regular method of assignment employed by the Church appeared unpromising. In 1768, therefore, the vestry took the initiative in the matter, extending to the Reverend John Barnett, who was not happy in his station at Brunswick, an invitation to visit the parish. At the same time it sent a petition to Governor Tryon, urging him to assign Barnett or some other minister to Granville. The governor was willing to accommodate them, but he lacked the power to assign clergymen without the approval of the authorities in London. Dismayed at the prospect of remaining longer at Brunswick, Barnett then appealed directly to the Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, requesting that he be transferred to Granville or Northampton.[12]

Slightly less than a year later Governor Tryon secured ministers for a number of North Carolina parishes through the highly irregular method of drafting transient ecclesiastics who had been licensed to preach in Virginia. One of the men thus inducted into service was the Reverend James McCartney, who was assigned to Granville Parish and began his ministry there in June, 1769.[13]

[10] Tilley, Studies, pp. 188-90, 194; Charlotte B. Hobbs, History of St. John's and Granville Parish (unpublished paper read before a Granville chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution in 1931).

[11] Archibald A. Hicks, "Historical Sketch of Churches in Granville County," *Oxford Public Ledger,* October 22, 1929; Hobbs, History of St. John's and Granville Parish.

[12] *CRNC,* VII, 540, 789-90.

[13] *CRNC,* VIII, 45, 85-86.

In some respects McCartney was well pleased with his station. He was delighted with the attitude of his parishioners, who received him cordially and continued to exert themselves in an effort to make his situation as pleasant and comfortable as possible. The hospitality of the people was not enough, however, to offset the fact that in many respects the Granville unit of the Established Church had languished while the Presbyterians and Baptists flourished. Approximately five months after his arrival in the parish, McCartney revealed to the Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel that he "had baptized 221 whites and 79 Blacks." The satisfaction stimulated by the rapid progress was more than counteracted, though, by the knowledge that in his territory the dissenters were more deeply rooted than his brethren. With ill-concealed displeasure he reported that . . . "There are many Presbyterians in this Parish, and they have a minister settled amongst them. There are likewise many Baptists here, who are great Bigots; but be well assured, Reverend Sir, that I will (from a sense of my Duty and just gratitude to the Society) take every prudent method I am capable of to abolish Dissention and make converts to the Church."[14]

The length of McCartney's ministry in Granville and the success with which his efforts were crowned can not be determined. He was still in the parish, though, as late as 1772. By this time he must have been somewhat dissatisfied, for the financial return of his office had been substantially reduced. In addition to the annual salary of one hundred and thirty-three pounds, six shillings, and eight pence guaranteed him by the province and the revenue realized from fees for the performance of marriage and burial services, he had, for a limited period received from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel a regular stipend for his missionary endeavors. By late 1771 this had been discontinued, and McCartney evidently appealed to the governor for aid. In what was apparently a fruitless attempt to have it restored, Governor Josiah Martin and forty-five of "the principal Inhabitants of the Colony" testified both to the Society and the Bishop of London that he had "laboured with the greatest assiduity in the discharge of the duties of his sacred function" and was "a credit to his holy profession."[15]

The only other clergyman of the Church of England known to have served in the parish prior to 1800 was the Reverend George Micklejohn, who had been rector of St. Matthew's Parish in Orange County from 1767 until shortly after the outbreak of the Revolution. Sometime between the years 1776 and 1779 he moved to Granville; and for many years thereafter, possibly as late as 1810, he conducted services there

[14] *CRNC*, VIII, 86.
[15] *Ibid.*, IX, 61-62, 304-05, 306-07, *SRNC*, XXIII, 660.

and in neighboring parishes.[16] It is debatable, however, as to whether he held a regular pastorate during his long residence in the county. In 1788 the Reverend Henry Pattillo, pastor of the Presbyterian churches at Grassy Creek and Nutbush, reported that . . . "Our Episcopalians are getting Mr. Micklejohn to N[ut] B[ush] once in the month. I heard him last visit. He is an artist at avoiding Jesus Christ, both in name and substance. The first thorough deistical sermon I ever heard."[17]

Aside from the scarcity of ministers and the consequent lack of unity and leadership, the Established Church in Granville was confronted with other problems of an equally serious nature. In the first place, by reason of its formalism, organizational inflexibility, and lack of evangelical fervor it could not readily adapt itself to the needs of a frontier people. Another grave handicap stemmed from the fact of its establishment. As a state church supported by public funds, it was at best regarded with disfavor by many of the dissenters. In times of financial stress this passive disapproval was sometimes transformed into bitter resentment in the minds of non-member taxpayers, who were required to contribute to the support of a church that had been imposed upon them by law rather than through the power of religious conviction.

Such an attitude was reflected in the petition to the legislature of a group of discontented Granville citizens in 1771, shortly after the suppression of the Regulator uprising. The petitioners, who numbered

[16] *CRNC,* VII, 259-62, 457, 519-20, 541; VIII, 15, 20, 222, 822; X, xxvi, 560, 646, 917, 932. There are few more interesting characters in North Carolina history than Micklejohn. Probably of Scotch birth and ancestry, he came to North Carolina as a representative of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in 1766 and was installed in St. Matthew's Parish, Orange County, early in 1767. Always an advocate of legal, orderly government, he aligned himself with the forces of Governor Tryon during the War of the Regulation and was appointed a chaplain for the militia. At the same time, however, he was friendly to and was trusted by the Regulators, with the result that he served as an intermediary between them and Governor Tryon in 1768. When the Revolution broke out, Micklejohn became an active supporter of the king. In February, 1776, he participated in the battle of Moore's Creek Bridge as a member of the loyalist forces and was captured. In November, 1776, he was permitted to take the oath of allegiance and was freed by a committee of the Provincial Congress. At this point Micklejohn is said to have established his residence in Granville on a tract of land presented him by his friend, Thomas Person, a former regulator. Micklejohn lived in Granville until well after the turn of the nineteenth century. About the year 1810 he moved to Mecklenburg County, Virginia, where he died in 1817, or thereabouts. *SRNC,* XXIV, 297; Alfred S. Lawrence, "George Micklejohn," *The Carolina Churchman,* XII (December, 1921), 9-12; Joseph B. Cheshire, *An Historical Address Delivered in St. Matthew's Church, Hillsboro, N. C.* (Durham, 1925), (cited hereinafter as *An Historical Address*), pp. 10-18; De Rossett, *Sketches of Church History,* pp. 82-83, 211-12; List of Taxables and Taxable Property for Granville County, 1782, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina; MGCC, November 9, 1803.

[17] Pattillo to the Reverend Charles Pettigrew, Granville County, North Carolina, December 13, 1788, Pettigrew Family Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library. Nutbush was the original name of Williamsboro.

113, protested that "for a Considerable time" they had "Labour'd under a Heavy & Burthensome Tax." Well aware of the fact that the expenses of the government had been heavy during the period of the Regulation, they indicated their willingness to contribute their full share toward the elimination of the public debt. On the other hand, they felt that they had a valid grievance against their vestry which had "without duly Considering the Present Circumstances of Government & the heavy Taxes. . . . Engaged with Workmen to Build two Churches in their Parish the Expence of which will amount to upwards of Twelve Hundred pounds." Until the "Demands of [the] Government" had been met, it would be impossible, they declared, for them to "Discharge such a Considerable sum." Accordingly, they requested that they be released from the obligation to pay so much of the parish assessment as had been laid for the purpose of financing these churches, that the vestry be relieved from their commitments to complete the buildings, and that the contractors be paid "a Small Gratuity for their Disappointment & Trouble."[18]

In compliance with the wishes of the petitioners Thomas Person, who was a member of the Established Church but also a staunch friend of the oppressed, introduced into the assembly on December 7, 1771, a bill for the reduction of parish taxes. As might have been expected, however, it was voted down on its first reading in the council after having been passed by the house.[19]

The Revolutionary War struck the Established Church in North Carolina a mortal blow. Although many of the patriot leaders were lay members, its ties with England and the attitude of the clergymen soon destroyed what little popularity it had had. At the outbreak of hostilities most of the clergymen, feeling themselves bound by their oath to the king, either left the province or joined the Tories; and with the adoption of the first state constitution on December 18, 1776, it lost its legal status. Although there were still many Episcopalians, the end of the war found the Episcopal Church in a state bordering on complete decay; and efforts to revive it did not produce much fruit until 1817, when the Diocese of North Carolina was organized.[20] During the greater part of this period, however, the Episcopalians in Granville were more fortunate than most of their brethern because, in Reverend George Micklejohn, they had one of the few ministers of their denomination in the state.

While the Established Church progressed slowly and with great

[18] *CRNC*, IX, 95-97, 146.

[19] Lawrence, "George Micklejohn," p. 10; *CRNC*, IX, 115, 146, 168.

[20] Joseph B. Cheshire, "Decay and Revival, 1800-1830," in De Rossett, *Sketches of Church History*, pp. 243-78; Guion G. Johnson, *Ante-Bellum North Carolina, A Social History* (Chapel Hill, 1937), pp. 333-35; *CRNC*, X, 1011; *SRNC*, XXIII, 983.

difficulty during the colonial period, the Presbyterians and Baptists gained a foothold in the county and advanced rapidly through the momentum of their fervor for preaching the gospel and gaining converts to their doctrines. Presbyterian settlers from Virginia began to move into the territory prior to the formation of the county, probably as early as 1740. Apparently the first colonists of this faith were attracted principally by the rich lands lying along the Tar and the Neuse rivers and their tributaries. The growth of Presbyterianism in the region was undoubtedly stimulated, however, by the Great Awakening in Virginia, which came about under the leadership of the Reverend Samuel Davies, of Hanover County. James Criswell and Henry Pattillo, who organized the first Presbyterian congregations in Granville, were trained for the ministry in Hanover Presbytery; and the latter was taught by Davies himself.[21] Moreover, the Grassy Creek and Nutbush congregations were, at first, composed largely of emigrants from the Virginia counties of Hanover, New Kent, and King and Queen, who had come into the church through the influence of Davies and his followers. In a very real sense, therefore, the Presbyterian Church in Granville was an extension of Hanover County Presbyterianism. The influence of the Synods of Philadelphia and New York was also strong, since, between the years 1745 and 1758, they sent missionaries regularly into Granville and other parts of the province.[22]

The first Presbyterian minister known to have preached in Granville was the Reverend Hugh McAden, who was sent to North Carolina as a missionary in 1755 by the Synod of Philadelphia. Having been "sent for" and "very earnestly entreated to go" by some of the inhabitants, McAden first came into the county in mid-August, 1755. During the remainder of that month and part of April, 1756, he preached many times "to large and deeply interested audiences," composed chiefly of Presbyterians and Baptists. At "old Sherman's [Baptist Church], on Tar River" he found "a middling congregation, who appeared very devout, and some of them very much affected"; at the "Baptist meeting-house" sixteen miles from Grassy Creek he preached to a people "who seemed very inquisitive about the way to Zion"; at "the Baptist Yearly Meeting" at Fishing Creek he delivered five sermons with such telling effect that "the power of God appeared something conspicuous, and the word seemed to fall with power" upon the large congregations;[23] and at

[21] Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, pp. 78-79, 213, 215-16, 219; John H. Wheeler, *Reminiscences and Memoirs of North Carolina and Eminent North Carolinians* (Philadelphia, 1851), p. xxix; Wesley M. Gewehr, *The Great Awakening in Virginia*, pp. 68-105.

[22] Eli W. Caruthers, *A Sketch of the Life and Character of the Rev[erend] David Caldwell, D. D.* (Greensboro, 1842), p. 93; Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, pp. 158-59.

[23] Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, pp. 166-67. The above quotations are from McAden's Journal as reprinted in this work.

Nutbush, to which he was invited by the Presbyterians, he found "a cheerful people, without the regular preaching of the gospel, and in a situation as might be expected, with an abundance of wealth and full leisure for enjoyment."[24]

Since McAden was invited to come to Granville and his services were well attended, it may be inferred that the body of Presbyterians was already sizable. Unlike the Baptists, they do not appear to have been organized into congregations or to have had church buildings. Very likely the Reverend William Tennent found the same situation when he visited the county in 1763 as a missionary for the Synod of New York and Philadelphia. About his work nothing is known definitely. It is traditional, however, that he held the first communion service for Granville Presbyterians in a house belonging to Howel Lewis, located about a mile and a half from the place where the Grassy Creek Church was soon to be erected.[25]

In 1765 the Grassy Creek and Nutbush Presbyterians secured as their first regular pastor the Reverend James Criswell, a recent licentiate of Hanover Presbytery, who organized the congregations shortly after his arrival.[26] Two years later James Pettigrew, who had moved to Granville from Lunenburg County, Virginia, deeded to the session of the Grassy Creek congregation one acre of land with the understanding that a house of public worship would be built upon it;[27] and the church was erected not long thereafter. During his ministry in Granville, Criswell was one of the leaders in the movement which, in 1770, resulted in the creation of Orange Presbytery from the territory that had been under the jurisdiction of the Hanover unit. He died in 1778, and in 1780 the Reverend Henry Pattillo, who had served as pastor of the Hawfields, Eno, and Little River congregations in Orange County from 1765 to 1774, succeeded him. One of the greatest of the early North Carolina churchmen, Pattillo served the Grassy Creek and Nutbush churches faithfully until his death in 1801.[28]

During his ministry, and through his influence, Granville Presbyterianism seems to have embraced larger than denominational concepts.

[24] Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, p. 174. This is not a quotation from McAden's Journal. The statement was made by Foote, but was based upon material contained in the Journal.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67, 219; Helen H. Salls (editor), "Pamela Savage of Champlain, Healthseeker in Oxford," *NCHR*, XXIX (October, 1952), 553; Alfred S. Caldwell, "Brief History of the Oxford Presbyterian Church, 1818-1897," *Oxford Public Ledger*, June 24, 1897.

[26] Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, p. 219.

[27] William S. Pettigrew, "The Conventions of 1790, '93 and '94, and the Bishop-Elect," in De Rossett, *Sketches of Church History*, p. 226; Tilley, Studies, p. 195. James Pettigrew was the father of the Reverend Charles Pettigrew, who was the first Episcopal bishop of North Carolina.

[28] Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, pp. 217-222; Caruthers, *David Caldwell*, pp. 96-97, 197.

Although he was a Presbyterian both by training and conviction,[29] Pattillo's fundamental aim in life was to promote the spread of Christianity. Sectarianism was of secondary importance. The breadth of his Christianity is well illustrated by his exhortation to a lay friend in a distant community "to promote religion in your neighbourhood. Enquire after & invite pious ministers—have one or more houses of worship built. I hope the viccorage [*sic*] will readily joyn [*sic*] you." In his own neighborhood Pattillo maintained cordial relations with the ministers and members of other churches, particularly the Episcopalians. Frequently he invited clergymen of other denominations to fill his pulpit. Between 1776 and 1783 the Reverend Devereux Jarratt, unorthodox rector of a Dinwiddie County, Virginia, parish and a precursor of Methodism in North Carolina, visited various Granville churches, "preaching up free grace, [and] faith without works."[30] As late as 1788 Pattillo called him to his churches "to sow some good seed with the tares." Another eminent Episcopalian clergyman who probably conducted services on various occasions in the Nutbush and Grassy Creek churches was Pattillo's friend and former student, the Reverend Charles Pettigrew, of Tyrrell County, who had grown to manhood in Granville.[31]

Fearful lest Christianity should be "totally eradicated" by the skepticism and lax standards that characterized the moral and religious life of the people of North Carolina during the years immediately following the Revolutionary War, Pattillo led the Presbyterians and other denominations of Granville in a revival that began late in 1788 and blended into the Great Revival that stirred the state's churches and churchmen to new levels of enthusiasm and effort until well after the turn of the century.[32]

The Granville revival grew out of the new phase of the Great Awakening in Virginia, which began in 1787 at Hampden-Sydney College, a Presbyterian institution in Prince Edward County, and spread rapidly. The leader of this new growth of religious interest was the Reverend John Blair Smith, president of the college. Upon hearing

[29] Henry Pattillo, *Sermons & C* (Halifax, 1796), pp. 1-285; Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, pp. 213, 215-16.

[30] Pattillo to Doctor Knox [place and date of writing not indicated]; Pattillo to Reverend Charles Pettigrew, Granville County, North Carolina, December 13, 1788, Pettigrew Papers; Devereux Jarratt, *The Life of the Reverend Devereux Jarratt* (Baltimore, 1806), pp. 97-98; Johnson, *Ante-Bellum North Carolina*, pp. 373-74; *CRNC*, IX, 1003-04.

[31] Pattillo to Pettigrew, December 13, 1788, Pettigrew Papers; Pettigrew, "The Conventions of 1790, '93 and '94, and the Bishop-Elect," in De Rossett, *Sketches of Church History*, pp. 224-27.

[32] Pattillo to Pettigrew, December 13, 1788, Pettigrew Papers; Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, pp. 370-72; William H. Foote, *Sketches of Virginia* (Philadelphia, 1850), I, 419; Caruthers, *David Caldwell*, p. 252; Johnson, *Ante-Bellum North Carolina*, pp. 379-88.

about the revival, Pattillo acted quickly to turn it to advantage in his own neighborhood. Assembling a group of the young people in his congregations, he took them to Hampden-Sydney for an extended visit to his friend Smith. Deeply moved by the emotionalism of the services they attended, they transmitted the spark to their friends and neighbors at home, with the result that "a glorious revival broke out in Granville and Caswell counties."[33]

The highlight of the initial phase of the revival was a series of services conducted in Pattillo's churches late in 1788 by the Reverend Mr. Smith. About this man and the fruits of his labor in Granville Pattillo wrote:

> . . . What an elegant [*sic*] and ready tongue, and what a glow of religion attends that little seraph in all his motions! And how greatly are his labours blest . . . if a man is not made of ice, he must be warmed, animated, transported. I know not which is the more animating, the minister or the people. Such crowds of attentive hearers collect, that they seem to forget all distinction of professions & throng to the table, of all Denominations among us. Religion is but love amongst us. . . . I could perhaps name half a score of young people, that have set out promisingly, & bear the fruits of holiness; & you know we have some old professors whose light has shone for many years.[34]

Before the fervor generated by Smith's preaching had ebbed, McGready's Revival, which by 1800 had extended westward as far as Ohio, had begun; and the people were stirred anew. Educated for the ministry in Pennsylvania and influenced by Smith of Hampden-Sydney, the Reverend James McGready, soon to be known as the "Son of Thunder," came home to North Carolina about 1790 and began preaching in the churches along Haw River and at various other places in Guilford County. Due to his extraordinary ability to arouse the conviction of unworthiness and guilt in complacent church members, success as a revivalist came almost immediately. Soon congregations in Orange and Granville were also drawn under his influence, and the "excitement" he generated among the people "was great." McGready's purpose was to bring about reconsecration through alarming his hearers concerning the safety of their souls. His approach was direct and blunt. Pointing his finger at church members, he would frequently exclaim "An unworthy communicant in such circumstances as yours, is more offensive to Almighty God than a loathsome carcase [*sic*] crawling with vermin set before a dainty prince." The impact of such preaching upon both the converted and the unconverted was powerful; and many people wept openly.

While McGready's revival was in progress, Nash Legrand and

[33] Gewehr, *The Great Awakening*, pp. 177-79; Foote, *Sketches of Va.*, I, 419.
[34] Pattillo to Pettigrew, December 13, 1788, Pettigrew Papers.

Cary Allen, two young evangelists from Virginia who had come into the ministry through the influence of John Blair Smith, visited Pattillo's churches. So effectively did they reach the worshippers that, when the services ended, "multitudes" followed them into Virginia to hear more of their preaching.[35] On the strength of the spirit generated by these revivals and the work of Henry Pattillo, Presbyterianism was advancing strongly in Granville as the eighteenth century drew to its close.

Of the three denominational groups active in colonial Granville the Baptists were the best organized, the most aggressive, and apparently the strongest numerically. Before clergymen of either of the other denominations came into the county, Baptist ministers were in the field preaching, making converts, and organizing churches. In 1755 the Reverend Hugh McAden found organized congregations at Grassy Creek, Tar River, and Reedy Creek;[36] and apparently his services were more heavily attended by Baptists than Presbyterians. Further evidence that this denomination constituted a strong segment of the population almost from the beginning of the county's history is found in the Reverend James McCartney's assertion in 1769 that his parish was inhabited by a large number of Baptists, whom he regarded as "great Bigots."[37]

The Baptists began their work in Granville about the year 1748, when Dr. Josiah Hart came to Reedy Creek, in the east-central section of the present county of Warren, as a missionary of the General Baptist group. A crusader with an appeal that enabled him to win converts easily, Hart planned to use Reedy Creek as his headquarters for an evangelistic campaign which he hoped would carry the Baptist influence throughout an extensive area west of the Roanoke. As the initial step in this program he intended to establish a mother church at Reedy Creek. With this in mind he began preaching the Arminian doctrine of salvation for all who professed faith in Christ. From the first his mission was extraordinarily fruitful. Among the local inhabitants he found many receptive hearers, and conversions were numerous. Prior to the end of the year 1748, he had organized the Reedy Creek congregation and had installed as pastor the Reverend William Walker, whom he himself ordained. To this church every other known Baptist congregation of early Granville, directly or indirectly, owed its origin.

In the meantime word of the revivalist activities at Reedy Creek had spread through the surrounding territory, and people were traveling in large numbers from points as far distant as twenty-eight miles to attend

[35] Foote, *Sketches of N. C.*, pp. 368-77. In 1796, as the result of opposition in his home territory, McGready moved to Kentucky. From there he and his colleagues carried the revival into Tennessee and Ohio and ultimately into the southwest.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67. It has now been established that the Fishing Creek church was situated on Reedy Creek, a tributary of Fishing Creek. George W. Paschal, *History of North Carolina Baptists*, 1663-1805 (Raleigh, 1930), pp. 174-75.

[37] *CRNC*, VIII, 86.

Hart's services. Many were baptized and returned to their homes as converts to the free-will doctrine of salvation for all. Unable to minister properly to the needs of his growing flock and anxious to expand his field still further, Hart ordained and pressed into service as assistants several of the more zealous of his own converts.

About this time he also established branches of the Reedy Creek church at a number of distant locations where the converts were sufficiently numerous to warrant the holding of regular services. One of the branches was situated on Tar River, probably not far from Oxford. Generally known as "old Sherman's" because it was located on the land of John Sherman, this branch is reported to have been organized as a separate church in 1749. William Washington, one of Hart's fellow evangelists at Reedy Creek, was installed as its first pastor.[38]

It is very probable that the church at Grassy Creek, in the north-central section of modern Granville, was also founded as one of the fruits of the Reedy Creek program, although it joined the Separate Baptist movement early and became one of the first members of the Sandy Creek Association. Whether Grassy Creek had a regular pastor under the General Baptists, though, is doubtful.[39]

Late in 1755 Elder Stearns, the father of the Separate Baptist movement, probably passed through the Grassy Creek region on his trip from Virginia to his permanent seat at Sandy Creek in Guilford County; and it is likely that he began the work of steering the church's members into his fold at that time. The following year Elder Daniel Marshall, Stearns' chief lieutenant, conducted services at Grassy Creek; and through his influence many were converted to the Separate view. A short time later, possibly in 1757, Stearns, who at that time was the only ordained minister in the Separate group, baptized them. Grassy Creek, therefore, became a regularly constituted Separate Baptist church in 1757 or 1758.[40]

During this visit at Grassy Creek Stearns probably explained to the brethren his plans for gathering the Separate churches together in an association and persuaded them to join. In any event, delegates from nine congregations assembled at Sandy Creek in January, 1758, and formed an association of that name. Grassy Creek was represented at

[38] Paschal, *Hist. of N. C. Baptists,* pp. 173 *et seq.;* George W. Paschal (editor), "Morgan Edwards' Materials towards a History of the Baptists in the Province of North Carolina" (cited hereinafter as "Morgan Edwards' Materials"), *NCHR,* VII (July, 1930), 375-76, 379-80; Foote, *Sketches of N. C.,* p. 166. A branch consisted of a group of members who held meetings regularly, but were not organized as a congregation.

[39] J. D. Hufham, "The Baptists in North Carolina," *North Carolina Baptist Historical Papers,* I (July, 1897), 227-28; Paschal, *Hist. of N. C. Baptists,* p. 299; Foote, *Sketches of N. C.,* p. 166.

[40] Devin, *Hist. of Grassy Creek Baptist Church,* pp. 49-53; Paschal, *Hist. of N. C. Baptists,* pp. 299-300.

the convention by its first pastor, Elder James Reed, a convert of the year 1756, who reported that the organizational work was accomplished with "sweet decorum and fellowship."[41]

For the next twelve years the Grassy Creek church, along with all the other Separate congregations in North and South Carolina and Virginia, retained membership in the Sandy Creek Association. Following a disagreement about a rule of procedure in 1770, however, the association was divided into three organizations—one for each of the three colonies. Since it was in the extreme northern part of North Carolina, the Granville congregation was assigned to the Virginia Association, with which it remained for eighteen years. In 1788 it was transferred to the newly organized Roanoke Association, and four years later it was shifted to the Flat River Association.

From the time of its organization as a Separate congregation Grassy Creek was a flourishing church. It had a spacious, well-constructed house of worship and a large membership, many of whom possessed considerable wealth and high social position. Due chiefly to the extraordinary energy and zeal of its first two pastors, Elders James Reed and Samuel Harris, whose combined ministries covered a period of more than thirty years, it became the fountainhead for the spread of Separatist doctrine and influence over a broad area, including a large part of south-central Virginia. It was not unusual for these two indefatigable evangelists, sometimes traveling separately, frequently together, to journey from fifty to two hundred miles away from the home church, preaching, baptizing, and organizing congregations all along the way. As a result of their zeal Grassy Creek not only gained renown as the mother of churches, but also its own members were for many years scattered over a territory extending fifty miles in all directions.[42]

[41] George W. Purefoy, *A History of the Sandy Creek. Baptist Association* (New York, 1859), pp. 62-64; Paschal, *Hist. of N. C. Baptists,* pp. 394 *et seq.;* Devin, *Hist. of Grassy Creek Baptist Church,* pp. 52-53.

[42] Devin, *Hist. of Grassy Creek Baptist Church,* pp. 26-27, 53, 72-74, 77-78, 80, 84, 101-05; Paschal, *Hist. of N. C. Baptist,* pp. 302, 404; Robert B. Semple. *A History of the Rise and Progress of the Baptists in Virginia* (Richmond, 1894), pp. 17, 19-25, 28, 216, 238, 240, 331. Reed was probably first installed as pastor in 1757. In 1770 he was charged with "unchristian conduct" and expelled from the church. Having given satisfactory evidence of repentance, however, he was restored to the communion of the church in 1772. Sometime later, probably early in 1773, he was re-installed as pastor and held the charge until 1789. At the time of his conversion in 1756 he was completely illiterate and was taught to read and write by his wife. As a minister his chief asset was an extraordinary talent for bringing people into the church. Harris, a Virginian of some wealth and education, served as pastor during the period when Reed was in disrepute. He was active as an evangelist, however, for many years. At one meeting in Virginia Reed and Harris baptized seventy-five people; during another one of their journeys, which usually lasted several weeks, they baptized "upwards of two hundred." Among the churches which stemmed from Grassy Creek were Meherrin, Bethel, and Buffalo in Virginia and Tabb's Creek, Amis' Chapel, Hester's Chapel, and Island Creek in Granville.

While the church was prospering and expanding its influence, it did not neglect to maintain the strictest sort of discipline, frequently calling members to task for delinquency in doctrinal matters and sometimes interfering in their private lives to the extent of curtailing their personal liberties. In one instance, for example, one of the ladies of the church was brought before the congregation and "censured for talking too freely." Upon confessing her sin, however, she was "restored to fellowship." On another occasion two of the brethren were appointed "to admonish sister J—— C—— for living an immoral life such as dancing & c." Failing to correct her conduct after having been cited by the committee, the lady was called before the entire church body two months later to stand trial. "She owned the allegation, but said she found no repentance, (that is, she was unwilling to give up dancing.) She then not being found to hear the church, was, therefore, excommunicated." Several years later the question was raised at a congregational meeting as to whether "the word of God tolerate[d] Christians to be at balls and the assemblies of the wicked." The issue was unanimously resolved in the negative.

Other decisions arrived at from time to time in congregational assembly were that a "private transgression" should not be confessed in public while there was still "hope of recovering the offender"; that, when a member "absent[ed] himself from the Lord's Supper, without giving some reason for it," he was "liable to the censure of the church"; and that it constituted "disorder . . . for a member of the church to stay at home, or go visiting on the Lord's day, when he might conveniently attend public worship." Occasionally, too, a member was called upon to defend himself against the charge of "holding unsound principles." In such cases he was sometimes excommunicated after a congregational hearing.[43] In light of the church's attitude toward sin and false doctrine and the narrowness with which it construed those terms, it was not easy for the communicants so to regulate their behaviour and thinking as to avoid the many pitfalls that might ensnare them.

While the Separates were establishing themselves at Grassy Creek, the General Baptists subscribed to a major doctrinal change, thereby aligning themselves with the sect known as the Particular or Regular Baptists.[44] The theology of the General group, as previously noted, was based upon the Arminian doctrine of salvation for all believers in Christ. A major tenet of the faith was that willingness to be baptized constituted sufficient evidence of conversion. The Particulars, on the other hand, were rigid Calvinists, who contended that only those who had

[43] Devin, *Hist. of Grassy Creek Baptist Church,* p. 76 *et seq.* The Reverend Mr. Devin's study is based on the church records for the period from 1769 to 1880. It contains many excerpts from the church minutes.

[44] After the rise of the Separate group the Particular Baptists began calling themselves "Regulars." Paschal, *Hist. of N. C. Baptists,* p. 414.

been elected by God prior to the creation of the world had any hope of salvation. The elect could not be lost, while those not so fortunate as to have been predestined to salvation could not, under any circumstances, enter the Kingdom of God.

The defection in the ranks of the General Baptists in Granville began with the ministers as early as 1750. Having come under the influence of the Reverend Robert Williams, the first Particular minister in North Carolina, the Reverend James Smart, who was a member of Dr. Hart's staff of evangelists at Reedy Creek, began to preach Calvinism in the latter part of 1750 or early 1751. Less than two years later the Reverend Henry Ledbetter, another prominent member of Dr. Hart's group, and the Reverend William Walker, pastor of the Reedy Creek church, also declared themselves converts to Particularism. Thus, Granville ministers were leaders in this significant transitional development, helping through their example to prepare the way for the general acceptance of the Calvinist doctrine.

In May, 1755, the Reverend John Gano, who had been sent south the previous year by the Philadelphia Association for the express purpose of hastening the transition, visited Granville and preached at the Reedy Creek and Tar River churches. A short time later he was followed by Peter Vanhorn and Benjamin Miller, also representatives of the Philadelphia Association. As a result of the visitations of these missionaries the Reedy Creek church made the change to Particularism on December 6, 1755, becoming one of the first congregations in the province to take the step. The Tar River church failed to transfer immediately, but in 1761 it was organized under the new faith by William Walker. The Reverend William Washington, who had adopted the Particularist view sometime earlier, was again installed as pastor.[45]

Having made the transition from Arminianism to Calvinism, the Baptists of the older group took another significant step on November 6, 1769, when representatives of five congregations met at Kehukee, in Halifax County, and formed the Kehukee Association. Although it was represented at the organizational meeting, the Reedy Creek church was not admitted to membership until 1772. During the intervening years, however, its delegates were permitted to sit in the yearly meeting "as assistants."[46] Since the church was obviously anxious for membership, the only plausible explanation for its failure to gain admission is that, by this time, the Reverend William Walker had developed strong Separatist leanings.[47]

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 155-57, 204-11, 215-16, 444-45, 502; Paschal, "Morgan Edwards' Materials," *NCHR*, VII (July, 1930), 371-80.

[46] Kemp P. Battle (editor), "Minutes of the Kehukey Association, 1769-1777," *James Sprunt Historical Monographs* (cited hereinafter as *Sprunt Monographs*), V (1904), 8-18.

[47] Paschal, *Hist. of N. C. Baptists*, pp. 428-30.

Through the Reverend Henry Ledbetter, who had succeeded William Washington as pastor in 1761, the Tar River church vainly sought admission to the association in 1774. While the records provide no explanation, the logical supposition, in light of subsequent events, is that the rejection was brought about by the church's drift toward Separatist doctrine.[48]

From the time of the arrival of Shubal Stearns the simple doctrine of the Separates, with its emphasis upon "believers' baptism" and "free justification," had a strong appeal for the Regulars, as the Particularists were now calling themselves; and the Kehukee Association had hardly been organized before the question of its relationship to the other sect was raised. Cognizant of the rapid growth of the rival group and the increasing desire of some of its own members for union, the Kehukee Association, in August, 1771, heartily sanctioned the Regulars' communing with the Separates and agreed to send a delegation to the forthcoming session of the General Association of Separate Baptists of Virginia to discuss plans for union.[49]

The meeting was held the following year, but the Separates proved unwilling to unite unless the Regulars would agree to certain reforms which they considered essential to a converted membership. Since the majority of the members of the Kehukee Association refused to yield on the points at issue, a group of reformers, led by Elder Lemuel Burkitt, broke away in 1775 and formed a new association. Composed of six Regular and four Separate churches, this organization also adopted the name Kehukee. The Tar River church, under the leadership of the Reverend Henry Ledbetter, followed Burkitt into the new association, but the Reedy Creek congregation preferred to remain with the old group. The differences between the Regulars and Separates were finally reconciled, with the latter making some broad concessions to Calvinism; and in 1788 they entered into a formal union under the name of United Baptists.[50]

Like the Presbyterians, the Baptists relied to a great extent upon the revival to gain new members as well as to renew the spirit of the old communicants. Under Josiah Hart and his followers the Reedy Creek church became primarily a base of operations for the conduct of an almost continuous series of evangelistic services. As late as 1772 it was basically a missionary church. Although the annual salary amounted to only forty pounds, its ministerial staff consisted of three men—William Walker, the regular pastor, and two assistants. Its membership was

[48] Lemuel Burkitt and Jesse Read, *A Concise History of the Kehukee Baptist Association, from Its Original Rise Down to 1803* (Philadelphia, 1850), pp. 49-50.

[49] Battle, "Minutes of the Kehukey Association, 1769-1777," *Sprunt Monographs,* V (1904), 14-15.

[50] Burkitt and Read, *Concise Hist. of Kehukee Association,* pp. 40-51; Paschal, *Hist. of N. C. Baptists,* pp. 475, 492-93.

unofficially reported at 250, and its influence was said to have been extended to about five hundred families. Doubtless, the two assistant pastors spent the greater part of their time on the road, seeking converts in areas previously neglected by the Reedy Creek evangelists and holding services at the church's four branches. By 1773 its congregation had three hundred communicants, and in 1775 its Tar River offspring had seventy.[51]

As a center of revivalism and evangelism the Grassy Creek church rivaled, perhaps excelled, Reedy Creek. In addition to the missionary journeys of Elders Reed and Harris, which produced many individual converts and branch congregations, protracted revival meetings were held occasionally at the home church. On July 23, 1775, for instance, "a great meeting commenced," and "many souls were converted . . . baptisms occurring at almost every regular meeting throughout the year." As a fitting climax to his long and fruitful ministry James Reed led the congregation in another revival which lasted throughout the greater part of the years 1786 and 1787. In "extent, power and influence" this resurgence of spirit surpassed any Grassy Creek had ever experienced. Two years later there was a similar "very precious revival of religion" under Elder Henry Lester. During these services, which were usually attended by large crowds, the preachers generally appealed directly to the emotions; and it "was not uncommon for the brethren, and especially the sisters, to give expression to their feelings in outbursts of praise."[52]

The Baptist expansion was to some extent checked by the rise of another evangelical denomination—the Methodists, who entered the field in North Carolina while they were still only an unorthodox group in the Established Church. The seeds of the new religion were first planted in the eastern part of the province in 1772 by the Reverend Joseph Pilmore, an Anglican, who had been sent to America by John Wesley. The next year he was followed by the Reverend Robert Williams, another Wesleyan, who, during a six weeks' tour, organized the first Methodist society in North Carolina. Intensely evangelical and unfettered by denominational dogma, Methodism took root immediately and spread rapidly under the preaching of these men and their successors. In 1776 the membership of the Methodist societies in North Carolina was only 683; by 1783, one year prior to the formal separation of the denomination from the Church of England, the number had increased to 2,229.[53]

[51] Paschal, "Morgan Edwards' Materials," *NCHR*, VII (July, 1930), 375; Battle, "Minutes of the Kehukey Association, 1769-1777," *Sprunt Monographs*, V (1904), 22; Burkitt and Read, *Concise Hist. of Kehukee Association*, p. 50.

[52] Devin, *Hist. of Grassy Creek Baptist Church*, pp. 69-70, 80, 85.

[53] William L. Grissom, *History of Methodism in North Carolina from 1772 to the Present Time* (Nashville, 1905), I, 24, 34-44; Johnson, *Ante-Bellum North Carolina*, pp. 343-48; William K. Boyd, *History of North Carolina: The Federal*

Methodism was introduced into Granville by Devereux Jarratt, the non-conforming Anglican clergyman from Dinwiddie County, Virginia, about the time of the beginning of the Revolutionary War. Although a member of the Established Church, Jarratt was a product of the Great Awakening and a firm believer in the cardinal Methodist tenets of personal and experimental religion. To him heaven, hell, and the judgment were quite real; and, throughout his long ministry, he laid primary emphasis upon the fallen state of man and the necessity for spiritual regeneration through faith in God.[54]

In addition to performing his regular parish duties, Jarratt for many years rode circuit as zealously as a Methodist itinerant through a broad territory in Virginia and North Carolina. From his initial visit to Granville in 1776 until 1783, he conducted services in the county with some regularity, "preaching up free grace, faith without works," and "making use of extempore prayers and discourses." His labors were evidently well-rewarded, for in 1788 the Reverend Henry Pattillo invited him to visit his churches and "sow some good seed with the tares. . . ."[55]

As the result of the work of Jarratt and a few such pioneer ministers as Edward Dromgoole, Francis Poythress, James O'Kelly, and John Dickins the principles of Methodism were firmly grounded in Granville by 1780. By that time the circuit riders were holding services regularly, and at least three church buildings had been erected. Near Nutbush Creek there was "a chapel (a little log house, about twenty-five feet long and twenty feet wide)"; approximately eight miles from Nutbush there was a "Tabernacle" large enough to accommodate four hundred people; and in the Beaver Dam neighborhood, in southeastern Granville, Captain John Pope had constructed "a preaching-house."[56]

Period, 1783-1860 (Chicago and New York, 1919), (cited hereinafter as *The Federal Period*), p. 187. In Baltimore, Maryland, on December 24, 1784, the Methodists severed their relationship with the Church of England, establishing the Methodist Episcopal Church. The leaders in the movement for denominational independence and the first bishops of the church were Francis Asbury and Thomas Coke.

About four months later—on April 20, 1785—the first North Carolina Conference was held at the home of the Reverend Green Hill, one mile south of Louisburg in Franklin County, originally a part of Granville. Prior to this time several circuits had been established in North Carolina, the first one—the Carolina—in 1776. By 1780 all of Granville County was probably in the Tar River Circuit, although part of it might have been in New Hope. Grissom, *Hist. of Methodism in N. C.*, I, 48, 64, 66-67, 94, 97, 109-16, 121-22.

[54] Jarratt, *Devereux Jarratt*, pp. 97-98; *CRNC*, IX, 1003-04; Gewehr, *The Great Awakening*, pp. 138-39.

[55] Jarratt, *Devereux Jarratt*, p. 97; *CRNC*, IX, 1003-04; Pattillo to Pettigrew, December 13, 1788, Pettigrew Papers.

[56] Grissom, *Hist. of Methodism in N. C.*, I, 48; Francis Asbury, *The Journal of the Reverend Francis Asbury, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church from August 7, 1771, to December 7, 1815* (New York, 1821), (cited hereinafter as *Journal*), I, 291-98.

In June, 1780, Bishop Francis Asbury, the "founder, organizer, and apostle of the Methodist Church in the United States" and one of the most indefatigable circuit riders of all time,[57] made the first of many trips to Granville. Traveling constantly, preaching whenever and wherever people would listen, he did much to stimulate the spread of Methodism in the county.

The degree to which the new religion had taken hold is in some measure reflected by the size of the crowds attending his services. At the home of a Mr. Jenkins, in the Nutbush section, for example, Asbury "spoke very plainly to about eighty people"; at the Nutbush Chapel he found about 150 persons, the representatives of "a broken society"; at the Tabernacle near Nutbush he preached to "about four hundred people, rich and poor," who, he feared, would have to "be awakened by judgements"; at a certain Mr. Turner's he had "eighty or ninety" hearers, many of whom "were stirred up"; at "Cooper's on Tar River" he conducted services for "about one hundred and twenty people" who had "heard Baptists and Presbyterians, but . . . to little purpose"; and at "Paschal's," in the southern part of the county, he "spoke very close and plain . . . to about thirty people, and had but very little faith in them."[58]

Although he was hospitably received and his services generally well attended, Asbury was not altogether pleased with the progress of Methodism in the Granville region. There were too many "Gospel slighters." In his entire ministry, he said, he had never encountered "so many difficulties" as he had "met with" in Tar River Circuit. There was "a hardness over the people here; they have had the gospel preached by Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists, and the two former appear to be too much in the spirit of the world." On the other hand, he found that there was "some life amongst some of the Methodists"; and he prophesied that they would "grow because they preach[ed] growing doctrines."[59] When he returned in 1784, he rejoiced to find that his prediction was being fulfilled. "I have had great times in Tar-River Circuit [he wrote]; the congregations have been large and living, more so than in any circuit I have passed through since I crossed the Patomac [*sic*]."[60]

Twenty years later he still had cause for thanksgiving. As he de-

[57] Grissom, *Hist. of Methodism in N. C.*, I, 84-85.

[58] Asbury, *Journal*, I, 292-97.

[59] *Ibid.*, I, 292, 295-96. Asbury's moods varied in accordance with the nature of the weather and the state of his health as well as the receptivity of his hearers. On one occasion when he was in the Granville area he reflected that "No people make you more welcome in their houses than these; but is Christ welcome in their hearts? I am sensible of the want of more religion among them." *Ibid.*, II, 238.

[60] *Ibid.*, I, 366. A few days before he made this observation about Tar River Circuit, Asbury had preached twice at Pope's Chapel in Granville. He noted that one of the services there had closed with a "short, simple, living, love-feast." *Ibid.*, I, 365-66.

parted from Granville in 1804, after one of his frequent visits, he wrote that "It is cordial to my spirit to reflect, that although we had but one preacher on that ancient and good circuit of Tar [River], and that one was a young one, and esteemed by some . . . [to possess only] moderate abilities, that his labours have been signally blest: it is true, the local brethren helped faithfully; and there were some good seasons at camp-meetings. My mind has great peace and consolation in God."[61]

Thus, as the nineteenth century began, the work of the Methodist pioneers was paying rich dividends in the Granville area. Within three decades after the first circuit rider appeared the church had gained such strength that it was challenging the Presbyterians and Baptists for leadership in this part of the North Carolina back-country. The rapid spread of Methodism did not mean that the other churches had become apathetic, however. Only the Episcopalians, demoralized by the severance of the old tie with England and unable to adapt to the new evangelical Christianity, lacked vigour. The Presbyterians and Baptists, stimulated by the post-revolutionary phase of the Great Awakening in Virginia as well as by the impetus of Methodism itself,[62] renewed their evangelical zeal and competed with a good deal of success.

In attempting to meet the challenge of the times the evangelical churches of Granville moved in unison with their neighbors. In the years following the Revolution revivalism, resurgent and dynamic, stirred the Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian churches of North Carolina and Virginia generally, and at the turn of the century North Carolina and Virginia revivalism blended into the great evangelical movement which swept the nation.

In spite of the prevalence of acute sectarianism in Granville, there were, in the period following the Revolution, occasional evidences of interdenominational cooperation. For several decades, for example, the Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists maintained a community church at Providence on Tar River, several miles southwest of Oxford. As the result of a plan initiated by one William Webb, a Presbyterian who had moved from Grassy Creek to Tar River, the Providence church was established in 1793 "for the ministers of all religious Societies to preach in." Until 1823, when it was reorganized as a Presbyterian congregation, it was conducted on an interdenominational basis. One of the many clergymen who preached there during this period was John Chavis, "a coloured but Educated Presbyterian Preacher, then living about 20 miles distant." In 1811 the Reverend Mr. Chavis, who also served the whites as a schoolmaster, was engaged to supply the church for a year, "but after coming a few sabbaths, & not receiving such familiar &

[61] Asbury, *Journal,* III, 151.

[62] Gewehr, *The Great Awakening,* pp. 167-86; Johnson, *Ante-Bellum North Carolina,* pp. 371-409.

hospitable Entertainment as was desirable & necessary he discontinued his visits."[63]

[63] "History of the Providence and Sharon Presbyterian Churches," in The Session Book of the Geneva Presbyterian Church, pp. 1-3. In 1823 Providence was reorganized as the Sharon Church. Again, in 1833, it was reorganized under the name of Geneva, which it still has.

By 1800 individuals of other faiths than the four treated in this discussion were probably residing in Granville, but so far as is known there were no organized congregations of any other denomination.

II

MAKING A REVOLUTION: THE NORTH CAROLINA WHIGS, 1765-1775[1]

By Charles Grier Sellers, Jr.

The American Revolution was not simply born out of some ineluctable historical necessity, but made. Like other revolutions, it was made by "an active, able, and far from infinitesimal minority working on a large majority group with grievances enough to be stirred up effectively when the time came."[2] Without minimizing the underlying conditions that made their activities possible, it is still important to ask just how the original American Whigs managed to push the inert and often hostile mass of their fellow provincials into a successful war against the mother country. This question is usually answered by reference to the chain of events that led from the Stamp Act Congress and the Sons of Liberty, through Sam Adams' propaganda and the provincial committees of correspondence, to the first Continental Congress and Lexington-Concord. Yet the decision for revolution was not made at the continental level, or even in Massachusetts or Virginia. The general pattern of Whig motives and tactics was actually a mosaic of different patterns, which must be studied at the provincial level.

North Carolina developed in particularly clearcut form one of the most important of these patterns. Here the Revolution was made by a close-knit and long intrenched provincial ruling class, representing the well-to-do planters in the tidewater counties, most of the merchants and professional men in the port towns, and the office-holding cliques in the interior counties. Here the Revolution was, more obviously than in most colonies, merely the culminating episode in a long campaign by these men to maintain their right to manage provincial affairs in their own way and for their own benefit. Here the Whig leaders encountered unusually stiff internal opposition. And here a disciplined province-wide organization, skillful propaganda, and a none too gentle campaign of coercion and intimidation were necessary to commit the province to armed rebellion.

Since the seventeenth century the North Carolina politicians had battled with the London authorities and their representatives, the gov-

[1] This essay is a revision of a paper written for Professor Newsome's seminar at Chapel Hill in 1948.

[2] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, 1938), p. 105. See also Philip G. Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution 1763-1783* (Chapel Hill, 1941), pp. xv-xvi, 1-37.

ernors, over every conceivable aspect of provincial policy. Years before the British government embarked on its New Imperial Policy of taxation and increased control, one governor had been alarmed by the "republican spirit of Independency rising in this colony." The assembly, he said, "think themselves entitled to all the Privileges of a British House of Commons and therefore ought not to submit to His Majesty's honble. Privy Council . . . or . . . Governor and Council here whose person they would usurp and place all in a Junto of an Assembly here."[3] Thus the North Carolina leaders were prepared to meet the first hints of the New Imperial Policy with a prompt assertion of "our Inherent right and Exclusive privilege of Imposing our own Taxes."[4] These bold words they reinforced with violent action when the Stamp Act became law in 1765.

The Stamp Act demonstrations were the beginning of North Carolina's participation in the continental resistance movement, and in this first skirmish the Whig leaders began to develop the techniques they would later use so effectively. Strong resentment of the stamp law seems to have been confined largely to the provincial politicians at first, but their tactics resulted in the stopping of ocean borne commerce and the closing of the courts, which spread disorder and excitement throughout the province. The populace was actively enlisted for agitation only in the wealthy lower Cape Fear valley, where many of the provincial leaders resided. Here, at Wilmington, North Carolina's only aggressive Sons of Liberty group set mobs to marching, burned effigies, insulted the governor, and intimidated the stamp officials into resigning, all under the guidance of Cornelius Harnett and other politicians who were to be conspicuous in later revolutionary activity.[5]

Following repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766, North Carolina's drift toward revolution was impelled mainly by local questions, and only with the Intolerable Acts of 1774 did continental-imperial issues again come to the fore. The Townshend Duty Act of 1767 did afford the assemblymen an occasion to assure Massachusetts that they would "ever be ready to unite with their sister colonies in pursuing every constitutional measure for redress of the grievance so justly complained of."[6] And when Governor William Tryon dissolved the assembly to prevent it from endorsing Virginia's suggestion for a continental non-importation movement, the members eagerly seized the opportunity to defy his excellency by meeting in extra-legal convention and promising North Carolina's adherence.

[3] William L. Saunders, ed., *The Colonial Records of North Carolina* (Raleigh, 1886-1890), VI, 279.

[4] *Ibid.*, VI, 1261.

[5] C. Robert Haywood, "The Mind of the North Carolina Opponents of the Stamp Act," *North Carolina Historical Review*, XXIX (July, 1952), 317-43.

[6] Boston *Evening Post*, May 15, 1769, quoted in Robert D. W. Connor, *Cornelius Harnett: an Essay in North Carolina History* (Raleigh, 1909), p. 51.

North Carolinians made little effort to enforce non-importation, however, except on the Cape Fear, and here the movement was important mainly for its perfection of a form of organization and coercive techniques that would eventually spread over the province and carry the revolutionary movement through its decisive stage. Reactivating the Sons of Liberty, Cornelius Harnett and his associates organized a general committee for a six-county area and appointed special committees of inspection for each county and town, to advertise for boycotting any merchant who imported proscribed goods. But even here the Whigs were still unprepared to use stronger methods, and enforcement broke down with repeal of all the duties except the one on tea.[7]

The collapse of the non-importation movement is not surprising, since during the later 1760's the North Carolina leaders were preoccupied with a threat to their control more serious than that emanating from London. The backcountry farmers, long oppressed by corrupt courthouse rings and recently inspired by the example of the tidewater leaders in the Stamp Act crisis, had at last resorted to a violent campaign for redress of their grievances. "While the sons of Liberty withstood the Lords in Parliament in behalf of true Liberty, let not Officers under them carry on unjust Oppression in our own Province," declared these embattled Regulators. "While men are men though you should see all those Sons of Liberty (who has just now redeemed us from tyranny) set in Office and vested with power they would soon corrupt again and oppress if they were not called upon to give an account of their Stewardship."[8] Thoroughly frightened by the breakdown of tax collection and the mobbing of courts, the erstwhile Sons of Liberty quickly made peace with Governor Tryon and officered the provincial army that marched into the backcountry and crushed the dissident farmers in pitched battle at Alamance Creek.

While dealing with the Regulators, the provincial leaders got further practice in techniques for imposing their policies on a divided populace. At the important port town of New Bern the grand jury drew up an "association" or agreement, "solemnly engaging to support Government against the Insurgents, at the Risk of their Lives and Fortunes," which was signed by the governor, the members of the council, the speaker of the assembly, the grand jurymen, and (less voluntarily perhaps) "a great Number of others."[9] After the victory at Alamance, a group of "gentlemen" in New Bern called a public meeting to denounce and hang in effigy a Massachusetts editor who had shown sympathy for the Regulators. Meanwhile, in an adjoining tidewater county, the troops

[7] Connor, *Cornelius Harnett,* pp. 55-58; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776* (New York, 1918), pp. 209-10.
[8] Quoted in Haywood, "N. C. Opponents of the Stamp Act." p. 341.
[9] Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), Mar. 28, 1771.

returning from Alamance court-martialled ten men suspected of Regulator sympathies and had them "severely flogged at the Halberts."[10]

One significant result of the Regulator troubles was an alliance between the tidewater leaders and an important element in the backcountry, the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians. Governor Tryon and the assembly sought to woo this influential group at the first sign of disaffection in the backcountry by passing laws enabling Presbyterian ministers to perform marriages and granting a long sought charter for a Presbyterian academy in backcountry Mecklenburg County. "What was this for," the Regulators bitterly complained, "but to bring over the Presbyterians to [the governor's] side, against their Brethren of other Denominations?" "And with the same spirit," they charged, "the Gov. gives Commissions making one Col. Alexander, and another Capt. Alexander and another Alexander Esq. Justice of the Peace, &c. &c.—and all this to take in a large body of Presbyterians . . . that they might be ready Tools of the Junto, to serve as Pack-horses, to do their drudgery."[11] But such complaints did not prevent sizeable militia forces from volunteering in the Presbyterian counties for the expedition against their embattled neighbors, and with the Presbyterian adhesion, North Carolina's Whig coalition was complete.

The crushing of the insurrection and the tactful Governor Tryon's departure for another post ended abruptly the unnatural spirit of cooperation between governor and assembly. During the years 1771-1773, the provincial leaders revived the old pattern of contention with the governor over local issues, but their demands became increasingly unreasonable and were pressed with unprecedented truculence.

North Carolinians of all classes did have one legitimate and serious grievance: the British refusal to permit the province to continue issuing paper money. By 1768 the Virginia newspapers were reporting "great disturbances" to the south over this question; some counties were without sheriffs because no one would undertake the impossible task of collecting taxes where money had virtually disappeared; and even Governor Tryon admitted that great suffering had resulted.[12] Tryon managed to keep the politicians in hand on this question, but under his successor, Josiah Martin, the assembly discovered that it could retain some of the old notes in circulation simply by refusing to continue the tax for retiring them. After an acrimonious controversy, Governor Martin ordered the sheriffs to collect this sinking fund tax anyhow, while the assembly

[10] *Ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1771.

[11] [Hermon Husband?] "A Fan for Fanning and a Touch-Stone to Tryon," in William K. Boyd, ed., *Some Eighteenth Century Tracts Concerning North Carolina* (Raleigh, 1927), p. 348. For an account of concessions to the Presbyterians, see Paul Conkin, "The Church Establishment in North Carolina, 1765-1776," *North Carolina Historical Review*, XXXII (Jan., 1955), 1-30.

[12] Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), May 12, July 14, 1768; Feb. 9, 1769.

promised to indemnify any officers who suffered for noncompliance with the governor's directions.[13]

It was not the genuinely burdensome ban on paper money, however, that crystallized revolutionary sentiment in North Carolina, but a question of slight practical import: whether the provincial courts should have the power to attach for debt the North Carolina property of persons living in England. A prolonged controversy over the powers of the royally appointed chief justice had prevented enactment of a permanent court law, and just before the temporary law expired in 1773, the London authorities forbade Governor Martin to approve any new court law containing the attachment clause. Consequently the assembly refused to pass a court law at all, the courts were compelled to close, and disorder spread across the province. Tempers mounted when the governor created a special criminal court by proclamation, only to see it destroyed by the assembly's refusal to pay the judge's salaries. In 1774 the assembly did authorize county courts and a criminal court, but the law was carelessly drawn, and the criminal court collapsed when its technical defects were challenged.[14]

Since the debts of Englishmen to North Carolinians could not have been extensive, it is impossible to credit the assembly leaders' justification of their reckless course on the ground that attachment was "so essential to the Interest of this Province."[15] Actually, a heavy balance of debt went the other way, and the closing of the courts, ostensibly part of a campaign to help North Carolinians collect from their English debtors, in fact relieved indebted North Carolinians from the necessity of paying their English creditors. The suspension of judicial processes "appeared to proceed from a principle of dishonesty," declared the citizens of Halifax, an interior trading town many of whose merchants represented British firms.[16] Halifax instructed its assemblyman to oppose the attachment clause, and declared it to be "unjust, ruinous to individuals, and prejudicial not only to this Town, but the Province in general."[17]

Throughout the backcountry, where British credit rarely penetrated,

[13] Charles L. Raper, *North Carolina: a Study in English Colonial Government* (New York, 1904), p. 240.

[14] Samuel A. Ashe, *History of North Carolina* (Greensboro and Raleigh, 1908-1925), I, 396-414.

[15] Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), Apr. 15, 1773. It is true that one of the leading politicians, Abner Nash, benefitted from attachment in an important case then going through the courts. Having married Governor Arthur Dobbs' widow, Nash was engaged in a dispute with Dobbs' English heirs over the considerable estate, much of it in North Carolina lands. But the opposing attorney was William Hooper, an equally important leader of the assembly party and an equally adamant champion of attachment. In any event, a single case could hardly have caused such repercussions. *Colonial Records,* IX, 995-96; Archibald M. Hooper, "Life of William Hooper, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," *North Carolina Booklet,* II (July, 1905), 51.

[16] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1040-41.

[17] Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), Mar. 31, 1774.

the closing of the courts "caused many murmurs among the people,"[18] and Governor Martin's specially commissioned criminal courts were warmly welcomed for the protection they afforded "from that licentiousness and Outrage which but too soon appeared after the shutting up our Courts of Law."[19] Backcountry assemblymen voted almost solidly, though in vain, for a compromise attachment clause that would permit the courts to reopen.[20]

The assembly's curious intransigence over this insubstantial issue cannot be explained simply as a conspiracy to avoid payment of debts. Rather it was the logical culmination of the long campaign for provincial autonomy, brought to a high pitch of emotional intensity in the 1770's by local factors and by a simultaneous stiffening of general colonial opinion against British authority. The closing of the courts was merely an incidental gain for indebted North Carolina planters.

One of the important local factors was Governor Josiah Martin. Martin was an intelligent, conscientious, fair-minded man, but he was also notably blunt and obstinate in upholding British authority. He "did much harm in North Carolina by insisting so strongly upon the prerogatives of the King," a neutral contemporary observed, "and by talking of it so constantly that it gave great offense."[21] Martin did not help himself with the assembly, either, by adopting a conciliatory policy toward the former Regulators. These "wretched people," he discovered, had "been provoked by insolence and cruel advantages taken of the people by mercenary tricking Attornies, Clerks and other little Officers, who have practiced upon them every sort of rapine and extortion"; whereupon "the resentment of Government was craftily worked up against the oppressed, and the protection which the oppressors treacherously acquired, where the injured and ignorant people expected to find it, drove them to acts of desperation."[22] Martin did everything he could to protect the demoralized rebels from further punishment, and they reported gleefully to one of their exiled leaders that the new governor was exposing corrupt and extortionate officials, "to the great grief and shame of our gentry." As a result, "our officers hate him as bad as we hated Tryon, only they don't speak so free."[23]

With animosity toward Governor Martin mounting, personal and sectional rivalries within the assembly party intensified the revolutionary spirit. The governor observed that aspiring politicians were trying to outdo each other in "clamour against Government," so as "to acquire

[18] Adelaide L. Fries and Douglas L. Rights, eds., *Records of the Moravians in North Carolina* (Raleigh, 1922-1954), II, 808.

[19] Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie and Dixon), Aug. 12, 1773.

[20] *Colonial Records*, IX, 902.

[21] *Moravian Records*, II, 808.

[22] *Colonial Records*, IX, 330.

[23] James Hunter to William Butler, Nov. 6, 1772, quoted in Ashe, *History of N. C.*, I, 404-05.

an interest in the Assembly,"[24] and by early 1773 a radical anti-Martin, anti-British faction was taking shape. In March a visitor to the Cape Fear discovered the existence of a radical cabal, "a select number who had mutually agreed and solemnly promised each other to keep each a regular journal not only of the public occurrences, but of the conduct of every public character." This same man was somewhat surprised to learn that William Hooper, whom he had known six years before in Boston, was "apparently in the Whig interest, has taken that side in the house, is caressed by the Whigs, and is now pushing his election through the influence of that party."[25]

Meanwhile the most uncompromising demands for the attachment clause were coming from the Cape Fear area.[26] Governor Martin finally concluded that, although a few politicians honestly thought the attachment issue important, and others saw in it a way to escape their creditors, the main impulse behind the agitation was the candidacy of Samuel Johnston and John Ashe for the province's two lucrative treasurerships. The long standing rivalries between the three tidewater centers of wealth and influence had already spurred men like Samuel Johnston and Joseph Hewes from Edenton in the Albemarle Sound country and Isaac Edwards and Richard Cogdell of New Bern to keep pace with the aggressive Cape Fear radicals, Cornelius Harnett, Robert Howe, William Hooper, and John Ashe. And now the Albemarle men had joined hands with the Cape Fear men to elect Ashe and Johnston. They had pressed the attachment question "as an engine to gain weight and popularity in the Assembly," and also to discredit one of the incumbent treasurers who had made the mistake of serving as judge of the governor's special criminal court.[27]

The attachment controversy had just reached fever pitch when the North Carolina leaders made contact with Sam Adams' movement to unite all the colonies in resistance to British regulation. Operating through the Boston town meeting during the winter of 1772-1773, Adams had organized a network of Whig committees of correspondence covering eighty-odd Massachusetts towns. On March 12, 1773, the Virginia Burgesses proposed a system of similar provincial correspondence committees to the other colonies. Sixteen days later Adams' emissary, Josiah Quincy, Jr., reached the Cape Fear to sound out the North Carolina politicians.

Quincy's arrival could not have been better timed. Just three weeks before, the governor and assembly had reached an impasse over attach-

[24] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1051.

[25] Mark A. DeWolfe Howe, ed., "Southern Journal of Josiah Quincy, Junior, 1773," Massachusetts Historical Society, *Proceedings,* Third Series, XLIX (1916), 458, 460.

[26] Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), Mar. 10, 1774.

[27] *Colonial Records,* IX, 966, 1053.

ment, and the members had gone home angrily defying the governor's demand that they reconvene. The courts had closed, taxes could not be collected, business was grinding to a halt, and the Cape Fear radicals were ripe for rebellion. Small wonder, then, that Quincy found "the plan of Continental correspondence highly relished, much wished for and resolved upon, as proper to be pursued."[28] With scarcely a ripple to indicate what was happening, North Carolina's brawling little tributary of provincial conflict flowed into the broadening stream of the continental resistance movement.

The North Carolinians did not get to appoint their correspondence committee until Governor Martin finally called the assembly back into session in December. Even then local issues remained primary. The Tea Act of 1773, which caused such a furor elsewhere, was hardly noticed in North Carolina, and according to an observer in the backcountry, "most of the people considered the acts of the other Colonies as madness."[29] It was the attachment question that kept the revolutionary pot boiling ever higher. The assembly's committee to state its position on attachment was practically identical with the committee of correspondence, and the list of men who served on both—Cornelius Harnett, Robert Howe, William Hooper, John Ashe, Richard Caswell, Joseph Hewes, and Samuel Johnston—reads like a roster of the revolutionary high command in North Carolina.[30]

Yet the politicians' temper had been subtly affected by their coalescence with the continental resistance movement. As early as the summer of 1773, one leader, disturbed by "the distresses of the times . . . under a suspension of judicial proceedings," was thinking of a solution only in continental terms. The colonies, he declared, "have too sacred a regard to what they esteem their undoubted birthright, tamely to surrender it to the command of any tribunal under heaven."[31]

With this change in temper came a shift in tactics. Up to now the excitement had been confined mainly to the politicians, but with a decisive struggle over the fundamental imperial relationship taking shape, they would need wider support. The suspension of courts had let loose an orgy of "robbery, murder, stealing of horses and swine, and the counterfeiting of both paper and hard money," and the resulting unrest, according to the peace-loving Moravians, "permits the turbulent spirit to increase greatly." The "turbulent spirit" they had in mind was political, for it was the more radical Whigs who "tried constantly to increase" the unrest and turn it against Governor Martin and the British govern-

[28] "Journal of Josiah Quincy," p. 460.
[29] *Moravian Records,* II, 808.
[30] *Colonial Records,* IX, 741, 875.
[31] Jo. Seawell Jones, *A Defence of the Revolutionary History of the State of North Carolina from the Aspersions of Mr. Jefferson* (Boston and Raleigh, 1834), p. 122.

ment.[32] In fact, the desire of the bolder spirits to maintain the chaotic conditions under which their agitation was flourishing may have prevented a compromise on the attachment issue.

In the backcountry, "the Presbyterian Party" blew "strong and hot" on the court question and "undermined the influence of Governor Martin from time to time,"[33] while all over the province lawyers, bereft of their regular employment, turned their energies to agitation.[34] And soon there were signs that the proscriptive tactics of Stamp Act and non-importation days were being revived. When, at the end of 1773, Governor Martin irately dismissed another assembly without reaching agreement on a court law, or any law for that matter, the Whig press denounced the "designing persons" who had misled the governor, "and who, if they could be known should be treated as Enemies to their Country."[35]

North Carolina's revolutionary movement entered its decisive stage early in 1774, with Governor Martin's dissolution of still another assembly over the attachment issue. The venerable John Harvey, speaker of the assembly and grand old man of provincial politics, was enraged when Martin's secretary told him that the governor was resolved not to call a new assembly until he could get a compliant one. On his journey home, Harvey was "in a very violent mood," and urged his traveling companion, Samuel Johnston, to join him in "assembling a convention independent of the governor." He would "issue handbills under his own name," the speaker said hotly, and "the committee of correspondence ought to go to work at once."

Johnston promptly passed these sentiments along to his Cape Fear colleagues on the correspondence committee. "Without courts to sustain the property and to exercise the talents of the country, and the people alarmed and dissatisfied," he wrote to William Hooper, "we must do something to save ourselves."[36] The old speaker's vehemence was music to the ears of the Cape Fear radicals, and within two weeks Hooper was telling friends that the colonies *"are striding fast to independence, and ere long will build an empire upon the ruin of Great Britain."*[37]

At this juncture, just when the local controversy over attachment had brought the provincial politicians to the verge of radical action, outside influences again broke in to sweep them past the point of return. In May, North Carolinians learned that an exasperated Parliament had

[32] *Moravian Records,* II, 808, 818.
[33] *Ibid.,* II, 755, 808.
[34] Jones, *Revolutionary History of N. C.,* pp. 122-24; Hooper, "William Hooper," p. 52; Griffith J. McRee, *Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, One of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States* (New York, 1858), I, 197.
[35] Wilmington *Cape-Fear Mercury,* Dec. 29, 1773.
[36] Jones, *Revolutionary History of N. C.,* p. 124.
[37] McRee, *James Iredell,* I, 197.

closed the port of Boston in retaliation for the famous Tea Party. Hard on the heels of this news came word of other "Intolerable Acts" and resolutions from the northern colonies suggesting non-importation and a continental congress. The committee of correspondence promptly endorsed these proposals and sped them on to South Carolina.[38]

Then the committee hesitated. Governor Martin had intimated that an assembly might be called for the end of July, and perhaps the more conservative Albemarle men hung back from the radical step of assembling a convention. At this point, matters were taken in charge by Cornelius Harnett, wealthy merchant and planter, veteran assemblyman, organizer of the Sons of Liberty, and architect of the committee system in the non-importation movement, who fully merited Josiah Quincy's description as "the Samuel Adams of North Carolina except in point of fortune."[39] On July 21 a meeting at Wilmington sent out a call to all counties and towns, urging them to elect delegates to a provincial convention, which in turn would choose delegates to the Continental Congress. "We consider the cause of Boston as the common cause of British America," announced the Cape Fear men.[40]

The assembling of North Carolina's first provincial convention at New Bern on August 25, 1774, was a major victory for the radical Whigs, since the provincial ruling class was now openly committed to their aggressive program. But it was still far from certain that the politicians could carry the province with them, especially if, as seemed increasingly likely, a resort to force became necessary. Whig strength was concentrated in two areas. One was a band of planting counties bordering the coast and reaching up the Neuse and Roanoke valleys in the northern half of the province, while the other comprised the Presbyterian counties of Mecklenburg and Rowan far to the west.

The majority of North Carolina's white population, however, lived in the intervening neutralist-loyalist zone. Sprawling Cumberland County on the upper Cape Fear was filled with recently settled Scottish Highlanders, attached to the king and ready to fight. Westward and northward from the Highlander country, in a broad band of counties stretching from Anson on the South Carolina line to Orange, Guilford, and Surry bordering Virginia, German settlers turned deaf ears to Whig agitation and former Regulators cherished hatred for the Whig politicians. Still farther west, beyond the frontier line, the warlike Cherokee were becoming ominously belligerent under the influence of a skillful British agent. So strong was loyalist sentiment that for seven months

[38] Walter Clark, ed., *The State Records of North Carolina* (Winston and Goldsboro, 1897-1905), XI, 245-47.
[39] "Journal of Josiah Quincy," p. 460.
[40] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1016-18.

after the New Bern convention Governor Martin remained confident that he could maintain British sovereignty "in all Events."[41]

Whig anxiety over the difficulty of winning firm control in North Carolina was evident in every action of the first provincial convention. The New Bern assemblage declared, for example, that all acts of the Continental Congress approved by the delegates from North Carolina—William Hooper, Richard Caswell, and Joseph Hewes—would be "Obligatory in honour upon every inhabitant thereof who is not an alien to his Country's good and an apostate to the liberties of America." A non-importation association was the most important of these anticipated continental acts, but it was more with an eye to the impending contest for supremacy in North Carolina than to the continental economic campaign against Great Britain that the New Bern convention proceeded to draw up its own non-importation association. This was clear from the additional resolution that "a Committee of five persons be chosen in each County by such persons as acceed [*sic*] to this association to take care that these Resolves be properly observed and to correspond occasionally with the Provincial Committee of Correspondence of this Province."[42] In other words, the association was to be the test of allegiance, and the test was to be applied by a province-wide network of committees, like those used on the Cape Fear in 1770. The fate of the revolutionary movement in North Carolina would depend on these committees, and the Cape Fear precedents indicated that, persuasion and propaganda failing, the ultimate weapons would be coercion and intimidation.

A few committees had been appointed at the county meetings to choose delegates to the provincial convention in August, but a concerted organizing drive got underway only after the delegates returned home, and received further impetus from the promulgation of the Continental Association in October. The Continental Congress spelled out the committees' functions in some detail, resolving that they should

> observe the conduct of all persons touching this association; and when it shall be made to appear, to the satisfaction of a majority of any such committee, that any person within the limits of their appointment has violated this association, that such majority do forthwith cause the truth of the case to be published in the gazette; to the end, that all such foes to the rights of British-America may be publicly known and universally contemned as the enemies of American liberty; and thenceforth we respectively will break off all dealing with him or her.[43]

[41] *Ibid.*, IX, 1228; Robert O. DeMond, *The Loyalists in North Carolina during the Revolution* (Durham, 1940), *passim.*

[42] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1043-48.

[43] Worthington C. Ford, *et al.*, eds., *Journals of the Continental Congress* (Washington, 1904-1937), I, 79-80.

Organization came first in the Whig strongholds, of course, but these committees had no sooner got into operation than the revolutionary ardor seemed to ebb in the province at large. Though additional committees were formed adjacent to the Whig centers during the fall and winter of 1774-1775, some of them were clearly short-lived, most were relatively inactive, and none at all were to be found in the neutralist-loyalist area.[44] The only really active committees seem to have been those at the port towns of Wilmington, Edenton, and New Bern, and in the counties of Pitt, Halifax, and Rowan. Rowan was a Presbyterian stronghold in the backcountry, Pitt was a prosperous tidewater county near New Bern, and the planters in the upper Roanoke valley seem to have organized the Halifax County committee to keep the loyalist merchants in the town of Halifax under control.[45]

Where they were effectively organized, however, the Whig radicals redoubled their efforts to arouse their fellow provincials. During the summer and fall of 1774 they sought to dramatize British tyranny by collecting donations for the beleaguered victims of the Boston Port Bill. The Cape Fear men, in sending out their call for the New Bern convention, had appealed for aid "to the poor Artizans and Labourers" of Boston, who were "suffering in defence of the Rights of the colonies in general," and reported that a shipload of provisions had already been contributed in the Wilmington area.[46] The sum of eight hundred pounds was subscribed in a few days, and "Even those from whom another conduct was expected . . . surprised the world by a zeal for the service of our suffering brethren in Boston." A Brunswick merchant offered a sloop to carry the three hundred barrels of supplies to Massachusetts, and the captain and crew volunteered their services without charge.[47]

From the Edenton area, John Harvey dispatched over two thousand bushels of corn, twenty-two barrels of flour, and seventeen barrels of pork to Boston in September; while the committee at New Bern was collecting corn, peas, pork, and other articles, as well as money, throughout the winter. The Pitt committee received money contributions as late as May, 1775, and a little earlier it had ordered three men to appear

[44] The incomplete records contain brief references for this period to committees in Anson, Beaufort, Brunswick, Carteret, Duplin, Johnston, Northampton, and Onslow counties. New Bern *North-Carolina Gazette*, Jan. 13, May 12, 1775; *Colonial Records*, IX, 1031-32, 1128, 1236-38.

[45] *Colonial Records*, IX, 1072, 1075, 1116, 1133; Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), Jan. 12, 1775; Thomas Loring, ed., *Proceedings of the Safety Committee: for the Town of Wilmington, N. C. in 1774, 1775 and 1776—Printed from the Original Record* (Raleigh, 1844), p. 3.

[46] *Colonial Records*, IX, 1017.

[47] *Ibid.*, IX, 1018; McRee, *James Iredell*, I, 201; Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), Sept. 1, 1774; "Correspondence in 1774 and 1775, between a Committee of the Town of Boston and Contributors of Donations for the Relief of the Sufferers by the Boston Port Bill," Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections*, Fourth Series, IV (1858), 22-28, 88.

and explain why they had been obstructing collections for Boston. In the interior, transportation difficulties prevented the collection of provisions, while the scattered efforts to raise funds for Boston relief were probably frustrated by the chronic shortage of money.[48]

With publication of the Continental Association in October, enforcement of its provisions replaced Boston relief as the primary committee activity. The only provision that took effect immediately was the ban on consumption of East India tea. As early as August a Brunswick merchant had refused to accept a shipment of tea on the ground that "the people would not suffer it to be landed."[49] In the backcountry, apparently as a result of agitation by the Rowan committee, the Moravian leaders stopped tea sales at the community store and advised their followers to "be careful about buying and drinking tea, so that they do not give occasion for criticism to travelers or visitors."[50]

The general non-importation provisions of the Association became effective on December 1, and enforcement necessarily fell to the seaport committees. Incomplete records indicate that the Edenton committee took this responsibility seriously, and the New Bern committee probably did also, but the fullest picture of the enforcement system survives in the records for Wilmington. Initially the committee seized all imports from Great Britain and sold them at auction, with the substantial profits going into the Boston relief fund. After February the banned goods could not be landed at all.[51]

The best testimony to the effectiveness of the seaport committees was the marked decline in North Carolina's imports. Simultaneously exports showed a notable increase, as merchants and planters sought to clear their debts to British firms before non-exportation took effect in September, 1775. With goods becoming scarce, the committees turned more of their attention to enforcing the Association's ban on profiteering, and here the interior committees were also active.[52] The Pitt committee threatened public denunciation of those who sold salt for more than a specified "fair price," and the Rowan committee was constantly passing judgment on violators of its price regulations. One culprit was compelled to post bond that he would not raise the price on his substantial stock of

[48] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1033, 1081, 1116, 1154, 1281; "Correspondence between Boston and Contributors," pp. 85-86.

[49] William Hill to Messrs. Kelly and Co., Aug. 17, 1774, quoted in Ashe, *History of N. C.,* I, 426.

[50] *Moravian Records,* II, 895.

[51] *Wilmington Committee Proceedings,* 6-28; *Colonial Records,* IX, 1134-35; Samuel Johnston to Joseph Hewes, Apr. 2, 1775, Typescript Copies from the Hayes Collection, N. C. Department of Archives and History, Raleigh. The New Bern *North-Carolina Gazette,* Jan. 13, 1775, reported the seizure and sale of a shipment of British goods by a committee in Carteret County near New Bern.

[52] *Moravian Records,* II, 846; Charles Christopher Crittenden, *The Commerce of North Carolina 1763-1789* (New Haven, 1936), pp. 119-20.

powder, and another was advertised in the *South-Carolina Gazette* as "an Enemy of the common cause of Liberty."[53]

The association's clause denouncing extravagence and dissipation prompted the North Carolina committees to ban many forms of entertainment. At Edenton three young men were forced to sign a statement of repentence after being involved in a horse race. At Wilmington the committee prevented one horse race by threatening the participants with public denunciation, and ordered the cancellation of bets on another. Dancing in public houses was prohibited, as were billiard tables and private balls. One hostess was ordered to recall invitations on the very day her ball was to be held.[54]

Whatever effect all these activities had as part of the continental campaign of economic coercion against Great Britain was exceeded by their importance in consolidating Whig control of key areas in North Carolina. While most of the province remained apathetic or hostile during the winter of 1774-1775, the committees in the hotbeds of Whig agitation were using the Association to perfect techniques that would prove decisive the following summer. As early as September, 1774, the Rowan committee denounced as "Enemies to their Country" two men who had circulated an advertisement criticizing the Association.[55] By December the Halifax committee was compelling merchants in the town of Halifax to sign the Association, and one man who refused was forced to change his mind by a committee-sponsored boycott.[56]

A similar effort at New Bern seems to have failed,[57] but the Wilmington Whigs were more successful. On March 1, 1775, the committee members themselves signed resolutions pledging strict observance of the Association and directed that they "be handed to every person in this county and recommended to the committees of the adjacent counties, that those who accede to the said resolves may subscribe their names thereto." The same afternoon the committee went in a body to "wait on all Housekeepers in Town, with the Association before mentioned, and request their signing it, or declare their reasons for refusing, that such Enemies to their Country may be set forth to public view and treated with the contempt they merit."

The next day a doctor, seven merchants, a planter, and two tailors appeared before the committee to explain their refusal to sign; whereupon it was

> Resolved and agreed, That we will have no trade, commerce, dealings, or intercourse whatsoever with the above mentioned persons or any others con-

[53] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1074, 1100; X, 9-10.
[54] *Ibid.,* IX, 1133; *Wilmington Committee Proceedings,* pp. 5-6, 12, 16, 20, 22.
[55] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1074.
[56] *Ibid.,* IX, 1096-97, 1101; Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), Mar. 31, 1775, supp.
[57] Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), Jan. 26, 1775.

nected with them, or with any other person or persons who shall hereafter violate the said association, or refuse to subscribe hereto; but will hold them as unworthy of the rights of freemen and as inimical to the liberties of their country, and we recommend it to the people of this colony in particular, and to the Americans in general, to pursue the same conduct.

This resolution was suspended for six days, however, and during that period eight of the eleven recalcitrants submitted to the committee's demands and signed.[58] Thus, by the spring of 1775, the committees had won complete control of the three important coastal towns and several strategic interior counties.

Governor Martin became increasingly disturbed, and in his address to the assembly in April warmly denounced "the violences these little, unrestrained and arbitrary Tribunals have done to the rights of His Majesty's Subjects."[59] Yet the second provincial convention, which met simultaneously with this assembly, demonstrated that the Whigs still had far to go. Ten counties and two borough towns refused even to elect delegates, and a large number of the delegates elected failed to attend.[60] In many counties, according to Governor Martin, the delegates were chosen by committees of ten or twelve men; and in the rest "they were not chosen to the best of my information by one twentieth part of the people, notwithstanding every act [art?] of persuasion was employed by the Demagogues upon the occasion."[61] One of Surry County's two delegates was a loyalist, and both came instructed "not to mix in the matter of the Bostonians, but instead to bestir themselves to have wholesome laws made for the country."[62]

The convention accomplished almost nothing, in fact, and spent most of its time in a wrangle that alienated one or more counties from the Whig cause. When a resolution endorsing the Association came up, Thomas Macknight, a prominent merchant representing Currituck County, said that he could not vote for it because he owed money to British creditors, which non-exportation would prevent him from paying. Macknight explained that he would support non-importation and non-consumption cheerfully, and would even give "passive obedience" to non-exportation, but he could not honorably vote for a measure that would mean repudiation of his debts. A majority of the delegates were willing to accept his promise to conform, but the radical minority threatened to withdraw unless the convention insisted on complete endorsement of the Association. When Macknight himself finally withdrew, the radicals pushed through a resolution denouncing him as an enemy to American liberty. Disgusted by these "extraordinary, rash, and unwarrantable"

[58] *Wilmington Committee Proceedings,* pp. 21-26.
[59] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1191.
[60] *Ibid.,* IX, 1178-79.
[61] *Ibid.,* IX, 1228.
[62] *Moravian Records,* II, 869.

actions, the entire Currituck delegation and two delegates from neighboring Pasquotank followed Macknight out of the convention. The Pasquotank committee later defended Macknight against the convention's charges, while Currituck seems never thereafter to have had a functioning committee.[63]

Governor Martin concluded that the royal government was safe for the present, but he warned the British authorities that "the movements of this part of the continent will be governed by the impulse of the people of New England."[64] Twice before an impulse from New England had reacted with a crisis in the local attachment controversy to precipitate a major development in North Carolina's drift toward revolution. In the spring of 1773, Josiah Quincy's mission had brought the province into the continental correspondence system. In the spring of 1774, the Boston Port Bill and the proposals for non-importation and a Continental Congress had swept the North Carolina politicians fully into the continental resistance movement and given birth to the local committee system. Now, in the spring of 1775, North Carolina's final decision for revolution was to be triggered by still another impulse from New England—"the shot heard 'round the world."

News of the engagement between British troops and the embattled Massachusetts farmers at Lexington and Concord reached North Carolina on April 26. The news "wrought a great change in the face of things," Governor Martin reported, "confirming the seditious in their evil purposes, and bringing over vast numbers of the fickle, wavering and unsteady multitude to their party."[65] "The *Sword is now drawn,*" trumpeted the Whig press, "and God knows when it will be sheathed."[66] Moderate Whigs were now ready for aggressive action, the established committees girded themselves for stern measures, new committees sprung up overnight, and everywhere the Whigs fell into line behind radical leadership, determined to make a revolution in North Carolina.

The first important result of the burst of excitement was the firm establishment of the committee system in most parts of the province. Even in such counties as Cumberland and Anson, where the Whigs were outnumbered, committees were formed. In Anson the May term of the county court was broken up by arrival of the news of Lexington-Concord, and the Whigs, emboldened by their success in the ensuing riot, called a meeting for the same afternoon and elected a committee.[67]

[63] Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter), May 6, 1775; *Colonial Records*, X, 31-34.
[64] *Colonial Records*, IX, 1167.
[65] *Ibid.*, X, 44.
[66] New Bern *North-Carolina Gazette*, May 12, 1775.
[67] *Colonial Records*, X, 125-26; Archibald Henderson, *The Revolution in North Carolina in 1775: Transylvania, Craven, Anson, and Mecklenburg* (n.p., n.d.), pp. 16-17.

The established committees now made vigorous efforts to organize and strengthen committees in surrounding areas. William Kennan, lawyer and chairman of the aggressive Rowan committee, was practically a walking delegate for the Whigs in the backcountry. In May he shared Mecklenburg's fervent reaction to the news of Lexington-Concord, and apparently helped draft the famous resolutions by which the Mecklenburgers abrogated Crown authority in their county and formally designated the committee as their governing body.[68] In July, at the meeting to elect a committee for the frontier county of Tryon, there was a "General voice for William Kennan, Esquire."[69]

During August Kennan was pushing Whig organization in Surry County, home of the neutralist Moravians and one of the strongest centers of Regulator and loyalist sentiment. Up to this time the Moravians had rejoiced that "all is quiet in our County; no Committee has been organized in it"; and one Moravian writer explained that "the last Regulator Rebellion, which cost many lives and brought many into poverty and need, had made people afraid of hurting themselves again, for the burned child dreads the fire." The Moravians were well aware that the Whigs in adjoining Rowan County "would gladly draw us into their net," and this was precisely what Kennan was now trying to do, by enlisting them to vote for Whig delegates to the forthcoming third provincial convention. Though he failed with the Moravians, the Whigs succeeded in electing their candidates anyhow, and the delegates promptly appointed themselves as a temporary committee for the county.[70]

The Wilmington committee was equally active. The news of Lexington-Concord prompted it to call a meeting of Whigs from all the counties in the area. On June 20 representatives from New Hanover, Brunswick, Bladen, and Duplin counties appeared, and at a similar meeting the following month two additional counties, Cumberland and Onslow, were represented. The Cape Fear radicals frequently presumed to advise and scold their less zealous compatriots. On one occasion they demanded that the Brunswick committee report what it was doing about a vessel supposed to be violating the Association within its jurisdiction; and they censured the New Bern committee for allowing a British account of Lexington-Concord to be published. They had better reason for concern about the Cumberland Whigs, whose leader, Farquard Campbell, eventually took the British side. At one point the Wilmington committee tried to seize all the gunpowder in Cumberland, and by August the Cape Fear men were so suspicious of the Cumberland committee that

[68] William Henry Hoyt, *The Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence* . . . (New York, 1907), pp. 256-58, 284. Contemporary newspapers say that the resolves of May 31 were passed at a meeting of "the Committee," which indicates that Mecklenburg already had a functioning Whig organization.

[69] *Colonial Records,* X, 88.

[70] *Moravian Records,* II, 878-80, 938-39.

they refused to send it any more information unless its members took an oath of secrecy.[71]

Thus, by August, committees were active in at least twenty-six of the thirty-five counties.[72] Wielding the two-edged sword of persuasion and terror, they forced the wavering into line, overawed the dissident, and built up a unified provincial organization capable of waging war. Whig propaganda had been gathering momentum for a long time, of course, but it reached its peak in the summer of 1775. "Every device . . . has been practiced by the seditious Committees to inflame the minds of the Inhabitants of this Country," Governor Martin testified.[73]

The most obvious of these devices was the printed word. North Carolina's two newspapers served as official organs for the Whig cause, their editors being leading committee members at New Bern and Wilmington respectively, and the Wilmington paper appearing under committee subsidy. Besides the newspapers, the committees distributed over the province countless handbills containing battle accounts, resolutions, addresses, and circular letters. Through all these channels the Whigs sought to demonstrate the tyrannical purposes and cruel methods of the British in general and Governor Martin in particular.[74]

The spoken word also bulked large in Whig propaganda, oratory being a staple at Whig meetings.[75] Confronted with the hostility of an entire neighborhood, the Rowan committee sent a delegation to the dissidents "to confer together for their mutual benefit."[76] The militiamen mustering at Wilmington were "harangued by their officers with the implacable cruelty of the king of Great Britain, who had resolved to murder and destroy man, wife, and child, and that he has sworn before God and his parliament that he will not spare one of them." All this, the

[71] *Wilmington Committee Proceedings,* pp. 29-31, 41, 46; *Colonial Records,* IX, 1152; X, 74.

[72] In addition to the committees already mentioned, the records refer to committees in Bertie, Dobbs, Bute, Orange, and Wake counties by the summer of 1775. Samuel Johnston to Joseph Hewes, June 11, 1775, Hayes Collection; New Bern *North-Carolina Gazette,* July 14, 1775; Jones, *Revolutionary History of N. C.,* p. 147; *Wilmington Committee Proceedings,* p. 46; McRee, *James Iredell,* I, 261. No evidence of committee activity before the third provincial congress has been discovered for the counties of Chatham, Currituck, Edgecombe, Guilford, Hyde, Hertford, Martin, Perquimans, or Tyrell. It is likely that a committee existed in Perquimans, home of John Harvey, but unlikely that such was the case in Currituck, where public opinion had been outraged by the treatment of Thomas Macknight, or in Guilford or Chatham, where the Regulators had been strong. Committees or not, the Whigs made slowest progress in the Highlander county of Cumberland and in such Regulator counties as Orange, Chatham, Guilford, and Surry.

[73] *Colonial Records,* X, 232.

[74] *Ibid.,* IX, 1143, 1154-55; X, 14, 20-21, 85-86, 93, 105, 139-40, 152; *Wilmington Committee Proceedings,* pp. 17, 32-35; *Moravian Records,* II, 847, 875-77, 928; Wilmington *Cape-Fear Mercury,* July 28, Aug. 11, 1775.

[75] See for example *Colonial Records.* IX, 1097.

[76] *Ibid.,* IX, 1080.

loyalist observer marvelled, "those deluded people believe more firmly than their creed, and who is it that is bold enough to venture to undeceive them."[77]

By far the most effective propaganda was spread by word of mouth. The Anson Whigs told one loyalist that "Lord North was a Roman Catholick, that the King's crown tottered upon his shoulders, for he had established the Roman Catholick Religion in the Province of Quebeck, and that the King and Parliament did intend to establish Popery on all the Continent of America, and that the King was forsworn." Another rumor had it that "Governor Martin and his damned officers will set the Negroes on to kill us." The people of Rowan were not only threatened with "Popery," but also told that Lord North had already ordered arms for the Indians to use in scourging the frontiers.[78]

What made the Whig propaganda so effective was the threat of force that lay behind it. This alternate Whig weapon was employed first to compel the people generally to subscribe associations, then to deal with recalcitrants, and finally to silence any remaining dissent by precipitating military activity.

Association papers were the key to the Whig campaign for supremacy. Following the news of Lexington-Concord, the association strategy, with which the Wilmington committee and a few others had experimented during the winter, was adopted by committees all over the province. Many of these local associations were modeled on the widely circulated New Bern association or the new Cape Fear association, and all of them committed the signers to the Whig cause in sweeping terms. The Cape Fear document, for example, justified "resisting force by force" and pledged the subscribers to "go forth and be ready to sacrifice our lives and fortunes to secure our freedom and safety, [and] in all things [to] follow the advice of our Committee."[79]

The collection of signatures was pushed ruthlessly. At New Bern the committee ordered all persons to sign within five days, and even before the deadline the association was reported to be "generally signed in this country." Those who failed to comply were promptly branded as enemies to American liberties and deprived of their arms.[80] The Rowan Whigs transmitted their association to the different militia companies with these instructions: "Each Captain and such of his Company as think it their Duty to hand down unimpaired to posterity the Rights and Privileges their ancestors through seas of Blood handed down

[77] Evangeline W. and Charles M. Andrews, eds., *Journal of a Lady of Quality . . .* (3rd ed., New Haven, 1939), pp. 198-99.

[78] *Colonial Records*, X, 126-29, 135.

[79] *Wilmington Committee Proceedings*, pp. 31-32.

[80] Alonzo T. Dill, Jr., "New Bern during the Revolution," *North Carolina Historical Review*, XXIII (July, 1946), 333-34; *Colonial Records*, X, 158.

to them, are desired to join their hands hereto."[81] The Wilmington committee ordered its association signed by every white man capable of bearing arms; failure to comply, the committee warned, would be regarded as "a declaration of intentions inimical to the common cause of America."[82] The Mecklenburg Whigs were "threatening to force people . . . to sign a Declaration stating whether we held with the King or with Boston."[83] The Pitt committee decreed that no person could serve in any "Publick Capacity" without signing its association.[84]

More revealing of the circumstances under which the associations were signed than the laconic committee records is the journal of Miss Janet Schaw, a Scottish gentlewoman who was visiting on the Cape Fear. "At present," she wrote,

> the martial law stands thus: an officer or committeeman enters a plantation with his posse. The Alternative is proposed, Agree to join us, and your persons and properties are safe; you have a shilling sterling a day; your duty is no more than once a month appearing under Arms at Wilmington, which will prove only a merrymaking, where you will have as much grog as you can drink. But if you refuse, we are directly to cut up your corn, shoot your pigs, burn your houses, seize your Negroes and perhaps tar and feather yourself. Not to chuse [*sic*] the first requires more courage than they are possessed of, and I believe this method has seldom failed with the lower sort.[85]

Even the Whig leaders were occasionally alarmed by the lengths to which this kind of mass proscription was carried. "Things were going on *tantivy* to licentiousness for awhile," Joseph Hewes learned from one of his friends at Edenton shortly after Lexington-Concord. "You have been much wanted here to keep the spirit of liberty from wandering beyond its bounds." Order had been restored only by "the spirited interposition of some of the old members of our committee," and the committee's complete reorganization.[86]

The committees meted out strong medicine to individuals who dared to resist their demands. Only rarely did a committee recommend "charity and circumspection," as did the Pitt committee in dealing with one John Tison, who had spoken disrespectfully of the Continental Congress. And only rarely did individuals refuse, as Tison did, to recant.[87] Public denunciation or special attention from a Whig deputation was usually sufficient to effect a change of heart, and often to secure a recantation as abject as the following:

[81] *Colonial Records,* X, 84.
[82] *Wilmington Committee Proceedings,* pp. 38-39.
[83] *Moravian Records,* II, 875.
[84] *Colonial Records,* X, 61-62, 221, 243.
[85] *Journal of a Lady of Quality,* pp. 198-99.
[86] McRee, *James Iredell,* II, 594; Samuel Johnston to Joseph Hewes, June 11, 1775, Hayes Collection.
[87] *Colonial Records,* IX, 1240, 1266.

I ALDERSON ELLISON, of the County of Beaufort, having said many illegal and unwarrantable Things against the General Congress, and the Committee of said County, tending to mislead the Inhabitants thereof from their Affections and Zeal for their just Rights and Liberties, DO sincerely ask forgiveness of all my Countrymen, and this Committee in particular, for this my corrupt Behaviour; and further say, that for the future I will use every Means in my Power to preserve and defend the Rights and Liberties of my Country.[88]

In Rowan two suspected loyalists were first placed under house arrest and later sent to South Carolina for imprisonment. Another, after a visit from a party of Whigs, "honestly professed his sorrow [and] signed the test."[89] Still another Rowan loyalist, a Baptist minister, appeared before the committee, "in the most explicit and humiliating Terms professing his Sorrow."[90]

Anson County, where the Whigs were strong but not dominant, suffered a virtual reign of terror. When the committee failed to persuade people to sign its association at neighborhood meetings, it went to work on leading loyalists. One loyalist was first approached "in a violent manner" by a committee agent, who "called him damned scoundrel, swore he had a great mind to kill him, saying he was surprised that he would be against the country." Shortly afterward this same man was arrested and plied with Whig propaganda for several days. The committee finally released him, but sent a gang of hoodlums in pursuit. Overtaking him after dark, they announced that they intended to treat him as an enemy of his country and began stripping off his clothes, "but after much threatening they released him and [he] was informed they intended to take him again dead or alive."

Meanwhile the Anson Whigs were making threats against the life and property of James Cotton, one of the most prominent men in the county and leader of the loyalist forces. When he refused to sign the association, an armed band broke into his house one morning before dawn and seized him, but he managed to escape by getting his captors drunk. The same day the Whigs, with several hundred reinforcements from South Carolina, broke up a loyalist meeting, forcing one leader to swear allegiance to the committee. Thus when the fugitive Cotton tried to call out the loyal militia, he found the people so intimidated that only forty men appeared.[91]

Cotton and two other prominent loyalists were finally captured while establishing contact with Governor Martin, imprisoned at Wilmington, and later moved to the jail at Hillsborough, where the third provincial

[88] New Bern *North-Carolina Gazette*, July 7, 1775.
[89] John H. Wheeler, *Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851* (Philadelphia, 1851), II, 365, 367, 369.
[90] *Colonial Records*, X, 134, 137.
[91] *Ibid.*, X, 125-29.

convention was meeting. The day after Cotton's incarceration at Hillsborough, one of his old enemies from Anson appeared and announced that he would be hanged if he did not recant by noon. Cotton made his submission and was set free, but he later raised five hundred loyal troops for the campaign that ended in loyalist defeat at Moore's Creek Bridge.

Cotton's case throws a revealing light on Whig accounts of dealings with loyalists. While he and his companions were imprisoned at Wilmington, the Whig press reported, "on an impartial representation of our present dispute . . . all requested to sign the association, and voluntarily took an oath, to obey the regulations of the continental congress, and provincial convention."[92]

At Wilmington one man was threatened with expulsion from the province, if he did not recant his loyalist sentiments within thirty days.[93] The committee used different tactics with another prominent loyalist, appointing him a colonel in the Whig militia and then ordering him to attend musters. When the royal Receiver General of Quit Rents ignored a committee order to resign his post, "he became very anxious in regard to his children, whom he feared he would not long be able to protect." But anti-loyalist activities were not confined to the committee. Only intervention by the officers saved an English groom from tar and feathers, when he evinced amusement at a review of the Whig troops. Even so he was compelled to beg the regiment's pardon, and then "drummed and fiddled out of town, with a strict prohibition of ever being seen in it again."[94]

The Wilmington committee finally assembled several thousand Whig militiamen to intimidate those who still refused to sign the association, and Miss Schaw's journal affords an illuminating eyewitness account of the proceedings.

> I went into the town, the entry of which I found closed up by a detachment of the soldiers; but as the officer immediately made way for me, I took no further notice of it, but advanced to the middle of the street, where I found a number of the first people in town standing together, who (to use Milton's phrase) seemed much impassioned. As most of them were my acquaintances, I stopped to speak to them, but they with one voice begged me for heaven's sake to get off the street, making me observe they were prisoners, adding that every avenue of the town was shut up, and that in all human probability some scene would be acted very unfit for me to witness. I could not take the friendly advice, for I became unable to move and absolutely petrified with horror.
>
> Observing however an officer with whom I had just dined, I beckoned him

[92] Wilmington *Cape-Fear Mercury*, Aug. 25, 1775; DeMond, *Loyalists in N. C.*, pp. 109-10; *Colonial Records*, X, 168, 170-71, 181-82.
[93] *Wilmington Committee Proceedings*, p. 50.
[94] *Journal of a Lady of Quality*, pp. 190, 212.

to me. He came, but with no very agreeable look, and on my asking him what was the matter, he presented a paper he had folded in his hand. If you will persuade them to sign this they are at liberty, said he, but till then must remain under this guard, as they must suffer the penalties they have justly incurred. "And we will suffer every thing," replied one of them, "before we abjure our king, our country, and our principles." "This, Ladies," said he, turning to me, who was now joined by several Ladies, "is what they call their Test, but by what authority this Gentleman forces it on us, we are yet to learn." "There is my Authority," pointing to the soldiers with the most insolent air, "dispute it, if you can."

The prisoners stood firm until two in the morning, "tho' every threatening was used to make them comply." They were then allowed to retire on parole to appear before the committee the next morning. These tactics succeeded, and on a later visit to town Miss Schaw found it "intirely [*sic*] deserted by the Tories, some of whom are out in the country, and others gone out of the way, till this hurry of passion be a little settled."[95]

The Cape Fear radicals had begun to raise troops and to create an atmosphere of imminent warfare as early as March, but only after Lexington-Concord was their example generally followed in other parts of the province. Military preparations were originally designed to force people to take sides, and on the Cape Fear all able-bodied men were compelled to attend musters. By the end of the summer, however, this purpose had been largely served, and the Whig militia had been transformed into a provincial army, organized for military action against the British.

These forces were no sooner embodied than the more radical Whigs precipitated military action against the royal authority. The menacing behavior of the Whig militia at New Bern induced Governor Martin to flee from the Palace at the end of May and take refuge in Fort Johnston at the mouth of the Cape Fear. Six weeks later the Whig militia descended on this weakly defended royal post from Wilmington, Martin and the garrison escaped to a British ship, and the fort was burned. Royal authority was at an end.

Ruefully surveying the situation, the governor blamed the course of events wholly on the Whig committees. During the spring and early summer he had received assurances of support from encouragingly large numbers of people in the counties of Anson, Chatham, Craven, Cumberland, Dobbs, Guilford, Mecklenburg, Rowan, and Surry.[96] But as the summer advanced, the numerous loyalists and the even more numerous North Carolinians who simply wanted to be let alone had proved incapable of restraining the hard-hitting Whig committees. The loyalist

[95] *Ibid.*, pp. 191-94, 210.

[96] *Colonial Records*, IX, 1266; X, 126-27, 134, 168-71, 204, 231; *Moravian Records*, II, 847, 927-28; New Bern *North-Carolina Gazette*, July 14, 1775.

program was essentially negative, and the aggressive Whigs, by seizing the initiative, had prevented the potential loyalist majority from ever getting organized. When Governor Martin finally tried to effect a loyalist organization in the winter of 1775-1776, it was too late, as the contretemps at Moore's Creek Bridge pathetically demonstrated.

The governor paid high tribute to the effectiveness of the Whig organization. "The influence of Committees, My Lord," he wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth in August, "hath been so extended over the Inhabitants of the lower part of this Country . . . that the loyal Subjects among them are in fear of their lives, if they utter a word against their proceedings or even contrary to their liking."[97] A month later Martin was still mourning over the loyalist failure. "For the preservation of their persons from insult, and their property from confiscation," he explained, the loyal population must "indignantly and reluctantly yield to the overbearing current of revolt, . . . a piteous necessity that, while I lament and deplore it, I know not how to blame."[98]

The most striking feature of the whole story is the stark incongruity —early noted by the Regulators—between the Whigs' devotion to "liberty" and their coercive tactics. "You pretend to be strenuous assertors of liberty," a harrassed Anglican clergyman protested to the New Bern committee. "Pray let me have a little liberty as well as yourself, at least liberty to be peaceful and quiet and do my duty." But the Whigs remained insensitive to any inconsistency between their professions and their practices, and the parson was suspended from his post.[99] That is how revolutions are made.

[97] *Colonial Records,* X, 232-36.
[98] *Ibid.,* X, 244.
[99] Dill, "New Bern during the Revolution," pp. 335-36.

III

WILLIAM BLOUNT IN NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS, 1781-1789

By Alice B. Keith

No other political leader was associated with as many important aspects of public affairs in North Carolina in the 1780's as was William Blount. This gifted and versatile leader was born in Bertie County, North Carolina on March 26, 1749. When he was yet a small boy, his parents, Jacob and Barbara Gray Blount, moved to Craven County and settled on property which Jacob had inherited. Little is known of William's early life. From some sources he was able to acquire a fair education, social graces, and a good knowledge of business and politics.[1] When he entered the house of commons as a representative of the borough of New Bern in 1781,[2] he had already had more experience in public service than most men acquire in a life time, but his political career was just beginning. During most of the 1780's he had the rare distinction of serving in both the General Assembly of North Carolina and in the Congress of the Confederation. In this same decade he served as the special agent of his state at the Treaty of Hopewell between the commissioners of the Confederation and the Cherokee Indians; was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia; and was a member of the Fayetteville Convention where North Carolina ratified the Constitution. While in the General Assembly, he served once as speaker of the house of commons and three times as a member of the senate. He was nominated for comptroller, governor, and United States Senator. For the last mentioned, the legislature balloted every day for almost a week before he was defeated.[3]

As a member of the General Assembly, Blount was active in the introduction of motions and bills and in service on many important committees, including finance, petitions, preparation of public bills, con-

[1] For a more detailed sketch of William Blount see Alice B. Keith, ed., *The John Gray Blount Papers* (Raleigh, 1952), I, xvii-xxi; Philip May Hamer, "William Blount," *Dictionary of American Biography,* II (1929), 390. A recent full length biography of William Blount is William H. Masterson, *William Blount* (Baton Rouge, La., 1954).

[2] In addition to the two representatives from the county, certain towns were allowed to send a representative. See towns listed in Walter Clark, ed., *The State Records of North Carolina,* 20 vols., XI-XXX (Goldsboro, Winston, etc., 1895-1914), XXI, 3. Blount did not continue to represent New Bern. He was later a representative of Craven County and following that of Pitt County.

[3] See Legislative Papers, North Carolina Senate, May 1785; House of Commons, November 3-13, 1789 (State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh).

fiscated property, trade, settlements for discharged soldiers, and legislative balloting.[4] The variety of his work may be taken as an indication of the breadth of his ability. He was especially valuable in committee problems involving county boundaries which called for a wide knowledge of the territory of the state as well as a sensitivity to local opinions.[5]

Blount's private business interests undoubtedly influenced his stand on a number of important bills, particularly the issuance of paper money, cession of the western lands, settling claims of Continental soldiers and militia,[6] public improvements, and bills affecting the people of the Tennessee area.

In May 1783, he presented a bill for the emission of paper currency.[7] It may appear illogical for a man of Blount's financial standing to favor paper money. But this served Blount and his associates in business very well. The paper could be used in the state for the purchase of local produce to be shipped in their own vessels to other states, to the West Indies, or to Europe, where payments would be received in hard money, bills of credit, or desired goods. As a silent member of the firm of John Gray & Thomas Blount, Merchants, William Blount shared in the profits derived from this trade.

North Carolina politics in the 1780's cannot be understood without reference to sectional rivalries. The dominant group was the "East"—made up of the residents of the northeastern section who had early established themselves along the valleys of the Roanoke, the Tar-Pamlico, and the Neuse Rivers. The "East" had been able to win over to its side many of the settlers of the far western section of North Carolina which was commonly referred to as Tennessee. The rival of the "East" was the "West"—a faction made up of the residents of the Piedmont area together with the Cape Fear and Wilmington groups. The Wilmington leaders found this political alliance desirable because of the economic advantages of trade with the back country by way of the Cape Fear River. Then too, the consciousness of being a political minority increased their interest in maintaining a friendly relation with the West.

The Blounts and their friends constituted a powerful bloc in the East faction and the friendship which William Blount maintained towards the Tennessee area helped to keep this area in alignment with the East. It was said that he helped to frame bills for representatives of the area and gave "many proofs of sympathy and interest for the pioneer settlers."[8] They repaid him with devotion and loyal support in most instances.

[4] *State Records of North Carolina,* XVII, 111, 117; XVIII, 25, 127, 161 217; XIX, 135, 149, 239, 264, 307, 353, 532, 571, 605; XX, 485, 497, 502.
[5] *Ibid.,* XXIV, 705.
[6] *Ibid.,* XIX, 307.
[7] *Ibid.,* XIX, 307.
[8] A. W. Putnam, *History of Middle Tennessee* (Nashville, Tennessee, 1859), pp. 238, 334.

Many of their representatives were his personal friends and shared his interests, either as members of his land company or as his employees. Then too legislation which he wanted for his lands—protection from the Indians, settlement of the area, and internal improvements—met their needs also.

William Blount was a strong blend of the statesman and the provincial. When other states were ceding their western lands to Congress he thought that North Carolina should not be subjected to criticism because of failure to make its cession.[9] Yet, from a personal point of view he probably thought that his own lands would fare better under the protection of Congress. In February of 1784 he had secured a favorable decision from the legislature of Georgia on his petition for the grant of the Muscle Shoals area to his land company.[10] This constituted an enormous speculation if Blount were able to carry it through. But lands could not be sold to advantage where Indians were committing atrocities and were increasing their depredations—egged on by Spanish intrigue. This land interest cannot be separated from William Blount's position in the cession question any more than it can from his position on Indian affairs. It was the same interest which colored much of the action of John Sevier and only to a lesser degree that of Governor Richard Caswell.

The cession bill of 1784 to cede the state's western lands to the United States produced a sharp rift in the house of commons.[11] Blount and some of his friends as well as other representatives who did not commonly side with the Blounts favored the measure. William R. Davie[12] aided by Thomas Person, one of the strongest leaders of the West faction, led the opposition. In spite of this powerful opposition the bill passed, but at the next session of the General Assembly a bill to repeal the cession was introduced and apparently with little opposition was passed.[13]

William Blount's absence from the state while in attendance in Congress does not appear to have dulled his interest in local politics, nor did his activity in state affairs prevent him from attending Congress. In fact it was because of Blount's willingness to attend Congress that the state had a representative there as continuously as it had. North

[9] See William Blount and Hugh Williamson's report to Governor Martin, in 1782 in the *State Records of North Carolina,* XVI, 388.

[10] For this petition see *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, 536-537.

[11] *State Records of North Carolina,* XIX, 642-643.

[12] In light of the records of this legislature it is very difficult to understand the statement of Davie's biographer on this point [*Dictionary of American Biography,* V (1930), 98] when he says, ". . . he [Davie] more than anyone else was responsible for the action of that body [the legislature of North Carolina] . . . [in making] the cession of Tennessee to the Union." Davie voted against the bill of 1784, he moved to table it, and then presented a protest against it. *State Records of North Carolina,* XIX, 642-643; 711-712; 773; 804-805.

[13] Samuel A'Court Ashe, *History of North Carolina,* 2 vols. (Raleigh, 1925), II, 38.

Carolina had great difficulty in getting delegates to serve in Congress.[14] Salaries were not only inadequate, but they were paid in North Carolina paper, which suffered heavy discounts in northern cities. The extensive merchandizing and shipping carried on by the Blounts enabled William to handle the paper money problem for himself and often for the other North Carolina delegates. The original plan of the General Assembly was to pay the salaries of its delegates in hard money,[15] but Governor Caswell found this impracticable and sent warrants instead.[16]

Some North Carolina delegates tried to ship goods to New York to exchange for hard money or for bills of credit which would be acceptable at par value, but this often only involved them in further trouble and to no avail. Timothy Bloodworth wrote that his naval stores were unsold and that "Mr. White has not received anything from the state, . . ."[17] Benjamin Hawkins was sometimes without sufficient money. (except what he had borrowed)[18] to support him for one day. Richard Dobbs Spaight was often in financial straits,[19] and John Sitgreaves suffered such losses with his attempts at speculation by shipping supplies that he was much embittered. After detailing his misfortunes he concluded that: "If the public are much longer served in that Appointment I think the persons . . . who fill it will be more patriotic & shew more Confidence in the State than I think it has right to expect."[20]

When appeals were made by the delegates to the Blounts for financial assistance, and there were many, usually attempts were made to relieve them. It does not appear that there was any direct exchange of political support exacted for this service. At least no hard bargains were driven. The delegates who received aid were friends and of the same political faction and were usually of the same position on controversial issues.[21]

The impotence of Congress together with the apathy of the states

[14] Governor Caswell was often distressed because those appointed would not attend. The General Assembly chose six delegates at a time and expected them to serve in relays of two. In January of 1786, he complained to the Council that not only did they fail to go when chosen, but that some had drawn their money and then had not gone [Governors' Papers, State Series (State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh), XII, 19]. Blount was not among the latter.

[15] *State Records of North Carolina,* XXII, 992.

[16] *Ibid.,* XVIII, 678.

[17] *Ibid.,* 718.

[18] Benjamin Hawkins to Alexander Martin, Princeton, September 27, 1783, Governor Martin's Letterbook (State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh), V, 584.

[19] *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, 146, 160, 303, 342.

[20] *Ibid.,* 201-202.

[21] See Stuart & Barr to John Gray & Thomas Blount, Merchants, Philadelphia, February 23, 1785, *ibid.,* 188-190; Richard Dobbs Spaight to John Gray Blount, Philadelphia, July, 3, 1787, *ibid.,* 315; and Hugh Williamson to John Gray Blount, Philadelphia, July 19, 1787, *ibid.,* 324-325. Although the business transaction usually fell to John Gray Blount, it was likely to be William who insisted that aid be given. See William Blount to John Gray Blount, Piney Grove, March 4; and his "Postscript" April 8, 1785, *ibid.,* 192-193, 195.

kept the members of that body from having a heavy load of duties in their capacities as delegates; nevertheless it was desirable for North Carolina to have representatives there in order to gain information on the proceedings of Congress and the attitudes and purposes of other states. This general service William Blount seems to have performed to the satisfaction of the governor and even of the more critical legislature which indicated approval of his representation by reelecting him time and again in the 1780's. When Governor Caswell heard that Blount had declined to attend Congress for a session, he was concerned lest the state be without an able representative who would give "steady attendance."[22] William Pierce of Georgia who was well acquainted with many members of Congress also said that Blount had "discharged his duty with ability and faithfulness."[23]

While in attendance at Congress, Blount gave careful attention to the interests of his state. He made faithful reports to the governor informing him of happenings within the representative body. He made pertinent comments on national and international affairs, showing a grasp of the significance of both despite his limited provincial experience. He and Hugh Williamson, also a North Carolina delegate, assumed the guardianship of their state's reputation, which had "long been viewed in unfavorable light" because of its failure to contribute to the "necessary expenses of the war." They prepared and had published in the Pennsylvania *Journal & Packet* a "summary account" of the state's services for the year.[24] Blount's knowledge of business made him alert to financial issues and the possible effect upon a fairly poor state such as North Carolina. He and Williamson favored borrowing as a means of meeting the public obligations, since "Tar, Pitch, turpentine, Lumber, Indian Corn and the other staples of North Carolina are too bulky to bear transportation in time of War."[25] They fought stubbornly to prevent the allocation of war debts to the states on the basis of land acreage alone. Such a move would not only be contrary to the Eighth Article of the Confederation, upon which they made their stand, but also would be unfair to the large land possessing, sparsely-inhabited southern states, and particularly to North Carolina with its "great tracts of broken barren and piney lands. . . ."[26] When Pennsylvania pressed for Continental troops to join its militia to maintain peace on the frontier, the North Carolina delegates wanted to know if the governor of North Carolina had sent militia to quell disturbances on their frontier, which they were in-

[22] *State Records of North Carolina,* XVIII, 753.
[23] "Notes of Major William Pierce on the Federal Convention of 1787," *American Historical Review* (January 1898), III, 332.
[24] *State Records of North Carolina,* XVI, 334-335; 338.
[25] *Ibid.,* 435-441.
[26] *Ibid.,* XVI, 406.

formed was needed. If so, they were prepared to follow Pennsylvania's example and ask for Continental troops.[27]

On the international level Blount and Williamson showed attachment to France and suspicion of England. They expressed concern over a letter from Great Britain to Congress which "seemed to point at some desire to separate America from her unity with France."[28] On their own "risque" they addressed the minister of France on the birth of a dauphin and apologized for their state's neglect in doing so.[29] Some four years later when France sent Sieur de la Forest as Vice Consul General to the United States, Blount cultivated his acquaintance.[30]

William Blount derived great benefit from his experience in Congress. Contacts and associations made in his capacity as a delegate contributed to his general education and unquestionably fired his ambition to reach for high stakes in politics and business. Association with such big business men as Robert Morris (with whom the Blounts were later to engage in trade and immense land deals) and observations of such Congressional favors as those given to the tremendous land-speculation schemes of Rufus Putnam and Manasseh Cutler,[31] were not without influence upon his later difficulties.

The North Carolina delegation to Congress sometimes showed a sectional spirit on questions other than slavery. William Blount gave evidence of this attitude in 1787. He had gone to Congress with the full expectation of being chosen President of that body, but ultimately he was defeated and his pride was deeply stung.[32] He complained of the unfairness of the representatives of the northern states who would not choose a Southerner for this office. Governor Caswell sympathized with him and was sorry that there were among them those who could "dwindle to such low subterfuges. . . ."[33] Blount's bitterness over this

[27] *Ibid.*, 410.
[28] *Ibid.*, 398.
[29] *Ibid.*, 398.
[30] *Ibid.*, XVIII, 492; *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, 252, 257-258.
[31] Ray Allen Billington, *A History of the American Frontier* (New York, 1950), pp. 212-214.
[32] William Blount to John Gray Blount, New York, January 10, 1787, John Gray Blount Papers. (These are original manuscripts in the North Carolina State Department of Archives and History at Raleigh and were not included in *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I.)
[33] *State Records of North Carolina,* XX, 628. Blount's confidence in his own election may appear a bit brazen at first view, but it probably stemmed from the fact that the previous Presidents had been fairly well distributed among the states. Only Georgia and North Carolina among the southern states had not been represented and North Carolina was among the large states in population [By 1775 it had "become the fourth most populous English colony. . . ." Hugh Talmadge Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, *North Carolina* (Chapel Hill, 1954), p. 71]. Three of the four Presidents immediately preceding this election were from northern states, so it seemed to be time for North Carolina to have representation. Blount also attributed his defeat to the charge by the northerners that the state had been "anti-federal" in that it earmarked the fund from the public tobacco for direct

incident is revealed in a letter to his brother some time later when he said: "The Tobacco being sold I have only one more Object in staying that is to Vote for the Removal of Congress from this to Philadelphia and this I believe will undoubtedly happen as soon as Maryland comes up—To do this Act, I owe to myself, the Yankees and the State of New York. . . ."[34] This may have bearing on Blount's vote against New York's proposition to call a convention to revise the Articles of Confederation.[35] He might have been voting against New York instead of against the convention and his later work for ratification of the Constitution seems to justify this conclusion.

Blount's troubles were not over. While he was still smarting over his defeat in Congress, his opponents were beginning to make sharp attacks on him in the North Carolina General Assembly. They found fuel for charges in Blount's action regarding goods for the Indians in the Treaty of Hopewell in 1785. In the fall of 1783 Alexander Martin, then governor of the state, formed an agreement with the Blounts whereby, their firm, John Gray and Thomas Blount, Merchants, was to furnish goods to be given to the Cherokee Indians so as to smooth the course of land adjustments.[36] The treaty did not materialize at that time. But in 1785 the Confederation appointed a commission to deal with the Indians and Governor Richard Caswell named William Blount as the official observer to see that no injustice should be done to North Carolina.[37] The Blounts were still expected to supply the goods and to deliver them to the place of the treaty. The materials were to be sent to Charleston and from there overland by wagons to Hopewell, but they did not arrive in time to serve the commissioners. Blount explained that he had been unable to find wagons to transport the cargo from Charleston, and since he had no instructions for disposal of the goods he assumed the responsibility of selling them to Bryan Ward and to George Ogg for Clay Telfair & Co. at their Franklin store in Georgia. Some of the goods were damaged or spoiled in shipping. Ward made payment in deer skins which were shipped to Philadelphia to Stuart and Barr, a

payment on the state's war debt instead of turning it into the Continental treasury. Benson J. Lossing, *Harpers' Popular Cyclopaedia of the United States History from the Aboriginal Period,* 2 vols. (New York, 1894), I, 316; Governors' Papers, State Series, XIII, 90.

[34] William Blount to John Gray Blount, New York, March 14, 1787, John Gray Blount Papers.

[35] Charles C. Tansill, ed., *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the American States* (Washington, 1927), p. 45. Blount could not be called an opponent of the Constitution because during the time of the Convention he wrote Caswell that it would be to the "respective interests" of the states to adopt the Constitution. *State Records of North Carolina,* XX, 764-765.

[36] Alexander Martin to William Blount, Kinston, September 3, 1785, *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, 124.

[37] Richard Caswell to William Blount, Kinston, September 3, 1785, John Gray Blount Papers.

mercantile house. Then in order to prevent a loss to the state, Blount purchased linens and tea which he hoped would sell for a profit.[38] These purchases did not bring the price which he expected and moreover a part of them remained unsold.

In the summer of 1786 Governor Caswell wrote Blount that: "Some reports are propagated to your discredit respecting the disposition of the Indian Goods, 'tis said you took care they should not be given to the Indians but reserved them to purchase Lands from the Indians, after the Treaty, for yourself and friends. To minds unprejudiced this would easily be gotten over, but I apprehend some design in it, as from Hillsborough and Salisbury Districts, it seems to have taken its rise. . . . I mention it now not to pain you, but to appraise you."[39] Blount replied to the accusations in a letter to Caswell on the nineteenth of October following. He said that he found it "generally believed" that he had purchased a quantity of land from the Indians who were at Hopewell, but he declared upon his "word & honor" that he had not bought any lands of Indians since the summer of 1785.[40] The matter seems to have been smoldering until the West found its opportunity in 1787. Blount's account was referred to a committee of which Thomas Person was chairman. The committee charged that Blount had assumed authority in handling the goods when there was no law to authorize him to make such a disposition; therefore, he stood charged with £1442.19.7 sterling,[41] but was to be allowed until the next Assembly to settle the account.[42]

If Blount was guilty of the above charges, he was certainly skillful in protecting himself. Letters from Arnoldus Vanderhorst and George Ogg about the wagons and the sale of the goods indicate that efforts were being made to transport the cargoes to the place designated.[43] A letter from William Blount to George Ogg about the shipment of deerskins to Philadelphia was written in January of 1786,[44] over five months before Governor Caswell's letter telling Blount about the unfavorable comments on the subject of Indian goods. This suggests that Blount did not wait until the rumors pushed him to take some action. Also, in fairness to Blount, the part of partisan politics should be taken into consideration. Caswell's comment, "I apprehend some design in it [the rumor], as from Hillsborough and Salisbury Districts," gives some support to the idea that Blount's political opponents were quite ready to capitalize on his difficulties. On the other hand they probably knew, or at least suspected, that he was not overly scrupulous.

While Blount's trouble over the Indian goods was going on he and another North Carolina delegate to Congress, Benjamin Hawkins, had

[38] See the correspondence on this matter in the *State Records of North Carolina*, XVII, 582; XVIII, 524-525, 554-556.
[39] *Ibid.*, XVIII, 646-647.
[40] *Ibid.*, 767.
[41] *Ibid.*, 646-657.
[42] *Ibid.*, XX, 402-406.
[43] *Ibid.*, XVIII, 524, 525.
[44] *Ibid.*, 512.

an important business transaction placed in their hands. The legislature of North Carolina instructed them to sell the public tobacco. In 1785 the General Assembly had passed an act for the emission of £100,000 in paper currency, of which an amount not exceeding £36,000 was to be used to purchase tobacco. The tobacco was to be sold and its proceeds applied to the discharge of the public (national) debt.[45] The delinquency of North Carolina in assuming a fair share of the Confederation debt had long been a source of embarrassment to the public officials of the state, but the state's meager income had made it inconvenient to contribute cash for this purpose.[46] The expediency of paying through the sale of produce seemed to be a good solution.

On February 10, 1787, William Blount wrote Governor Caswell that he had received through his brother, John Gray Blount, an excerpt of the act authorizing the delegates to dispose of the tobacco.[47] Blount and Hawkins began at once to secure information regarding the amount, places of storage, and conditions of the tobacco. They suggested that that which had been injured from poor storage be reinspected and reweighed.[48] In the meantime they began to receive bids for purchase and to seek suggestions for their own guidance in the sale. They turned particularly to the commissioners of the Board of Treasury of the Confederation to whom the purchase notes would be given. The delegates were especially impressed with the offer from Constable Rucker & Company of Philadelphia.[49] Early in March William Blount wrote John Gray that he thought that Robert Morris, who was reputed to be one of the wealthiest merchants of the country, must be the purchaser of the tobacco. Morris was a member of the firm of Constable Rucker & Co. and had a contract with the Farmers General of France[50] to ship 15,000 hogsheads a year in American vessels. If the sale to Constable Rucker & Co. materialized, as Blount felt sure it would, the Blounts would be able to obtain as much of the tobacco stored in the warehouse of John Gray & Thomas Blount, Merchants at Washington, North Carolina as they wanted and they would be given the right to purchase at the

[45] *Ibid.*, XXIV, 722 (See Section XII of this Act).

[46] A somewhat similar plan had been adopted to pay the government of Martinique. In this instance John Gray and Thomas Blount, Merchants were to be paid in paper currency for the goods which they would furnish for the Island.

[47] Governor Caswell wrote William Blount that John Gray Blount, who had "the only Copy of the act brought to this part of the Country. . . ." had promised to forward an extract of it to the delegates. *State Records of North Carolina,* XX, 602.

[48] They were undoubtedly right about the dubious condition of the tobacco. It had been stored in private warehouses which were often inadequate for this purpose.

[49] They ignored the fact that the Council of North Carolina had turned down an offer from Morris and Romayne in November, 1786. *State Records of North Carolina,* XVIII, 777-778.

[50] *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, 276 n. 40. See comments on and copy of contract in *State Records of North Carolina,* XVIII, 627-634.

same price that Constable Rucker & Co. were to pay.[51] William suggested that they take 100 hogsheads. This understanding does not appear to have been reached by conversation with the New York firm prior to the conclusion of the contract. The Blounts had originally hoped to secure the entire amount of the tobacco, which they would have sold through Thomas Blount who was then in Europe. But Thomas had inadvertently let the secret slip and they failed to get the consignment.[52] The Board of Treasury was pleased with the proposal to sell and from the "solidity of the House" with which Blount and Hawkins had contracted, expected to be able to pay the interest on the Dutch loan which was due the following June.[53]

On March 14, 1787, William Blount informed Governor Caswell that Constable Rucker & Co. had just offered $3.50 @ cwt. for the tobacco in bills on Holland, which the Board of Treasury would accept, and he thought that the delegates should accept the offer.[54] Caswell received the contract and expressed his pleasure with it.[55]

There was some complaint about the price being too low and the time allowed for delivery being too short,[56] but in general perhaps less than usually accompanies a deal of this proportion. The Blounts bought their 100 hogsheads[57] and seem to have encountered no opposition to the transaction. Whether this was due to the secrecy which shrouded the deal or to the lack of public opposition is not revealed.

The tobacco having been sold, Blount was ready to go home; but he wanted to wait long enough to vote for the Congress to be moved from New York to Philadelphia. This was to retaliate for New York's part in his defeat as a candidate for the Presidency of the Congress.[58] But he was not yet to be permitted to go home. When Congress sent the call to the states for representatives to be chosen to a convention at Philadelphia for "the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation" the Assembly of North Carolina chose William R. Davie, Alexander Martin, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Willie Jones, and Richard Caswell.[59] Willie Jones declined and Hugh Williamson was appointed in his place. Caswell at first planned to go, but later changed his mind. He attributed

[51] William Blount to John Gray Blount, March 8, 12, 1787, John Gray Blount Papers.

[52] John Gray Blount to Thomas Blount [Copy], Washington, April 8, 1787, *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, 278.

[53] *State Records of North Carolina,* XX, 639.

[54] *Ibid.,* 686.

[55] *Ibid.,* 680.

[56] Robert Rowan to Richard Caswell, Governors' Papers, State Series, XIV, 9, 10, 24.

[57] Constable Rucker & Company to John Gray Blount, April 18, 1787, *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, 289.

[58] William Blount to John Gray Blount, New York, March 14, 1787, John Gray Blount Papers.

[59] *State Remords of North Carolina,* XX, 602, 683.

his decision to ill health,[60] but the condition of the state's finances probably had something to do with it. Spaight was already in debt and Caswell was embarrassed over the state's predicament.[61] It is not surprising that with all of the duties of his office and added financial strain he should have declined the service; nor is it any more surprising that he should have appointed his long-time friend, William Blount, to go in his place. Blount could be counted on to finance himself—that is he could use the North Carolina currency better than most Carolinians of that time; he was experienced in national politics; and he would in all probability follow Caswell's own point of view on most matters. Blount accepted the appointment, but without any show of enthusiasm. He was delayed in attendance because of a minor illness and after reaching Philadelphia thought it better that he should return to Congress in order to help make a quorum for that body.[62]

Even after returning to Philadelphia William Blount actually played a relatively small part in the Convention. This is quite understandable. In the first place he was a practical politician who had had little experience with and probably less knowledge of the theories of government. He did not get in on the ground floor of the meeting and undoubtedly his mind was fixed on other things. After his first visit to the Convention he wrote Governor Caswell: "I must confess notwithstanding all I heard in favour of this system I am not in sentiment with my Colleagues [the North Carolina delegates] for as I have before said[63] I still think we will ultimately and not many years hence first be separate and distinct governments perfectly independent of each other."[64] This statement should be viewed in the light of his disappointment at not being chosen the President of Congress and as the result of his sectional consciousness, rather than as an expression of discontent with the Constitution.

Almost one month later he was taking a different view. William Blount had become educated on the virtues of the new plan for government. He wrote Caswell: "I believe [the Constitution] will be readily adopted by the several States because I believe it will be such as will be their respective interest to adopt."[65] Blount's reluctance to sign the finished document[66] does not necessarily indicate his unwillingness to accept the plan. In all probability it is but the expression of the seasoned

[60] Ashe, *History of North Carolina,* II, 70.
[61] Governors' Papers, State Series, XIV, 10, 24.
[62] *State Records of North Carolina,* XX, 683.
[63] William Blount, Benjamin Hawkins and Robert Burton to Richard Caswell, December 15, 1787, *State Records of North Carolina,* XX, 24-43.
[64] William Blount to Richard Caswell, July 19, 1787, *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, 321-323. See p. 321 n. 63 on the identification of this letter.
[65] William Blount to Richard Caswell, Philadelphia, August 20, 1787, *State Records of North Carolina,* XX, 764-765.
[66] Tansill, ed., *Documents . . . of the American States,* p. 743.

politician who knows that any definite commitment is potential thunder for some future opponent.

Whatever Blount lacked in enthusiasm at the Convention was made up for in the struggle to secure ratification by North Carolina. The Constitution "became an issue in North Carolina before men knew what it was about."[67] The contest was soon on between the sectional rivals, East and West. The latter was able to defeat ratification at the convention at Hillsboro, which met July 25-August 4, 1788. William Blount was not elected to this convention. As one of his usual opponents, but a friend on this issue, said: "[He was among those] left out for their attachment to a form of government so well calculated to make the people happy."[68]

Although Blount was left out of the convention at Hillsboro, he was in the North Carolina Senate, which met in the following November. The friends of the Constitution were watching this meeting with baited breath—would the Assembly pass the needed measure to call a new convention to reconsider ratification? The opposition was tough and the supporters of the Convention began to lose hope. Even Blount began to despair. He thought that Willie Jones—one of the strong leaders of the opposition—was "inflexible."[69] But in the Senate Richard Caswell made the motion for the new convention and William Blount seconded it. The measure passed by a two to one majority.[70] The step towards victory had been taken, but the opposition was strong enough to put the date for the convention so late that North Carolina would not be able to participate in the first election of a President of the United States.

The friends of the Constitution worked fervently. Alexander Maclaine thought that all lawyers should decline all business to fight "a nest of hornets, with Tom Person at their head."[71] In December of 1788 William Blount wrote John Gray Blount: "Pray keep in view the election of as many Blounts as possible for the next year."[72] In January following he assured John Steele that "you may rely on the support of my friends and self on all occasions and we are planning to be very strong in the next session from this quarter. . . ."[73] When the convention met

[67] H. M. Wagstaff, "Federalism in North Carolina" in the *James Sprunt Historical Publications* (Chapel Hill, 1910), IX, No. 2, 10.

[68] Archibald Maclaine to James Iredell, April 29, 1788, in G. J. McRee, *Life and Correspondence of James Iredell*, 2 vols. (New York, 1857), II, 222-223. For sketch of Maclaine see H. M. Wagstaff, *The Papers of John Steele*, 2 vols. (Raleigh, 1924), I, 16 n. 1 and 17 n. 3.

[69] William Blount to John Gray Blount, Fayetteville, November 6, 1788, *The John Gray Blount Papers*, I, 433.

[70] *State Records of North Carolina*, XX, 514.

[71] Archibald Maclaine to James Iredell, Wilmington, August 29, 1787, in *Life and Correspondence of James Iredell*, II, 178-179.

[72] William Blount to John Gray Blount, December 5, 1788, John Gray Blount Papers.

[73] William Blount to John Steele, Greeneville, January 17, 1789, in H. M. Wagstaff, ed., *The Papers of John Steele*, I, 29-30.

at Fayetteville they were there: Hugh Williamson; John Sevier and Joseph Martin, members of the Blounts' Muscle Shoals land company; Charles Gerrard, who often kept the Tarboro store when Thomas Blount went to congress: James Cole Mountflorence, a land agent of the Blounts; Jacob Johnston, a business associate; Benjamin Hawkins; John Wallace from Carteret, later an associate in Shell Castle; and the three Blount brothers—William, John Gray, and Thomas.[74] In fact William carried a double portfolio—a delegate from Pitt County and also a delegate from Tennessee.[75]

When the convention organized, John Gray Blount moved for a committee of five to be named to prepare the rules on order. William Blount was appointed to this committee and it was he who made the report on the rules. Hugh Williamson moved that the Constitution be read and William Blount seconded the motion. Then Williamson moved that the Constitution be adopted, but his motion was lost to one that referred the Constitution to the committee of the whole—this was on Wednesday. At this point the West wanted to bargain its support for ratification. Close on the heels of the Constitutional question was a motion by Hay of Cumberland, seconded by Groves, also of Cumberland, for Fayetteville to be made a borough which would give the West an additional vote in the Assembly. John Gray Blount led the opposition. Back and forth they fought—East against West, not against the Constitution itself. Finally the West was able to marshall a generous majority and the Constitution was ratified; but the West had a new borough—Fayetteville.[76] John Gray Blount's demand for a roll-call was a rather futile stroke. The East had won the ratification; but the victory was dearly bought, its adversary had gained much strength.

The battle for the ratification of the Constitution was over and William Blount's services to North Carolina were fast drawing to a close also. On April 2 of the next year (1790) the Congress of the United States accepted the transfer of North Carolina's western lands (Tennessee area) to the Federal Government. Soon thereafter William Blount announced that he wanted to be appointed governor of this territory.[77] He obtained the appointment and left North Carolina for his new abode and with this Tennessee country he was to be identified until his death. Upon leaving North Carolina Blount could look at its politics with a more objective view. In 1792, he wrote John Steele: "I recommend a coalition of Eastern and Western Interests between you and Colonel

[74] "Journal of the Convention of North Carolina, 1789," *State Records of North Carolina,* XXII, 36.

[75] The secretary of the convention refused to pay him traveling expenses from Tennessee since he had only traveled from Pitt and the House complimented the secretary for refusing, *ibid.,* XXI, 1007.

[76] *Ibid.,* 38-48.

[77] *The Papers of John Steele,* I, 57.

[Richard Dobbs] Spaight—one for Governor and the other Senator. . . ."[78] But the breach was not to heal so easily and consciousness of North Carolinians of the political division of the state into East and West arose at future elections of the governor.

Blount was interested in the social affairs of his time as well as the political and apparently found pleasure in formal dinners, dances, concerts, and associations with prominent people. Perhaps he sensed the importance of providing some established conventions for a frontier society in order to give it stability when it had not yet developed patterns of its own. This conclusion is supported by the diary of John Sevier who entered item after item to say that he dined or drank tea at the Governor's (Blount's).[79] Without some more serious meaning, the representation of men customarily drinking tea in Tennessee in the 1790's sounds a bit incongruous. It was probably this same drive which led Blount to give generously to educational institutions. In North Carolina he was a trustee of numerous academies and a charter member of the board of the University of North Carolina.[80] Nor did he abandon his interest when he went to Tennessee, but was soon engaged with schemes for laying the nucleus of Blount College.

It would surely be too much to call William Blount a great man in history. Yet he undoubtedly possessed qualities far above the average: his fertile brain which showed vision and creative thought beyond the scope of most men; a tremendous energy and indomitable will as was shown in his innumerable journeys along the coast from New York to Georgia and from eastern North Carolina to Tennessee; his faithful attendence at Congress, legislative, and other political meetings; the long hours spent in writing and making duplicates of all important letters and papers; and apparent single purposefulness and pursuit of whatever interest, personal or public, engaged his attention. The possession of these and other qualities in unusually full measure set him above most men. He also had the capacity to draw people to him—prominent men, stooges, and favor-seekers; but above all the members of his own family. His kindness and generosity to the latter were repaid with beautiful devotion. In no instance does strong-minded and strong-willed John Gray seem to question either his judgment or his motive. To all other members he seemed to possess heroic qualities. This was particularly true of his half-brother, Willie, who served him faithfully and with admiration and devotion seldom found even in a whole brother. His extreme political ambition, his determination to acquire wealth without complete regard for scruples, and his willingness to use others for his

[78] *Ibid.*, 84-85. Steele was too friendly to the "Eastern" faction to win this election.

[79] S. G. Heiskell, *Andrew Jackson and Early Tennessee History* (Nashville, 1920), "Journal of Governor John Sevier (1790-1815)," II, 511-526.

[80] *The John Gray Blount Papers,* I, xviii.

own advancement, even to profit from their misuse of public offices which had been intrusted to them, were weaknesses most apparent to his political and business rivals. However, they were serious enough to encourage later generations to point accusing fingers at his integrity. Surely William Pierce's contemporary description of William Blount as a man without talent "plain, honest, and sincere," should be recorded as a major error in judgment.

IV

DAVID LOWRY SWAIN, THE FIRST WHIG GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA

By Carolyn Andrews Wallace

By a combination of peculiar circumstances, David Lowry Swain (1801-1868) was elected governor of North Carolina in 1832 over the determined opposition of the leaders of the state's majority Democratic Party. The coalition which elected him was informal, temporary, and unstable. The new governor had no hope of effective party support.

This deficiency did not appear very important in 1832, for the governor was not by custom the leader of a political party. Neither, within recent years, had he been a leader of the state. These were the Rip Van Winkle years of North Carolina, noted chiefly for an absence of constructive legislation. Mediocrity appeared to have descended upon the state, and nowhere was it more apparent than in the executive office, where a succession of gentlemanly nonentities performed routine duties with dignity and conscientiousness, but without energy, initiative, or statesmanship. They were not entirely to blame for their lack of enterprise, for an over-cautious Provincial Congress had so restricted the authority of the executive that a justice of the Supreme Court of the state could say:

> The governor of North-Carolina may be said to possess *no* political power. He has no share in the making of laws, he has no share in the appointment of officers. Except the right of granting reprieves and pardons, all that is required of him is, that he should be a gentleman in character and manners, and exercise a liberal hospitality.[1]

Apparently, Swain had little opportunity to exert a constructive influence upon the policy of North Carolina, and well-established precedents for refusing to try. He might have been pardoned had he settled down for a leisurely and comfortable term of office, secure in the conviction that if he kept quiet enough custom would ensure him two additional one-year terms. Instead, he devoted himself to the rejuvenation of North Carolina, and in so doing made the governor's office more forceful than it had been in many years. In striking contrast to the administrations which preceded, his was characterized by constructive philosophy, active leadership, and noteworthy achievement.

[1] Speech of William Gaston, in [Joseph Gales, ed.], *Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of North Carolina, Called to Amend the Constitution of the State, Which Assembled at Raleigh, June 4, 1835* (Raleigh, 1836), p. 337. (Hereinafter cited as *Convention Debates.*)

Swain's election was surprising for several reasons. He was completely a darkhorse. One newspaper editor frankly declared that "he was not even spoken of" among the pre-election candidates.[2] He was extremely young to be chosen for such an office, especially in the critical times of the nullification crisis, for he was elected a few weeks before his thirty-second birthday. The state was in the midst of a bitter sectional controversy, but a Westerner was elected governor even though Easterners dominated the legislature. And finally, in a state which had just given its third, and overwhelming, endorsement to Andrew Jackson, a staunch Jacksonian was defeated by one of the relatively few men in North Carolina who had never voted for the "Hero of New Orleans."

Although the young governor was a darkhorse in the gubernatorial contest, he was not unknown in politics. He had been an active member of the legislature for five years as a representative of his native Buncombe County. He had also served as a member of the Board for Internal Improvements. In 1827, he had won a hotly contested election as solicitor of the Edenton judicial circuit; and, in 1830, he was elected a Superior Court judge. For the two years preceding his election as governor, he had been quietly riding his circuits, and had held court in two-thirds of the counties of the state. He was a familiar figure to North Carolina lawyers and politicians.[3]

Swain's contemporaries regarded him as prudent, sober, industrious, energetic, and able. He had a striking ability to win influential friends, such as the veteran newspaper editor, Joseph Gales, and the distinguished lawyer, William Gaston. Gales and his son, Weston, established enduring friendships with the young mountaineer when he first went to Raleigh to study law in 1822, and thereafter gave him the firm support of the state's leading newspaper, the Raleigh *Register*.[4] Gaston, though *persona non grata* politically because of his Federalist affiliation, held a unique place in the esteem of his fellow citizens and was idolized by the younger lawyers.[5] When he bestowed a "high regard" upon Swain, and tried to

[2] Tarboro *Free Press*, December 11, 1832.

[3] A discussion of Swain's life prior to his election as governor and a detailed account of his gubernatorial administration are found in Carolyn Andrews Wallace, "David Lowry Swain, 1801-1835" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, the University of North Carolina, 1954). The most important source for Swain's life before 1836 is Epistolary Correspondence of David L. Swain, 1809-1867 (five bound volumes of manuscript letters and papers), North Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina. (Hereinafter cited as Correspondence.)

[4] Joseph Gales to George Swain, May 11, 1822, Correspondence, II; Weston R. Gales to David L. Swain, September 15, 1823, Correspondence, I; Raleigh *Register*, July 6, 1829. For accounts of the Gales family and the newspaper, see Clement Eaton, "Winifred and Joseph Gales, Liberals in the Old South," *Journal of Southern History*, X (November, 1945), 461-474; and Robert Neal Elliott, Jr., *The Raleigh Register, 1799-1863* (Vol. XXXVI of *The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science*, Chapel Hill, 1955).

[5] The fullest account of Gaston's life is found in J. Herman Schauinger, *William Gaston, Carolinian* (Milwaukee, 1949).

show him "every attention," he naturally enhanced the young man's prestige.[6]

These well-established and conservative friends strengthened the political preferences which Swain's family and background had already developed. His father, George Swain, had arrived in the South from New England with no assets but a meager education, a shrewd mind, great energy, and confident ambition. In Georgia, he had married a prosperous widow, Caroline Lane Lowry, niece of Joel Lane, who had led in the founding of Raleigh. When the Swains moved to the little North Carolina mountain community which became Asheville, they were soon counted among the leading citizens. Never wealthy, George Swain strove for the advancement of himself, his children, and his community, while he developed and imparted to his son David a certain complacency regarding his relative rank in society.[7] When David L. Swain entered North Carolina politics, his political philosophy reflected his father's influence, for it was a mixture of progressivism and conservatism. He became a leader of the reform forces in the legislature which advocated internal improvements and an increase in the power of the West in the state, but he proved himself a conservative on banking, slavery, and popular government.

Neither the personality of Andrew Jackson nor the upsurge of protest known as Jacksonian Democracy made any appeal to Swain. However, he was too astute a politician to engage in hopeless opposition to Jackson, who held sway in North Carolina throughout the years of Swain's political activity. On the other hand, he made no pretense of endorsing Jackson, and won his position in the state without benefit of party affiliation. In 1832, he was noncommital, apparently nonpartisan, on national political issues.[8]

In the fall of 1832 there were three leading contenders for the position of governor. Richard Dobbs Spaight, a conservative Easterner,

[6] William Gaston to Mrs. Robert (Susan Gaston) Donaldson, January 19, 1829, William Gaston Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

[7] The details of George Swain's life are recounted in a letter by David L. Swain to an unidentified correspondent, June 9, 1856, Correspondence, III. His character is revealed in his letters to his son, Correspondence, II. See also George Swain to the editor of the Raleigh *Star,* Albert Ray Newsome, ed., "A Miscellany from the Thomas Henderson Letter Book, 1810-11," *North Carolina Historical Review,* VI (October, 1929), 398.

[8] In 1824, Swain favored William H. Crawford for the presidency. This preference displayed the conservative rather than the progressive side of his nature, and probably also reflected the influence of his father, his half-brother, James Lowry, and his friends Joseph and Weston Gales. In the years after 1824, he was so noncommital on national politics that his opinions are difficult to determine, but it is clear that he approved of the administration of John Quincy Adams and that he never supported Andrew Jackson. In 1834 Weston Gales declared that Philo White, who was consistently pro-Jackson, and Swain had "always been opposed" in politics. Raleigh *Register,* December 30, 1834.

was the candidate of the regular Democrats. Thomas G. Polk, a western reform leader, was ostensibly also a Democrat, but cooperated with National Republicans. The third candidate was John Branch, an Easterner like Spaight, an early Jacksonian like Polk, but at the moment a leader of the extreme state rights group which both Polk and Spaight bitterly opposed. These men were discussed in the newspapers and were nominated early in the legislative session which would decide the election. No mention was made of David L. Swain.[9]

Since the election was by secret, joint ballot of the two houses, and the political preferences of many of the members are not known, it is impossible to analyze with certainty just who voted for which candidate and why. Seemingly, the Democrats had a majority, and Democratic candidates for other offices were elected quickly.[10] Spaight would have won easily if he could have secured the votes of all the nominal Democrats, but the party leaders were unsuccessful in the effort to call a caucus to ensure unity in the gubernatorial election.[11] On the first ballot, Spaight was far ahead of either Branch or Polk, but lacked a majority. Polk, who was third, withdrew. His followers refused to yield, and on the second ballot most of them voted for Swain.[12]

Thus for the first time Swain was connected with the election. He was formally nominated before the third ballot, and took second place in the results. After two more indecisive ballots, Branch withdrew. Most of his supporters voted for Swain, who immediately forged ahead of Spaight, and won the election on the seventh ballot by a majority of four.[13]

Swain's victory resulted from his unusual success in attaining prominence in state affairs while keeping aloof from national politics. The two groups who were united only by common hostility to Andrew Jackson and his followers noted that Swain did not endorse Jackson, but did not raise the embarrassing question of whether he opposed him and why.[14] Since Swain did not criticize Jackson, Westerners could ignore national politics and emphasize his record as a champion of western interests. He accomplished what the more outspoken candidates

[9] Greensboro *Patriot,* October 31, November 21, December 5, 1832.
[10] Tarboro *Free Press,* November 27, December 4, 1832.
[11] Fayetteville *Observer,* December 4, 1832, quoting Raleigh *Star.*
[12] North Carolina *House Journal* (1832), pp. 152-153, 157, 159; North Carolina *Senate Journal* (1832), pp. 20, 27-30. (Hereinafter cited as *House Journal* and *Senate Journal.*) See also Raleigh *Register,* December 7, 1832; Salisbury *Western Carolinian,* December 10, 1832.
[13] *House Journal* (1832), pp. 159-162; *Senate Journal* (1832), pp. 30, 33-34; Raleigh *Register,* December 7, 1832; Fayetteville *Observer,* December 4, 1832.
[14] In 1834, a critic charged that the "Nullifiers . . . waited on" Swain before voting for him and ". . . he gave them some little hopes to feed reform, . . ." See "A Voice in the West," in Fayetteville *North Carolina Journal,* September 17, 1834. This charge probably had a basis of truth, but Swain could not have been very cordial toward the state rights group without losing the support of his original followers.

could not, and was elected by a combination of nationalists, state rights extremists, and western Democrats.

Swain took office in December, 1832. He spent the first months of his term inconspicuously but with regard for the requirements of custom, buying a carriage and ordering wines[15] in preparation to "exercise a liberal hospitality." Government House, which had been built for the use of the governor, was then replacing the burned capitol and was not available as a residence. In lieu of it, the legislature allowed him $300 a year for a rented house.[16]

Swain seemed to possess few of the physical attributes customary to a gracious social life, for a young visitor thought him "one of the most ungainly, awkward, homely looking men I ever saw . . . decidedly the awkwardest man I ever saw in any public Station."[17] Eleanor, his wife, had no taste for gaiety. Though she had grown up in Raleigh as the daughter of a former secretary of state, William White, she was shy and "retiring."[18] During Swain's administration, she was necessarily preoccupied with her young children. There were two when Swain was elected, a girl of three and an infant boy who died the following summer when just a year old. Another boy who was born while Swain was governor was never strong and received the anxious attention of both parents.[19]

In spite of such handicaps, Swain enjoyed social gatherings and participated in them successfully. "Genial temper, ready wit, his kindliness, his gift of speech, made him a favorite in all companies," wrote one who knew him later.[20] The entertainments ranged from the huge reception Swain gave during the legislative session to a round of small dinners held while Chief Justice John Marshall visited Raleigh to preside over the Circuit Court of the United States. At the latter, thought a guest from the North, "everything seemed right and fit, except a superabundance of ham and great titles."[21] In addition, Swain faithfully

[15] John Owen to Swain, January 1, 1833, Correspondence, IV.

[16] *Laws of North Carolina* (1833), p. 197.

[17] Henry Barnard to Chauncey Barnard, March 20, 25, [1833], Bernard C. Steiner, ed., "The South Atlantic States in 1833, as Seen by a New Englander. Being a Narrative of a Tour Taken by Henry Barnard, Principal of St. John's College, Annapolis (1860-1867)," *Maryland Historical Magazine,* XIII (September, 1918), 322-323.

[18] Kemp Plummer Battle, *History of the University of North Carolina,* 2 volumes (Raleigh, 1907, 1912), I, 534.

[19] Tombstone inscriptions, Swain Family Plot, Oakwood Cemetery, Raleigh; David L. Swain Diary, August 10, 1832, State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh; Raleigh *Register,* August 20, 1833; Swain to Joseph Seawell Jones, September 23, 1835, David Lowry Swain Papers, State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh.

[20] Battle, *History of the University of North Carolina,* I, 424.

[21] Joseph Green Cogswell to Mrs. George Ticknor, August 11, 1834, [Anna Eliot Ticknor, ed.], *Life of Joseph Green Cogswell as Sketched in His Letters* (Cambridge, 1878), p. 191.

presided or spoke at the more serious functions and public dinners which were the order of the day. He did not neglect his social responsibilities.

In the performance of routine duties, Swain displayed not only diligence, but also energy and initiative. At the request of the United States Secretary of State, he supervised the collection of statistics on North Carolina. His zealous cooperation astonished and gratified Edward Livingston and his successor, Louis McLane, who found the governors of other states far less interested and efficient.[22] Swain was likewise a constructive member of the Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina.[23] As head of the Literary Board, he far excelled his predecessors in his efforts on behalf of the State Library.[24] Within the limits of his narrow powers, he was a capable executive. Meanwhile, he looked for broader ways to serve his state, and in the summer of 1833 cast aside precedent and routine to become the leader of a popular campaign.

It was characteristic of Swain that the campaign should have been one for internal improvements, for he had repeatedly demonstrated his conviction that improved transportation facilities offered the key to both wealth and enlightenment. This was, of course, a conviction which he shared with many of his fellow citizens. Thirty-seven prominent leaders of the state joined with him in calling an internal improvements convention which opened in Raleigh on July 4, 1833. Swain served as president and delivered an opening address which set the tone of the meeting, and a concluding address which won enthusiastic praise from the Raleigh newspapers. The convention endorsed the idea of railroad construction and made plans for a popular campaign.[25] Swain became the leader, and during the summer and fall was busy attending regional meetings of which he was usually the president and chief speaker. He

[22] Edward Livingston to Swain, March 25, 1833, Swain to Livingston, April 7, 1833, Livingston to Swain, April 13, 1833, Swain to Louis McLane, December 14, 1833, McLane to Swain, February 18, 1834, all in Governors' Letter Books, State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh; Raleigh *Constitutionalist,* April 2, 1833; Raleigh *Register,* August 27, 1833.

[23] Minutes of the Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina, 1823-1840, pp. 272, 275, and Minutes of the Executive Committee of the University of North Carolina, 1835-1873. pp. 6-9, 14-15, 18-27, in University of North Carolina Archives, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina; Battle, *History of the University of North Carolina,* I, 378-400.

[24] Charles L. Coon, ed., *The Beginnings of Public Education in North Carolina: A Documentary History, 1790-1840,* 2 volumes (Raleigh, 1908), II, 694, 721, 727; Swain to John C. Hamilton, September 6, 1834, in "Correspondence in 1834, Between John C. Hamilton, Esq., of New York, and Judge Gaston and Governor Swain, in Relation to Interesting Events in the History of North Carolina," *North Carolina University Magazine,* X (May, 1861), 517; Swain to Gaston, September 26, 1835, William Gaston Papers.

[25] Raleigh *Star,* June 14, 28, July 12, 1833; Raleigh *Register,* June 18, July 9, 1833; *Journal of the Internal Improvement Convention Which Met at Raleigh, on the 4th of July, 1833, together with the Address of the Committee of that Body to the Citizens of North-Carolina* (Raleigh, 1833).

pleaded with North Carolinians to abandon "this eternal *stand-still* attitude" in favor of progress.[26] Most of the newspapers supported the campaign enthusiastically and gave Swain extensive favorable publicity. By the fall of 1833, Swain was probably the most publicized governor the state had ever had.

The editor of the Fayetteville *Observer* contrasted Swain's course with that of his predecessors:

> His conduct is worthy of all praise. Having the good of the whole State at heart, he is not satisfied with the mere performance of the established routine of Executive duties, but at the sacrifice of ease and personal comfort to say nothing of expense, he visits any part of the State in which he is induced to believe his presence may be useful, and employs all the energies of his great mind, to promote the cause so dear to him. Let it be remembered that he is the first Governor of North-Carolina who has adopted this patriotic course. If he do not prove the De Witt Clinton of the South, it will be because he has different materials to operate upon.[27]

Everything depended upon the legislature, for it alone could implement the plans for railroads by effective action. Swain could only make recommendations, but he did that with vigor. His annual message of November 18, 1833, was a challenge to reform in several aspects of public life. Denouncing what he called the "apathy which has pervaded the legislation of half a century," he bluntly told the legislature it had been neglecting its duties.[28]

Swain urged revision and codification of the laws of the state. He criticized the bank charter passed the previous year, which was ineffective because private investors would not subscribe to a state-controlled bank and the bank thus could not be organized. Swain recommended the creation of several banks along more practical and more conservative lines. He proposed experimental draining of a portion of the unproductive swamp lands which were nominally the property of the Literary Fund, in the hope that the Fund might be increased to the point that it could actually be used to support schools.[29] He even dared to denounce the time-hallowed and also time-worn tax structure of the state, which he characterized as inefficient, unjust, and inadequate. He proposed re-

[26] Chapel Hill *Harbinger,* September 17, 1833. Accounts of the meetings and references to the campaign are found in Raleigh *Register,* August 27, September 10, 24, October 22, 1833; Raleigh *Star,* September 6, 20, November 15, 1833; Chapel Hill *Harbinger,* September 10, 17, November 5, 1833; Tarboro *Free Press,* October 4, 1833, quoting New Bern *Spectator;* Wilmington *People's Press,* November 6, 1833; Salisbury *Western Carolinian,* November 11, 1833.

[27] Raleigh *Register,* October 1, 1833, quoting Fayetteville *Observer.*

[28] Annual Message of Governor David L. Swain, *House Journal* (1833), pp. 129-138.

[29] This part of Swain's program was presented in the report of the Literary Board rather than in the annual message; see Coon, ed., *The Beginnings of Public Education in North Carolina,* II, 642-649.

vised assessment laws, the adoption of an income tax with decreased reliance upon the poll tax, and an increase in revenue in order to support constructive activity.

The major constructive activity was of course to be railroad building. Swain discussed it at length, declaring that the state should construct and own the basic trunk lines, and contribute by stock purchase to the financing of subsidiary lines.

The challenging but persuasive message was highly praised. The greatest tribute to it came from an Easterner who disagreed with Swain but grudgingly admitted the message had "more the character of a State paper, than anything which [had] emanated from the Executive of North Carolina for many years past."[30]

The annual message was only the first of a series of measures designed to stimulate the legislature to action. It was followed a week later by another large internal improvments convention held in Raleigh. Again Swain was the dominant figure. He was elected president and made the keynote address which outlined the basic plans considered by the convention.[31] To ensure strong support, he had secured for his program the prior approval of the state's leading financier, Duncan Cameron, lawyer, banker, and wealthy planter.[32] Cameron, who was placed by Swain at the head of the important committee on resolutions, recommended Swain's plans without basic change. Naturally, the railroad enthusiasts who composed the convention adopted them. With Swain at their head, they appeared before the legislature to urge the enactment of a far-reaching program of railroad construction.[33]

A few days later, Swain fired his third shot, a lengthy report of the Board for Internal Improvements, in which his suggestions were presented in great detail.[34] He made no claim to originality, but adapted to the conditions of his day the plans evolved by earlier advocates of internal improvements. He proposed that the state construct a central

[30] Letter to the editor, Raleigh, November 19, 1833, Tarboro *Free Press,* November 22, 1833. The writer, who sent letters to the editor during each legislative session for several years, was probably John W. Potts, member of the House of Commons for Edgecombe County.

[31] Raleigh *Register,* November 26, 1833; Raleigh *Star,* November 29, 1833; [Edmund Ruffin], "Memoranda and Scraps from a Traveller's Note Book, Meeting of the Internal Improvements Convention," *The Farmer's Register,* I (January, 1834), 467.

[32] Swain to Duncan Cameron, November 14, 1833, Cameron Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

[33] *Proceedings of the Internal Improvement Convention Held in the City of Raleigh, November, 1833, with the Address of the Central-Committee, to the Citizens of North-Carolina* (Raleigh, 1834).

[34] *Report of the Board for Internal Improvements, 1833* (Raleigh, 1833). Much of the manuscript report sent to the legislature is in Swain's handwriting. Legislative Papers, 1833, State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh. Swain was identified as the author of the report in the Raleigh *Register,* December 25, 1833.

east-west railroad from the coast to the mountains, with an intersecting line running north and south, and canals connecting the sound region with Beaufort. For penny-pinching North Carolina, his estimate of a total cost of six million dollars was astounding. Swain thought this sum could be borrowed, with the income from the state bank stock and special funds, and perhaps a small increase in taxation, providing the interest payments.

In the meantime, Swain had urged another measure upon the legislature, forwarding with a conciliatory yet firm endorsement a request for constitutional reform.[35]

Swain's active course had made few enemies and had won many friends. His popularity and political influence were attested by two astute politicians, one of whom wrote Swain, ". . . you can do more than any man in North Carolina, and that too without seeming to mingle in the strife."[36] The other assured a friend that Swain could "do more than any dozen men in the State."[37] It was not surprising therefore that Swain was re-elected governor without opposition, nor that his candidate, William Gaston, who had ample influence and prestige of his own, was chosen to fill a Supreme Court vacancy.

Yet when the legislative session ended in January, 1834, Swain had very little to show for his efforts. The new western county of Yancey was gratifying, for Swain as a legislator had initiated and led the fight for it.[38] The charter of a state-owned and state-controlled bank, which he opposed, was rejected in favor of several banks of the type he advocated, with majority ownership and control reserved for private investors.[39] The authorization of a commission to revise and codify the laws of the state was peculiarly a personal triumph, for as legislator and governor Swain had fought for it almost single-handed.[40] An earlier

[35] Swain to the General Assembly, November 25, 1833, *House Journal* (1833), pp. 148-149.

[36] Mangum to Swain, December 22, 1833, Correspondence, IV. The letter is printed in Henry Thomas Shanks, ed., *The Papers of Willie Person Mangum*, 5 volumes (Raleigh, 1950-1955), II, 51-56. (Hereinafter cited as *Mangum Papers.*)

[37] George E. Badger to Gaston, November 14, 1833, William Gaston Papers.

[38] Letter to the editor, Raleigh, December 17, 1833, Tarboro *Free Press*, December 20, 1833; *House Journal* (1825), p. 171; *ibid.* (1826), pp. 137-140, 159; *ibid.* (1828), pp. 154, 160, 170, 175; *ibid.* (1829), pp. 218, 220, 221, 225; Legislative Papers, 1825, 1826; Raleigh *Register*, January 16, 23, 1827, December 17, 1829; Tarboro *Free Press*, December 26, 1828, quoting Raleigh *Star*.

[39] *Laws of North Carolina* (1833), pp. 3-28.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40. This law resulted in the publication of Frederick Nash, James Iredell, and William H. Battle, revisors, *Revised Statutes of the State of North Carolina, Passed by the General Assembly at the Session of 1836-7* . . . , 2 volumes (Raleigh, 1837). For information on Swain's legislative efforts to provide for codification of the laws see *House Journal* (1826), p. 168; *ibid.* (1828), pp. 188, 195, 198, 201; Legislative Papers, 1826, 1828; Raleigh *Register*, January 30, 1827, December 19, 26, 1828; Tarboro *Free Press*, February 10, 17, 1827.

governor might have counted himself fortunate to have sponsored as many successful projects.

To Swain, and to his supporters, the essential needs of the state had been ignored. Nothing was done for constitutional reform, tax revision, public education, or a state system of railroads. Ten charters were granted for private railroad construction, but no one expected the roads to be built, and the discouraged governor called the charters an "inconvenient encumbrance upon the statute books."[41]

Swain's second year as governor was quite different from his first. He had done all that he could do to arouse public pressure in favor of internal improvements. The public response had been gratifying, but not the legislative. Swain and the other supporters of railroads soon agreed that the unrepresentative legislature was the chief obstruction to reform. Westerners declared that the power of the satisfied East must be broken before the state would undertake any progressive measures, and a few pro-railroad Easterners dared to agree.[42] Constitutional revision became the primary goal of the reform advocates in 1834. Swain placed it first in his program of state activity, but did not conduct on its behalf the kind of campaign he had led for internal improvements. That campaign, for all it had done for Swain's personal prominence and popularity, had accomplished little for railroad construction. Quiet negotiation and persuasion might be more effective with obdurate Easterners.

In addition, Swain was tempted in 1834 by the hope of high national office. The General Assembly which met in the fall would either re-elect Bedford Brown to a new term in the United States Senate, or choose another senator. A senatorship was usually sought by many aspiring politicians. In 1834, however, regular Democrats determined to reward Brown's faithful support of Jackson by uncontested re-election.[43] They were indignant when they heard rumors that the opponents of Jackson intended to support Swain in opposition to Brown. Swain's popularity with Democrats declined abruptly.

United States Senator Willie P. Mangum, who had recently broken with Jackson and desired a colleague with whom he could co-operate, seems to have initiated the movement for Swain. Mutual friends assured Mangum that Swain held "sound principles," and he was clearly the most 'available' candidate.[44] Behind him, it was hoped, would rally the nationalists and the so-called 'nullifiers' who had supported him against Spaight in 1832. Shrewd politicians in the nation were striving to weld

[41] Annual Message of Governor David L. Swain, *House Journal* (1834), p. 136.

[42] Raleigh *Register,* February 25, 1834, quoting New Bern *Spectator.*

[43] Brown, who had been elected to the Senate in 1829, had opposed the Force Bill but supported other administration measures and was considered a loyal Jacksonian Democrat. For an account of Brown see Houston G. Jones, "Bedford Brown: State Rights Unionist," *The North Carolina Historical Review,* XXXII (July, October, 1955), 321-345, 483-511.

[44] Mangum to Swain, December 22, 1833, *Mangum Papers,* II, 54.

these two diverse elements into a new political party, and already there were references in North Carolina to the Whigs. As yet, the coalition was so tenuous that it could not afford a platform and a real campaign. The leaders endeavored by quiet diplomacy to unite the opponents of Jackson behind Swain, and hoped also that he would attract wavering Democrats who disliked Martin Van Buren. Publicly they directed their campaign against Van Buren and Brown, and said little about Swain.

It was the Democrats who brought Swain openly into the picture, shrewdly attacking his and his supporters' most vulnerable points by asking embarrassing questions about his political views, and by trying to exploit the differences between the nationalist and the state rights groups. Critical comments on Swain began to appear in the Democratic newspapers. The Whig newspapers defended him, but were not aggressive in his behalf.[45]

Swain was most uncomfortable. On rare occasions, when no other course seemed feasible, he would fight fearlessly for a principle, but he preferred negotiation to controversy. He had never participated in the tumult of party politics and winced under what he called the "merciless excoriations."[46] In addition, the current conception of the governor's office was that he should be above politics and that while he could accept, he should not seek, another office. On the other hand, Swain was unwilling to reject the tempting bait of the senatorship without a thorough assessment of the situation. He solicited advice from influential and informed friends. It soon became evident that his real supporters were the nationalists and that the 'nullifiers' were regarded as unreliable allies. If they could be enlisted in the cause and Swain's friends among the western Democrats would continue to support him, he might win the election. For several months he carefully insisted that he was not a candidate, while he debated whether he should allow himself to be nominated.[47]

Only his friends among the nationalists had much knowledge of Swain's political opinions. One Democrat described him as "our Gov^r^ who is a nullifier—though at heart for Webster. . . ."[48] James W. Gwinn, a Democratic legislator from Swain's own mountain region, by a series of questions in a personal letter, secured the clearest statement of

[45] Fayetteville *North Carolina Journal,* September 10, 17, October 1, 22, 1834; Raleigh *Register,* September 23, October 7, 14, 1834; Salisbury *Western Carolinian,* October 11, 1834.

[46] Swain to Gaston, September 19, 1834, William Gaston Papers.

[47] Gaston to Swain, September 11, 30, 1834, Thomas G. Polk to Swain, October 17, 1834, Richmond M. Pearson to Swain, October 18, 1834, David L. Caldwell to Swain, October 25, 1834, all in Correspondence, IV; Swain to Gaston, September 6, 19, October 9, 1834, William Gaston Papers.

[48] Romulus M. Saunders to Martin Van Buren, August 25, 1835, Van Buren Papers (typed copies of originals in the Library of Congress), State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh.

opinion on national politics Swain made during the period. Answering Gwinn specifically but warily, Swain asserted that he thought nullification unconstitutional. He felt that a national bank was both constitutional and necessary, but that the charter of the existing bank required extensive revision. He thought that Jackson's actions in removing a secretary of the Treasury and the bank deposits had been unwise, but not illegal or unconstitutional. Some of these views, Swain knew, would be unpopular in the mountains, while others could ruin him with the "nullifiers," but if he had to take a stand, it would be with the nationalists.[49]

By the time the legislature met in November, 1834, Swain had recognized that it had a Democratic majority which was determined to maintain party lines and that his chance was hopeless. It was, therefore, to a legislature dominated politically by Democrats and sectionally by Easterners that Swain directed an annual message conspicuous chiefly for an ardent plea for constitutional reform. Swain considered constitutional reform the most vital issue confronting the legislature, and he urged its adoption with all the persuasive force he could put into the message.[50] Calling the message an "able state paper," a delighted western newspaper editor declared that Swain had presented the issue "in such a way as to excite a hope that this 'vexed question' will now be amicably settled."[51]

In addition, Swain discussed a controversial issue of national importance which had received little attention in North Carolina. He wholeheartedly endorsed the idea of distribution to the states of the revenue from the national government's sale of western lands. He linked the policy with internal improvements and public education, which would follow constitutional reform and provision of the requisite financial means.

The message, like that of the previous year, was highly praised. One Democratic editor, though proclaiming himself Swain's political opponent, called the governor "one of the most gifted sons" of the state, and declared that "no man in the Union could have written a message better suited to the wants and conditions of our citizens."[52] The Democrats did not even raise a specific objection to his advocacy of the distribution of public land revenue, though the issue was potentially dangerous to them, for it met, far better than anything else, the Whig need for a popular and unifying policy.

[49] James W. Gwinn to Swain, September 11, 1834, and copy of Swain to Gwinn, September 23, 1834, David Lowry Swain Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

[50] Annual Message of Governor David L. Swain, *House Journal* (1834), pp. 131-133.

[51] Salisbury *Western Carolinian*, November 29, 1834.

[52] Wilmington *People's Press*, December 3, 1834.

Democrats were not diverted from their avowed purpose of re-electing Brown to the Senate. They demanded an early balloting and nominated Brown immediately. A Whig nominated Swain, but quickly withdrew the name when told by others that Swain "did not mean to run. . . ." Left without a candidate, the Whigs in desperation made an unauthorized nomination of Thomas Settle, whose political leanings were obscure. Brown, of course, won easily.[53]

The Whigs did not blame Swain for spurning the dubious honor of leading them to defeat, and were probably glad that he was still available to run for governor. The more partisan Democrats attempted to defeat him by nominating the popular Democratic Speaker of the Senate, William D. Moseley, and three ballots were necessary before Swain won with a slim majority. Such unprecedented opposition to the re-election of a governor demonstrated the sharpness of party rivalry.[54]

Swain won the election in spite of his affiliation with the Whig Party and because some Jacksonians still refused to apply to him the test of party politics. Nevertheless, he was openly proclaimed a Whig by adherents of both parties, and he very quickly made his first public statement tacitly acknowledging his Whig affiliation. His inaugural address was devoted to national affairs and was a subtle criticism of the Jackson administration for extravagance and corruption occasioned by excess revenue. The remedy, he thought, was the distribution of revenue from the land sales. While the inaugural differed little in purpose from the annual message, it contained the first open criticism Swain had made of Jackson.[55]

Democrats denounced Swain, not unjustly, for having waited until he was beyond the reach of legislative action before clarifying his position.[56] They could not charge him with having chosen his principles for the sake of expediency. The party with which he at last affiliated was a divided minority. Democratic legislators emphasized their strength by instructing Senator Mangum to vote to expunge from the Senate *Journal* a measure which he had supported—the Senate resolution censuring President Jackson's withdrawal of deposits from the Bank of the United

[53] Raleigh *North Carolina Standard,* November 28, 1834.

[54] Raleigh *Register,* November 25, December 2, 1834; Greensboro *Patriot,* December 3, 1834; Salisbury *Western Carolinian,* November 29, 1834; Raleigh *North Carolina Standard,* November 28, December 5, 1834.

[55] Raleigh *Register,* December 16, 1834. Editor Gales published a pamphlet edition of the inaugural and offered to supply any number desired at $2.00 per hundred. *Ibid.,* December 23, 1834. A copy of the four-page leaflet, *Governor Swain's Inaugural Address, Delivered at Raleigh, December 10, 1834,* is found in *N. C. Politics,* No. 1 (the first of a two-volume collection of miscellaneous pamphlets, privately compiled and bound), North Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina.

[56] Raleigh *North Carolina Standard,* December 12, 26, 1834.

States.[57] With party politics at such a height, there appeared little hope for serious consideration of Swain's recommendations. Surprisingly, however, the Whigs won a moral victory on distribution. A resolution endorsing it passed the House over the written protest of leading Democrats, but was killed by Senate Democrats.[58] From the Whig standpoint, nothing could have been better, for now the Democrats were clearly on record in opposition to the popular issue.

When the legislature of 1834 did turn from a discussion of national affairs to a consideration of state problems, fortunately it did not approach them in a partisan spirit. Even on the crucial issue of constitutional reform, it does not appear that party politics was an influential factor. By a series of intricate maneuvers, a bill permitting the call of a constitutional convention was finally piloted through both houses. The member who seems to deserve most credit for its passage was William Henry Haywood, Jr., a leading eastern Democrat, but he had the assistance of Whigs within the legislature and the advice of Swain and Gaston without.[59] Despite his unpopular political position, Swain certainly shared in the negotiation and compromise, and in the end was gratified by the passage of a bill which basically conformed to the recommendations made in his annual message. At last the legislature had provided an opportunity to achieve the reform Swain deemed most essential to the welfare of North Carolina. To have participated in the achievement was creditable, and to have been the western governor in whose administration it was adopted was a triumph.

Thus, though the legislature of 1834 was hopelessly Democratic and

[57] *House Journal* (1834), pp. 159, 169, 172, 177, 183-184, 186-190; *Senate Journal* (1834), pp. 56, 59, 62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 71, 74-79, 81, 83-84; the instructions are in *Mangum Papers*, II, 269-270.

[58] Salisbury *Western Carolinian*, January 10, 17, 24, 1835.

[59] *House Journal* (1834), pp. 137, 167, 212, 214, 216, 219, 222, 228, 242, 244; *Senate Journal* (1834), pp. 13, 27, 50, 92, 99-100, 102-104; Legislative Papers, 1834; *Laws of North Carolina* (1834), pp. 3-6; Swain to William A. Graham, February 1, 1868, William A. Graham Papers, State Department of Archives and History, Raleigh. No evidence has been found which indicates that either party took a position on constitutional reform or that either Westerners or Easterners considered the issue from the viewpoint of party politics. In the legislature of 1834, Westerners were almost evenly divided between the parties, but were solidly in favor of constitutional reform. Democrats were in the majority among the eastern representatives who voted for the bill permitting constitutional reform, but they were also in the majority among those who opposed the bill. There were more eastern Democrats than eastern Whigs, and among Easterners the party division on constitutional reform was approximately equal in proportion to numerical strength. It appears that if party politics influenced the outcome, it was not, as is frequently stated, because the Whigs tended to favor the measure, but because party alignment may have helped to break down sectionalism for both parties. These conclusions are based on an analysis of three votes: the vote on the proposal to ballot immediately for United States senator, and the vote on the resolutions of instruction to Mangum, which were both basically party questions; and the vote on the passage of the convention bill. *House Journal* (1834), pp. 144, 189, 228; *Senate Journal* (1834), pp. 9, 83-84, 104.

unresponsive to most pleas for reform, the Whigs were not entirely dejected. Mangum, they speedily concluded, was obligated neither to obey instructions nor to resign. Swain found justification for his not doing so by using the method of calculation long familiar to western advocates of reform. He concluded that the legislators who had voted to instruct Mangum did not represent a majority of the population, and that those who had opposed instruction did.[60] The implication was that the Whig and Democratic positions would be reversed once the basis of representation was changed. In the meantime, however, the Whigs would not neglect to seek new converts by continued criticism of Jackson and repeated demands for distribution.

Swain and Mangum took the lead in the renewed Whig campaign of 1835. They were the chief speakers at so many political dinners that one friend rejoiced that Mangum's constituents did not intend to "get rid of [him] by starving [him] out."[61] An indignant Democrat protested: "It is the first time (and for the honor of the State I hope it may be the last)—when *the Gov.* of a State has travelled about, eating dinners, and making abusive speeches against the President, . . ."[62] This critic unconsciously pointed out another contribution Swain was making to the evolution of the gubernatorial office. The governor was becoming a party leader.

By the time Swain became actively affiliated with the Whig Party, his political principles and opinions had become fairly clear. Though he was practical and pragmatic, with little concern for abstract political philosophy, his specific opinions were related to a general philosophical attitude. He viewed politics from the standpoint of a conservative member of the upper class, approving of a government which protected property and provided for representation of property interests. This attitude was tempered by his general moderation, for Swain was certainly no arrogant aristocrat contemptuous of the masses. He simply found no reason for dissatisfaction with the class structure of North Carolina's social and political life.

He was, however, greatly dissatisfied with other aspects of the North Carolina of his day. He thought the state characterized by poverty, ignorance, and inertia. He considered vigorous measures of improvement the proper function of enlightened government, and advocated the advancement of North Carolina through political action. His concern for the welfare of the state appears to have been quite sincere; there is no evidence that he advocated improvements for the sake of great person-

[60] Burton Craige to Mangum, January 21, 1835, *Mangum Papers*, II, 288; Raleigh *North Carolina Standard*, January 23, 1835; Raleigh *Register*, December 30, 1834.

[61] Robert P. Letcher to Mangum, May 22, 1835, *Mangum Papers*, II, 347.

[62] "A Republican of Mecklenburg," in Raleigh *North Carolina Standard*, July 3, 1835.

al profit at the expense of his fellow citizens. He was concerned for the reputation and enlightenment as well as the wealth of North Carolina, and devoted time and energy to the collection and dissemination of statistical and historical information. In practice, he advocated a government not by the wealthy, but by men of "intelligence and liberality,"[63] by which he meant men of education, ability, and constructive ideas. Conservative though he was, Swain was no rigid advocate of the *status quo*. On many aspects of North Carolina life, he considered himself, and rightly, a progressive.

Swain's political views were undoubtedly influenced by the fact that he was a Westerner in the state and a Southerner in the nation. He advocated constitutional reform not because of democratic theories, but because his section wanted a more equitable voice in the government of the state, and because the West was the section which gave greater support to his reform program. He objected to a protctive tariff because he thought it unjust to the South, not because he thought it unconstitutional. He opposed national aid to internal improvements because he thought North Carolina did not share in the benefits, and denounced the abolitionists because of concern for southern security and social stability. In general, all of Swain's political activities can be explained by his upper class preferences and his concern for improvement, influenced by his geographic background.

These same factors go a long way to explain North Carolina politics in the period. Though there was in the 1820's evidence of an upsurge of popular protest of the type usually identified with Jacksonian Democracy, North Carolina politics throughout most of Swain's lifetime were controlled by the upper class. When the party fluctuations which made political alignment so confusing during the years after 1824 finally settled down toward the close of Swain's administration, the two parties were led by men who were resistant to democratic changes and satisfied with upper class rule. Those leaders who were also satisfied with the economic, social, and cultural conditions of the state generally chose the Democratic Party. Those who advocated improvement of these conditions in North Carolina usually preferred the Whig Party, which in North Carolina as in the nation had a concept of an active, paternalistic government. In spite of the confusion arising from the nullification issue, from alliance elsewhere of the party of Jackson with popular democracy, and from the usual individual variations within the pattern, in general in North Carolina the Democrats became the party of the

[63] "If the history of our legislation, at the close of another half century, shall nearly resemble that of the past . . . it is entirely immaterial what may be the basis of representation," declared Swain in the Convention of 1835. He insisted that he desired a representation which would "secure the largest share of intelligence and liberality" and for this reason objected to the abolition of borough representation. *Convention Debates*, p. 40.

status quo, and the Whigs the party of change. Swain's affiliation with the Whig Party was quite consistent with his earlier political course, for the principles of the Whig Party were those by which he had always been guided.[64]

Swain did not devote all of 1835 to the effort to strengthen the Whig Party. The passage of the legislative act authorizing constitutional reform was only the first step in a process which went on throughout the year. In a special referendum the voters approved the call of a convention. Swain was elected a delegate from Buncombe County, and was thus able to participate directly in the work of the convention, which met in Raleigh in June, 1835.

Swain's major purpose was to secure as much benefit for the West as possible within the narrow limits of the legislative act. So little discretion was left to the convention in drafting the amendment on representation that the compromise was really effected by the legislature, but there was a controversy between the sections over the size of the houses. The eastern-dominated convention threatened to establish a relatively large Senate, which the East would control, and a relatively small House, where the size of the western majority would depend upon the number of members. The West had already accepted far less than its real desires in order to obtain the call of the convention. Even moderate Westerners were determined to yield no more, and Swain led the western fight. He was chairman of the committee which drafted the articles on representation, and reported the western preference. In one of the bitterest and longest fights of the convention, he upheld the viewpoint of the West, even threatening that his section would revolt if disappointed again. Ultimately, he and his fellow Westerners were successful. The convention adopted the figures which gave the West the maximum benefit from the convention act. Henceforth, the more populous West would have a majority in the lower House, while the East would still control the upper. On joint ballot, the two sections would be about equal. This seemingly small gain proved highly beneficial for not only the West but also for the entire state. Swain was correct in thinking that even a slight change in the basis of representation would open the way to a new era in North Carolina.[65]

[64] For discussion of the political development in North Carolina during the period of Swain's political activity, see Albert Ray Newsome, *The Presidential Election of 1824 in North Carolina* (Vol. XXIII, no. 1 of *The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science*, Chapel Hill, 1939); William S. Hoffman, "North Carolina Politics During the Jackson Period" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, the University of North Carolina, 1953); Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, *North Carolina: The History of a Southern State* (Chapel Hill, 1954), pp. 323-331; Herbert Dale Pegg, "The Whig Party in North Carolina" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, the University of North Carolina, 1932), pp. 1-38; Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" *The American Historical Review*, LIX (January, 1954), 335-346.

[65] *Convention Debates*, pp. 27, 83-91, 141, 157, 162; *Journal of the Convention*,

Swain's other major aim was not so successfully achieved. He wished total elimination of religious qualifications for officeholding, but in the end had to accept only the slight change which clarified the fact, already established in practice, that Roman Catholics could hold office.[66] He had a second major disappointment, for he tried to prevent the disfranchisement of the borough towns, advocating a system by which all towns of a stipulated size might be represented, with their population to be subtracted from the representative basis of their counties. The convention, however, determined that borough representation must end.[67]

Though Swain fought staunchly on three issues, he was moderate and compromising on others. He interposed only mild objection to the adoption of an exceedingly slow and difficult method of amending the constitution, though he knew that his western colleagues hoped to make further changes in the future.[68] He was quick to defend the East when Westerners threatened to reject the eastern demand for constitutional perpetuation of the existing statutory equality of the poll tax on slaves and free whites. Swain admitted that he thought the amendment contrary to the best interests of the state, but he assured his fellow Westerners that the promise of such an amendment had been an essential part of the compromise which had permitted the call of the convention. Westerners accepted his assertion that the amendment was a "pledge" of the West, and "to a man almost" upheld the compromise.[69]

Some of the minor amendments were a gratification to Swain, and some he disapproved. None, however, was so important to him as the change in representation. Because of it, he voted to accept the entire group of amendments, and urged his Buncombe County constituents to vote to ratify them.[70]

When the legislature met in November, 1835, the outcome of the referendum on ratification had not been determined, but Swain knew by then that he and Mangum had not produced a Whig majority in the legislature. There was little hope that any recommendations he made to the hostile Democrats would be heeded, but he again endorsed the policies he had supported in the past, and continued his emphasis upon distribution.[71]

Called by the Freemen of North-Carolina, to Amend the Constitution of the State, which Assembled in the City of Raleigh, on the 4th of June, 1835, and Continued in Session until the 11th day of July thereafter (Raleigh, 1835), pp. 21-22. (Hereinafter cited as *Convention Journal.*)

[66] *Convention Debates.* pp. 244, 249, 252, 257, 259, 305, 311.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-43, 60, 204-212; *Convention Journal,* pp. 36-37, 43.

[68] *Convention Journal,* pp. 62, 69-71, 81-82; *Convention Debates,* pp. 345-348, 371.

[69] *Convention Debates,* pp. 81-82, 371.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 397-400; James Graham to William A. Graham, October 26, 1835, William A. Graham Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

[71] Annual Message of Governor David L. Swain, *House Journal* (1835), pp. 99-103.

Again both Whigs and Democrats praised Swain's message. Some Democrats did object to his ideas on distribution, but the party could not maintain a united opposition to the measure. The House adopted a Whig resolution favoring the policy, and the Senate passed a Democratic resolution for limited distribution. Since neither house would yield, no resolution was adopted.[72] Each party tried to blame the other for the defeat. Here the Whigs had all the advantage, for their record on the policy was clearcut and consistent. The controversy proved that the Democrats were having difficulty with Swain's favorite national policy.

In the meantime, returns were received from the referendum on the constitutional amendments. On December 3, 1835, Swain issued a proclamation stating that the amendments had been ratified and would go into effect with the new year.[73] It was highly appropriate that the proclamation should have been one of the last official acts of the western governor who had been anxious for such an achievement since his first entrance into public life.

Before this proclamation was issued, the Democratic legislature had chosen Swain's successor. However much they might weaken on distribution, party lines held firm in elections. Swain could not have been re-elected even if he had been eligible for another term. His old opponent, Richard Dobbs Spaight, was elected governor, and Democrats filled other offices.[74] As Swain retired from office, it appeared that his political opponents were in full control of the state.

The Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina, unlike the legislature, was controlled by Whigs, most of whom were also close friends and associates of Swain. Just before Swain's gubernatorial term ended, he was elected president of the University.[75] The election did not turn on party politics, but it certainly was no handicap that most of the trustees shared Swain's political views. Swain's active administration as governor and his alliance with the Whig Party had led not to political advancement, but rather to removal from the political field. His new position would require him to resume his nonpartisan approach in the interest of the University.

The administration of David L. Swain as governor of North Carolina was in striking contrast to those which had preceded. By his personal participation and leadership in many state activities, Swain made the governor's office a more vital force than it had been in many years. The achievement of constitutional reform during his administration broke

[72] Raleigh *Register*, November 24, December 8, 22, 29, 1835.
[73] *Ibid.*, December 8, 1835.
[74] *Ibid.*, November 17, 24, December 22, 1835.
[75] Minutes of the Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina, 1823-1840, p. 296. While the politics of all the trustees cannot be determined, a majority of the members of the Board and a majority of those attending the meeting at which Swain was elected can be identified as Whigs.

the stifling power of inertia, and provided a framework in which public opinion could operate more successfully.

Swain not only elevated the position of the governor; he also initiated a trend to make the governor a political leader. He gave great aid to the rising Whig Party. Like constitutional reform, the Whig Party in North Carolina was too broad and too big a movement to be considered the product of one man's influence, but Swain assisted it in attaining popularity and unity. Simultaneous culmination of constitutional reform and emergence of the Whig Party, occurring during Swain's administration and partially through his leadership, made his term of office one of the important periods in the development of ante bellum North Carolina.

The legislature of 1835 and the one-year administration of Richard Dobbs Spaight seemed a rejection of Swain and a repudiation of his policies and conduct. Actually, however, the negative policies of the satisfied East had themselves been partially repudiated by the adoption of the new constitution. Spaight's administration was displaced by a new order, and for many years the policies Swain had championed were carried out by the party he had supported. The people of North Carolina gave a clear verdict of approval to Swain when they elected governors who, like him, were active leaders, constructive statesmen, and staunch Whigs.

V

CONFEDERATE LITERATURE AND ITS PUBLISHERS

By Lawrence F. London

One of the important problems facing the people of the South at the out-break of war in 1861 was that of providing themselves with printed literature. Prior to the war Southerners had depended upon the North and upon England for a large proportion of their books and periodicals; consequently no publishing houses of any significance were developed. The blockade of southern ports in the spring of 1861 forced the printing establishments of the larger southern towns to reorganize and expand their facilities in an attempt to meet the cultural needs of the Confederate States. How the people of the Confederacy and their printers met this challenge and with what success forms a significant and interesting chapter of Civil War history.

Unfortunately, the South lacked the industries to provide sufficient quantities of such vital publishing materials as printing type, ink, and paper. Supplies of these necessities were brought in through the blockade from Europe but never in sufficient quantity to satisfy the demand. The shortage of paper was especially critical. The few paper mills in the region could not meet the greatly increased demand for their products. Rags, the customary ingredient of paper, were diligently gathered for the mills but when this supply ran low manufacturers turned to the use of raw cotton and other fibers. The quality of the paper produced gradually became more inferior as the war progressed. When the shortage became more acute the publishers of a few newspapers resorted to the use of wall paper, and some books were bound in this colorful material. In 1863 the editor of the *Southern Cultivator* declared that the shortage of paper compelled his periodical "to omit nearly all advertisements, and curtail the size of our sheet. The high price of cotton—great scarcity of rags, and limited capacity of the few paper mills in the Confederacy, may force us to a still further reduction in size. . . ."[1] Notwithstanding their best efforts the Confederates were not able to produce enough paper to supply their needs. As a result, many newspapers and periodicals suspended publication and the number of books, pamphlets, and other reading matter available to the region was substantially reduced.

Before the commencement of hostilities at least one Southerner had begun to think of the literary future of his section. William Gilmore

[1] *Southern Cultivator,* XXI (May-June, 1863), 81.

Simms on February 20, 1861 wrote a member of the Confederate Provisional Congress: "Do not forget the interests of Literature in the formation of the new Government. Have it decreed that all Nations, States, or Confederacies in amity with this Gov. and giving to its people the privileges of Copyright, as possessed by their own, shall enjoy the same rights & securities as our own people—*but no other States!*"[2] The Congress was not long in acting on this suggestion. On May 21, 1861, it approved a copyright law which gave equal protection to domestic and foreign authors and composers.[3] The importance of literature was emphasized by the editor of the New Orleans *Delta* when he sounded this warning: "A nation cannot live upon bread alone. The moral and intellectual must assist the material, or the whole fabric will fall. . . . The destiny of the South will be but a crude and unfinished attempt, an unmeaning, inconsequential projection into time and space, unless along with her political independence she achieves her independence in thought and education. . . ."[4] He pointed out that the South's development had been almost entirely in the fields of economics and politics, and that she must develop a native literature and cast off her dependence upon the outside. The publishing houses of the Confederacy throughout the war years exerted all their powers to heed this warning.

In the comprehensiveness and quality of its publications, the firm of West and Johnston, of Richmond, was the most important in the Confederacy. It issued every type of material from full sized books to broadsides. Commenting on the work of this house, the *Southern Literary Messenger* remarked: "The war has not put down West & Johnston. In spite of every difficulty, they have shown an enterprise and a sagacity which have put them ahead of all other Southern publishers, and which will make them the Appletons and Harpers of the South, whenever the war closes."[5] The *Messenger* later declared that if anyone in 1861 had predicted that the publishing house of West and Johnston would pay in 1862 as much as five thousand dollars to southern writers "he would have been regarded as demented; yet, Messers. West and Johnston, in that year, have paid to such over $15,000—more than all the publishers of the North ever paid any one year to southern writers."[6]

West and Johnston made arrangements with certain foreign authors to publish their writings and to pay them legitimate royalties. Heretofore, according to the *Messenger,* foreigners had been "robed [*sic*]. by Yankee swindlers, of the fruits of their genius; so that the American

[2] Mary C. Simms Oliphant, Alfred Taylor Odell and T. C. Duncan Eaves, eds. *The Letters of William Gilmore Simms,* 4 volumes (Columbia, 1952-1955), IV, 329.
[3] *The Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America* (Richmond, 1864), pp. 157-161.
[4] *Southern Literary Messenger,* XXXIII (October, 1861), 317.
[5] *Ibid.,* XXXIV (February-March, 1862), 207.
[6] *Ibid.,* XXXVI (February, 1863), 118.

book trade was regarded [as] a system of legalized piracy. . . ."[7] The most popular foreign title published by West and Johnston was Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables,* issued in five parts between 1863 and 1864. Two other foreign works of this house were *The Romance of a Poor Young Man,* by Octave Feuillet, and *No Name,* by the popular writer of mysteries, Wilkie Collins.

In its attention to foreign writers, the firm of West and Johnston did not neglect the literary talent of the Confederacy. In 1864 it published one of the few novels written by a Southerner during the war, *Macaria,* by Mrs. Augusta Jane Evans Wilson, the popular author of *Beulah.* It appeared in two editions and was a best-seller in its day. James Dabney McCabe's *The Guerillas,* the first original drama published in the Confederacy, was issued by them in 1863. *War: A Poem with Copious notes, founded on the Revolution of 1861-1862,* by John Hill Hewitt, composer of the music for the famous Confederate song, "All Quiet Along the Potomac Tonight," also appeared in 1863.

The fields of history, politics and military science found their place in the publications of this firm. *The First Year of the War,* by Edward A. Pollard, editor of the *Richmond Examiner,* appeared in 1862, followed in 1863 by his *Second Year of the War.* T. W. MacMahon's *Cause and Contrast: an Essay on the American Crisis* was published in 1862. While these works were decidedly partisan in interpretation, they are valuable as contemporary accounts.

West and Johnston made every effort to satisfy the great demand for military textbooks of all types. *The Volunteer's Hand Book,* by James K. Lee; *Napoleon's Maxims of War;* George Patten's *Cavalry Drill and Sabre Exercise; A Manual of Military Surgery,* by John J. Chisholm; and *The Judge Advocate's Vade Mecum,* by Charles H. Lee are a few examples of such materials from their presses. This active firm published many other titles in these fields as well as in those of religion, government, and economics.

A close rival of West and Johnston was the Charleston house of Evans and Cogswell, already a well-established business long before the war began. In 1864, it moved to Columbia, South Carolina, believing this location would be less exposed to the hazards of war. Evans and Cogswell imported from England after the war began thirty-two printing presses and large supplies of printing and binding materials. At the time of their removal to Columbia, they were using seventy-six printing presses, twenty-five ruling and binding machines, and had in their employ 344 persons. Their new building in Columbia covered two acres of ground.[8]

One of the best-made books published in the Confederacy, *The Spirit*

[7] *Loc. cit.*
[8] *The Index* (London), August 11, 1864.

of Military Institutions, by Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, was issued by Evans and Cogswell. It was translated from the French by Frank Schaller, Colonel of the 22nd Regiment, Mississippi Infantry. This firm had to its credit another superlative in the publication of Francis P. Porcher's *Resources of the Southern Fields and Forests.* The sub-title describes the work as "A Medical Botany of the Confederate States; with practical information on the useful properties of the trees, plants, and shrubs." It was sponsored by the Surgeon General of the Confederate States in order to demonstrate to the people how they might make use of native products as substitutes for unobtainable materials. This work was so well done that it is still an authority on its subject.

In 1861 Evans and Cogswell published one of the first books to appear in the Confederacy, *Notes on Spain and the Spaniards, in the summer of 1859, with a glance at Sardinia,* by James Johnston Pettigrew, later a brigadier general in the Confederate Army. Other examples from this house were: *Mounted Artillery Drill,* by R. Snowden Andrews; *The Golden Daggers, a Romance of California,* by Paul Feval; *A Digest of the Military and Naval Laws of the Confederate States,* compiled by W. W. Lester and W. J. Bromwell; *Balm for the Weary and the Wounded,* by the Rev. Charles T. Quintard; and *The Adventures of Philip on his way through the World,* by William Makepeace Thackeray. In addition to printing their own publications, Evans and Cogswell printed many books and pamphlets for other publishers.

The firm of S. H. Goetzel and Company, of Mobile, was particularly active in the republication of the works of foreign authors. On this subject Goetzel wrote Bulwer-Lytton: "The object of this is to state to you that we have taken the liberty to republish your 'Strange Story.' We issued ten thousand copies in two editions, and have awarded you by our free will an international copyright of ten cents on each copy, and placed one thousand dollars to your credit, of which you can dispose at sight as soon as this intelligence will reach you. We will continue to practice the same system with other republications that we may undertake of your works, as well as of other European writers. This is the first time to our knowledge that a republication of an English work has been attempted in the Southern states, and we think not to err if we assure you that our practice is merely a small sample of Southern commercial dealings. . . ."[9]

In addition to Lytton's *Strange Story,* Goetzel published in 1863 George Eliot's *Silas Marner,* Charles Dickens' *Great Expectations,* and Julian Henry Charles Fane's *Tannhauser, or, The battle of the bards.* This house also introduced to its southern readers the German authoress, Klaar Müller Mundt, better known by her pseudonym of Luise Mühlbach.

[9] *Southern Literary Messenger,* XXXVI (March, 1863), 185.

Two of her novels, *Henry VIII and His Court* and *Joseph II and His Court,* came from the Goetzel press.

Goetzel and Company also published two significant works by southern writers. In 1864, it issued *Raids and Romance of Morgan and His Men,* by Sallie Rochester Ford. It is an interesting story of Morgan's partisans based on historical facts, containing much local color and flavor. In 1861 this house published its first edition of William Joseph Hardee's *Rifle and Infantry Tactics.* By 1863 this important military manual had gone through nine editions.

The task of providing reading matter for the South was shared by printing establishments in all the states. While none of them operated on as large a scale as those already described, each one made some contribution to the cultural needs of the Confederacy. Among the more productive of this group were J. W. Randolph, Ayres and Wade, A. Morris and George L. Bidgood, of Richmond; John Russell, of Charleston; Hutton and Freligh, of Memphis; H. C. Clarke, of Vicksburg; Branson and Farrar, of Raleigh; James McPherson and Company, of Atlanta; and Burke, Boykin and Company, of Macon.

Another form of literary activity which exerted a significant influence on the cultural life of the Confederacy was the periodical. Such periodicals as the *Southern Field and Fireside,* well established before the war, continued to be published for most of its duration. The interesting feature of this form of literature, however, was the numbers which began their existence after the war commenced. With few exceptions, they were published for only a year and several for only a few issues.

One of the longest lived of the new periodicals was the *Southern Illustrated News,* of Richmond, Ayres and Wade, editors and publishers. It began publication in September, 1862 and continued until September, 1865. The prospectus described it as a journal "devoted to the dissemination of useful knowledge, embracing—literary novelties, historical legends, biographical sketches, latest news, and indeed every subject in the range of polite literature."[10] In the first issue the editor commented that the "Times are in some respects inauspicious, but in others happy for such an undertaking. We labor under some material disadvantages, arising out of the existence of the blockade, for the successful conduct of a paper altogether worthy of public support, but none, we confidently believe, that may not be overcome by energy. . . ."[11] A feature which attracted much attention was a series of biographical sketches and portraits of the most popular Confederate generals. The contributors to the *Southern Illustrated News* were drawn from the best talent of the South and included John Esten Cooke, Henry Timrod, Paul H.

[10] *Southern Illustrated News* (Richmond), October 4, 1862.
[11] *Ibid.,* September 13, 1862.

Hayne, George W. Bagby, J. D. McCabe, William Gilmore Simms, John R. Thompson, and Margaret Stilling.

Another periodical with a long run was *The Magnolia Weekly,* of Richmond, "a home journal of literature and general news." It made its initial appearance in October, 1862 and continued until April, 1865. It was edited first by James D. McCabe and later by Charles P. Dimitry, and numbered among its contributors such experienced writers as William Archer Cocke, Edward S. Joynes, Charles P. Dimitry, Constance Carey, and W. Gordon McCabe.[12]

A very attractive periodical in format was *The Record of News, History and Literature,* published in Richmond by West and Johnston from June through December, 1863. The publishers announced that it would contain political and military news of the day and that it would seek to "supply the place filled under the United States by the Eclectic Magazine, Littell's Living Age, and The Albion."[13] It appeared weekly under the editorial direction of John R. Thompson. In January, 1864 *The Record* was taken over by a new publication, *The Age,* a monthly eclectic magazine, edited by William M. Burwell and Ernest Legarde. *The Age* contained much the same type of material as its predecessor and like it was printed on unusually good paper for the times. It ceased publication after the appearance of only five numbers.

One of the most important publications of the war years from the standpoint of its usefulness for the times was the *Confederate States Medical and Surgical Journal.* It was published monthly in Richmond under the auspices of the Surgeon-General's Office and with the cooperation of the Association of Army and Navy Surgeons. The contents of this journal included hospital reports and articles by Confederate physicians and surgeons on tetanus, bone fractures, the effect and treatment of gunshot wounds, and yellow fever. Each issue carried a section devoted to extracts from European medical journals. Established in January, 1864, it ran continuously through February, 1865.[14]

Outside of Richmond there were several periodicals which had their birth during the war. The most significant of these was the *Countryman,* an unique periodical in that it was published and printed on a plantation nine miles from the nearest town. Its editor, Joseph Addison Turner, published the *Countryman* at his plantation, Turnwold, in Putnam County, Georgia. The first number was issued on March 4, 1862 and it continued publication until May, 1866. Beginning as a weekly of four pages, it was later increased to eight. In an early issue Turner announced that the *Countryman* would be modeled after such periodicals as *The Rambler, The Spectator* and *The Tatler.* He declared that it

[12] James D. McCabe, "Literature of the War," *Southern Historical Society Papers,* XLII (October, 1917), 200-201.

[13] *Record of News, History and Literature* (Richmond), June 18, 1863.

[14] *Confederate Medical and Surgical Journal,* 2 volumes (Richmond, 1864-1865).

was his purpose to fill his " 'little paper with essays, poems, sketches, agricultural articles, and choice miscellany. . . . We wish to make a neatly-printed, select Little Paper—a pleasant companion for the leisure hour, and to relieve the minds of our people somewhat from the engrossing topic of war news.' "[15]

Shortly after the establishment of the *Countryman,* Joel Chandler Harris at the age of fourteen, was employed by Turner to assist in printing the paper. He remained with him until the periodical ceased publication. Turner and young Harris wrote a large proportion of the original material which went into the magazine. It was well received in the Confederacy as attested by the fact that at one point in its career it had two thousand subscribers scattered from Virginia through Texas.[16]

In Lynchburg, Virginia, *The Weekly Register* began publication in January, 1864, continuing through December of that year. Under the editorial direction of A. M. Trible and C. A. Schaffter, it was "devoted to a record of important documents and events of the times; with essays on subjects connected with arts, science & literature."[17]

The Southern Monthly, of Memphis, Tennessee, was another short-lived periodical which had a promising beginning. Published by Hutton and Freligh, the first number appeared in September, 1861. The enterprise was abandoned a few months later when the Union troops occupied Memphis in the spring of 1862. Among other periodicals published for only a few months to a year were the *Southern Punch,* and *Smith and Barrow's Weekly,* of Richmond, the *Mercury,* of Raleigh, and the *Bugle Horn of Liberty,* of Griffin, Georgia. None of the Confederate journals was the equal of such periodicals as the *Atlantic,* the *North American Review,* and *Harper's.* The *Southern Illustrated News,* the *Countryman,* and the *Magnolia Weekly* were in many respects excellent magazines, but too often their editors allowed their patriotism to override their judgment and critical powers.

While the periodicals of the South circulated widely among the better educated citizens of the section, the newspapers were the source of information and enlightenment for the large majority. The *Enquirer,* the *Whig,* and the *Examiner,* of Richmond; the *Mercury,* and the *Courier,* of Charleston; the *Chronicle and Sentinel,* of Augusta; the *Daily Southern Confederacy,* of Atlanta; the *Southern Guardian,* of Columbia; the *North Carolina Standard,* of Raleigh; the *Advertiser and Register,* of Mobile; and the *Daily Picayune,* of New Orleans, were among the most important newspapers of the Confederacy. At the opening of the war almost every town of any size in the South had either a daily or weekly paper, but as the war pro-

[15] Bertram H. Flanders, *Early Georgia Magazines* (Athens, 1944), p. 166.
[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 164-172.
[17] Willard O. Waters, *Confederate Imprints in the Henry E. Huntington Library* (Chicago, 1930), p. 97.

gressed and paper and printers became more and more difficult to secure many of them either ceased publication or were greatly curtailed in size.

As in the case of many other necessities, the South in the past had relied upon the North for most of its school books. When the supply was cut off by war, southern teachers were quick to realize their responsibility to provide the children of the Confederacy with textbooks. Among the first of these were Professors Richard Sterling and James D. Campbell, of the Edgeworth Female Seminary in Greensboro, North Carolina. In 1861 they organized with James W. Albright, a printer of Greensboro, the firm of Sterling, Campbell and Albright for the expressed purpose of publishing textbooks. The firm was located in Greensboro, where all of its publications were printed. Some of its books were stereotyped in Liverpool and the plates brought into the Confederacy by the blockade runner, *The Advance*.[18]

Professors Sterling and Campbell prepared a primer, a first, second, and third reader, and an elementary spelling book. In addition to these texts, Sterling, Campbell and Albright published a primary grammar and an elementary grammar, by Charles W. Smythe; a Latin grammar, and *Caesar's Commentaries,* by William Bingham, of the famous Bingham School of North Carolina; and a primary arithmetic and school arithmetic, by Samuel Lander, principal of Lincolnton Female Seminary. These publications of Sterling, Campbell and Albright, known as "Our Own Series," went through several editions in the course of the war. Referring to some of the early titles in this series, one reviewer declared: "It is gratifying to see so creditable a commencement made towards supplying our own Country with our own school literature. . . . Let the South then encourage these books and everything else that is southern. Let us remember that we are not to be hereafter, as we have been heretofore for the most part, an agricultural people. . . ."[19]

Among the earliest textbooks issued in the Confederacy was a series compiled and published by an Association of Southern Teachers in 1861. The series, printed in Nashville, included in its list of titles *The Confederate Primer, The First Confederate Speller,* and *The Second Confederate Speller.* The editor of *De Bow's Review* asserted that these texts were "the harbingers of a new era which we are glad to hail. The Confederate States will very shortly be supplied with their whole school series by native writers and native presses."[20]

Branson and Farrar, of Raleigh, issued a comprehensive list of textbooks. For this firm Mrs. Marinda Branson Moore prepared *The Dixie Elementary Spelling Book; The Dixie Primer; First Dixie Reader; Geographical Reader;* and *Primary Geography.* Branson and Farrar

[18] James W. Albright, "Books made in Dixie," *Southern Historical Society Papers,* XLI (September, 1916), 57-60.

[19] *Church Intelligencer* (Raleigh), July 4, 1862.

[20] *De Bow's Review,* XXXII (January-February, 1862), 164.

also published *English Grammar,* by Brantley York; *First Book in Composition,* by Levi Branson; and *An Elementary Arithmetic,* by Lemuel Johnson, professor of mathematics in Trinity College.

In Macon, Georgia, the house of Burke, Boykin and Company published Burke's *Picture Primer; The Confederate Spelling Book,* by Washington Baird; *Grammar of the English Language,* by John L. Dagg; and Webster's *Elementary Spelling Book.* Commenting on a large edition of Webster's spelling book just issued by Burke, Boykin and Company, the *Southern Field and Fireside* observed: "Many would have preferred an original work, to this reprint, but we may not sectionalize the English language, . . . In developing a native literature, it is not necessary or desirable that we discard everything that originates in the North. . . ."[21] Southerners evidently agreed with this point of view for the "blue back speller" maintained it's popularity.

George L. Bidgood, of Richmond, published a primer, reader, and speller by Richard M. Smith, of Randolph-Macon College; and a grammar by Roswell C. Smith. W. G. Clark and Company, of Mobile, published a series of readers by Adelaide de Vendel Chaudron. The firms of E. H. Cushing and Company, of Houston, and the Southern Methodist Publishing House, of Nashville, also made contributions to the textbook literature of the Confederacy.

Although less numerous than spellers, English grammars, and arithmetic books, a few titles in the fields of modern foreign languages and the arts were issued. *Deutsches A-B-C und erstes Lese-Buch,* by Burghardt Hassel, was printed in Richmond in 1863. George Dunn and Company, of Richmond, published *A Complete Grammar of the French Language,* by John Christison; and Evans and Cogswell issued Ollendorff's *New Methods of Learning French.* Hunten's *Celebrated Instructions for the Pianoforte* and Burrowes' *Piano-Forte Primer* were published in 1864 by J. W. Randolph, of Richmond.

The large majority of Confederate textbook writers did not make use of their books as instruments of propaganda. There were a few exceptions, however, and it is these which have received the most attention. Mrs. M. B. Moore, in her *Geographical Reader,* wrote concerning the United States government: "Abraham Lincoln was a weak man, and the South believed he would allow laws to be made, which would deprive them of their rights. So the Southern States seceded, and elected Jefferson Davis for their President. This so enraged President Lincoln that he declared war, and has exhausted nearly all the strength of the nation, in a vain attempt to whip the South back into the Union."[22] Lemuel Johnson's *Arithmetic* contained this problem in division: "7

[21] *Southern Field and Fireside* (Augusta), March 14, 1863.

[22] Marinda Branson Moore, *The Geographical Reader, for the Dixie Children* (Raleigh, 1863), p. 13.

Confederate soldiers captured 21 Yankees and divided them equally between them; how many did each one have?"[23]

By the end of the war the publishing houses of the Confederacy had issued 127 different titles of textbooks, many of which were published in several editions. The editions were usually composed of from ten to thirty thousand copies.

The churches through their presses were active during the war in providing reading materials for the people at home and the soldiers in the field. They supplied the South with Bibles, devotional works, religious periodicals, tracts, and Sunday school texts. A major concern of the religious press was to furnish the Confederacy with Bibles since the customary source of supply, the American Bible Society, was no longer available. The first press to respond to this need was Graves, Marks and Company, of Nashville. They published the New Testament in 1861. Acknowledging the gift of a copy of this Testament from the Rev. J. R. Graves, of Nashville, Jefferson Davis wrote: "The Bible is a beautiful specimen of Southern workmanship, and if I live to be inaugurated the first President of the Confederacy on the 22d of February next, my lips shall press the sacred volume which your kindness has bestowed upon me."[24] On August 8, 1861 the Tennessee State Bible Society was organized for the purpose of publishing and distributing the Holy Scriptures. It issued in 1861 editions of the New Testament and the New Testament and Psalms. The printing was done by the Southern Methodist Publishing House under the editorial direction of Thomas O. Summers.[25]

It was soon felt by the Bible societies in the several states of the Confederacy that an effort should be made to publish the Bible on a much larger scale. Accordingly, a Bible Convention was held in Augusta, Georgia, March 19-21, 1862, which organized the Bible Society of the Confederate States of America "to encourage the circulation of the Holy Scriptures, without note or comment, by the printing, publishing, or procuring of the same."[26] The Tennessee State Bible Society presented to the Bible Society of the Confederate States of America the stereotype plates which had been used in printing its edition of the New Testament. These plates were used when the New Testament was printed for the Society by the Franklin Printing House of Atlanta. By April, 1863, the Bible Society had published 33,559 Testaments and 28,201 Testaments and Psalms and had in press 12,000 additional copies.[27] Evans and

[23] Lemuel Johnson, *An Elementary Arithmetic* (Raleigh, 1864), p. 51.

[24] *Daily Dispatch* (Richmond), January 15, 1862.

[25] *Proceedings of the Bible Convention of the Confederate States of America, including the Minutes of the Organization of the Bible Society,* Augusta, Ga., March 19-21, 1862 (Augusta, 1862), p. 5.

[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 3-16.

[27] *First Annual Report of the Bible Society of the Confederate States of America* (Augusta, 1863), pp. 6-7, 11.

Cogswell, of Columbia, announced in February, 1864, that they were publishing for the Bible Society 100,000 copies of the New Testament and Psalms.[28] Even with the addition of several shipments of Bibles and Testaments from the British and Foreign Bible Society, the supply was never sufficient to satisfy the needs of the army chaplains who were continually asking for more than was available.

It has often been claimed that the armies of the Confederate States were the most religious-minded of any since the days of Cromwell's praying hosts. Judging by the quantity of religious publications distributed to Confederate soldiers, this claim seems to have some basis in fact. The war had scarcely begun before the people of the South bestirred themselves to provide religious reading matter of every sort for the men in their fighting forces. The most popular type of religious publication, and certainly the greatest in volume, was the tract. It was small, usually composed of from four to thirty-two pages, could be carried easily by the soldier in his pocket or knapsack, and was inexpensive to publish.

One of the first organizations established in the Confederacy for the publication of tracts was the General Tract Agency, of Raleigh. It began its work on June 1, 1861. The agency announced that it was issuing tracts "from the pens of some of the best authors of the different denominations." After eighteen months of operation it had published 21,892,666 pages of tracts at a cost of one dollar for each 1,500 pages.[29]

The Evangelical Tract Society, of Petersburg, an inter-denominational association, was early in the field with its publications. It was organized on July 18, 1861, and after two years of publishing had issued more than 26,000,000 pages of tracts.[30] This society also published a semi-monthly paper for the soldiers, the *Army and Navy Messenger,* which had a wide circulation.

Another inter-denominational tract agency was the South Carolina Tract Society, of Charleston. It had been established before the war, but upon the outbreak of hostilities its efforts were concentrated upon supplying the soldiers with religious materials. In the course of the war the Society published 171 tracts. Over one-half a million copies of one of these, *The Sinner's Friend,* were printed.[31]

In addition to its tracts, this society published *The Soldier's Hymn Book* in two editions, the second consisting of 30,000 copies. *The Soldier's Prayer Book* was issued by the society in 1863. Its dedication stated that it "originated in the desire expressed by many soldiers to have forms of Prayer through which they might unite in social wor-

[28] *Daily Confederate* (Raleigh), February 26, 1864.
[29] *The General Tract Agency* (Raleigh, 1862), 4 pp.
[30] *Southern Presbyterian* (Columbia), November 19, 1863.
[31] Yates Snowden, *War-Time Publications,* 1861-1865, from the Press of Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co. (Charleston, 1922), pp. 26-29.

ship, and guide more perfectly their private devotions. . . ." The publications of the tract associations were distributed to the soldiers in the camp and field by the chaplains of the various churches and by colporteurs employed for the purpose.

Each of the major protestant denominations established tract agencies soon after the beginning of the war. The Baptists of Virginia in May, 1861, through their Sunday School and Publication Board, began the work of publishing religious materials for the soldiers. The Rev. A. E. Dickinson, superintendent of colportage for the Virginia Baptist Association, reported in the summer of 1864 that the Board had printed 50,870,000 pages of tracts and 100,000 copies of *Hymns for the Camp*.[32] The Baptists of South Carolina in the summer of 1861 began the publication and distribution of tracts through their Sunday School and Colportage Board. At the end of two years the Board reported that it had issued one hundred different titles of tracts of which 630,000 copies had been printed.[33]

The Methodist Episcopal Church, South, organized the Soldiers' Tract Association in March, 1862, with headquarters in Richmond.[34] Besides a large number of tracts, this association published *The Soldier's Hymn-Book: for Camp Worship,* in three editions consisting of more than 63,000 copies. It also published two semi-monthly periodicals, *The Soldiers' Paper,* at Richmond, and the *Army and Navy Herald,* at Macon. Forty thousand copies of the latter were circulated "every month throughout the armies."[35]

The Presbyterian Church, through its Committee of Publication located in Richmond, contributed its share of religious materials. From May, 1863, to March, 1864 the Committee published 1,312,000 pages of tracts and 15,000 copies of the *Army Hymn Book.* In the same period it distributed 59,000 copies of the *Soldier's Visitor,* a paper published especially for the army.[36]

The Diocesan Missionary Society of the Episcopal Church in Virginia, while not originally a publishing agency, undertook the printing of tracts and other religious materials. By the spring of 1864 this organization had published 30,000 tracts.[37] *The Southern Churchman* made an interesting comment on one of these which was addressed to

[32] *The Index* (London), September 1, 1864.

[33] *Minutes of the Forty-Second Anniversary of the State Convention of the Baptist Denomination in South Carolina* (Columbia, 1862), pp. 152-159; and *Minutes of the 43rd and 44th Anniversaries of the State Convention of the Baptist Denomination in South Carolina* (Columbia, 1864), pp. 182-184.

[34] *Christian Advocate* (Raleigh), July 3, 1862.

[35] William W. Bennett, *A Narrative of the Great Revival* (Philadelphia, 1877), p. 76.

[36] *Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America: with an appendix.* (Columbia, 1864), I, 306-307.

[37] *Journal of the Sixty-Ninth Annual Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Virginia* (Richmond, 1864), p. 36.

Christians in the army. It remarked: "Nearly all the tracts published seemed to take for granted that there were no Christians in the army. This tract therefore supplies a want; we hope it may have large circulation."[38] For Episcopalians, the most important publications of the Diocesan Missionary Society were two abridgments of the *Book of Common Prayer*. The first of these was entitled *Prayer Book for the Camp,* printed in 1863 in an edition of 10,000 copies. The second, *The Army and Navy Prayer Book,* was printed in an edition of 24,000 copies in 1864.[39]

The Protestant Episcopal Church Publishing Association, of Charlotte, N. C., was one of the last of the tract agencies to be established during the war. It was organized in the early part of 1864 and during its one year of life published twenty-three different titles of tracts.[40]

Some of the tracts issued by the several societies and associations contained good devotional material, but many were trite and sentimental. Among the hundreds of titles published, the following were typical: *Christian Duty to the Times, Come to Jesus, Words of Counsel to Confederate Soldiers, Death-Bed Repentance, Don't Play Cards, Boys, A Mother's Parting Words to Her Soldier Boy, Don't Swear!,* and *I Have Brought My Little Brother Back.*

An indication as to the reception the tracts got from the soldiers is found in a letter to the editor of the General Tract Agency from an army chaplain, who wrote: " 'I assure you, had you been present as I passed up and down every company in our Regiment distributing them, and seen how eagerly they were read by the soldiers, you would be stimulated to put forth every exertion to scatter such blessings continually among the soldiers.' "[41]

Before the war most of the churches in the South had well established periodicals which continued to be published for a part or all of the war years. Such well known denominational journals as *The Commission,* and the *Biblical Recorder,* of the Baptist Church; the *Southern Presbyterian,* and the *Central Presbyterian;* the *Southern Churchman,* and the *Church Intelligencer,* of the Episcopal Church; the *Southern Christian Advocate,* of the Methodist Church; and the *Southern Lutheran* were widely circulated in the army.

Concerning the reception of religious periodicals by the soldiers, the Rev. A. E. Dickinson wrote: " 'Having from the beginning of the war been acting as Superintendent of army colportage, I have been repeatedly assured by the colporteurs that nothing is so joyfully received and at-

[38] *Southern Churchman* (Richmond), May 2, 1862.
[39] *Journal of the Sixty-Ninth Annual Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Virginia* (Richmond, 1864), p. 37.
[40] Joseph Blount Cheshire, *The Church in the Confederate States* (New York, 1912), p. 93.
[41] *Church Intelligencer* (Raleigh), January 24, 1862.

tentively read as such journals. Many will read a paper who will not accept a tract and frequently one single paper is read by dozens.'" He went on to say that, if available, "thousands" of copies would be welcomed weekly by the soldiers in the vicinity of Richmond.[42]

In addition to Bibles, devotional works, tracts and periodicals, the churches published Sunday school books, catechisms, and sermons by their outstanding divines.

It must not be thought, however, that the Confederate soldier spent all of his spare hours in studying his Bible or reading his church paper. Like soldiers in all armies, in his spare time he looked eagerly for various forms of amusement. One of his favorites was that of singing in camp or on the march to the accompaniment of a banjo or guitar. The publishers in the Confederacy were early in the field with a generous supply of sheet music and songsters.

The largest publishers of sheet music were A. E. Blackmar and Brother, of New Orleans and Augusta; J. C. Schreiner and Son, of Macon and Savannah; George Dunn and Company, of Richmond; J. A. Selby, of Columbia; J. A. McClure, of Nashville and Memphis; and J. H. Snow, of Mobile. These firms, together with several smaller ones, published a total of 648 titles of sheet music during the war.[43] Much of it was the usual classical and popular music of the time, but there were also many new compositions which owed their origin to the war. Among the latter were such titles as "When This Cruel War Is Over," "Jefferson Davis Grand March," "God Save the South," "Gen. Lee's Grand March," "Beauregard Manassas Quick-Step," and "Drummer Boy of Shiloh."

These titles and many others like them were issued in large editions. A dealer in Raleigh advertised that he had just received ten thousand pieces of new music from George Dunn and Company, "the largest and finest music publishers in the South."[44]

The songster was also a popular musical publication, particularly with the soldiers. The "Jack Morgan Songster," "The Rebel Songster," "The Southern Soldier's Prize Songster," and "The Stonewall Song Book" were among the favorites. As many of their sub-titles proclaimed, they contained songs both sentimental and comic, patriotic and martial.

In addition to the classes of publications already discussed, the printers of the Confederacy issued almanacs, maps, broadsides, the proceedings and minutes of religious and secular organizations, and the laws and reports of the central and state governments.

After three years of war the editor of *De Bow's Review* gave a fair and critical appraisal of the literary situation in the Confederacy. He

[42] *North Carolina Presbyterian* (Fayetteville), June 28, 1862.
[43] Richard B. Harwell, *Confederate Music* (Chapel Hill, 1950), pp. 159-160.
[44] *Daily Confederate* (Raleigh), September 28, 1864.

wrote: "There can be little question that the intellect of the country is searched for now in the army, and this will explain why it happens that so little is being done for its literature. In this Titanic struggle which is going on, the genial pursuit of letters is at an end, and for nearly three years little has appeared which is worthy either of the genius or attainments of our people. The glorious struggle has scarcely inspired one song which will live beyond the generation that now burns with martial ardor and rushes to the deadly field.

"Books we have had—not a few. Works upon the army, works upon the navy, treatises interesting to the medical staff, translations and digests, some attempts at history, occasional school-books, and now and then a work of romance. We are not doing injustice to these. Many are of great value, some of literary merit, and a few which deserve more than passing comment. Still, the truth with which we set out cannot be gainsaid, and the development of Southern literature remains for the future."[45]

After the lapse of ninety years modern criticism agrees with the judgment of the editor of *De Bow's Review* that no great work of literature, history, or music was produced during the war. The publishing houses and printers of the Confederacy cannot be held responsible for this failure since they published the best that was offered them. The preoccupation of southern writers with the war and with the struggle for survival seems to have seriously impaired their creative powers. William Gilmore Simms wrote a friend in 1863: "my heart is too full of anxiety to suffer me to write, and though I have a contract for some $200 worth of prose, I find myself unable to divert my thoughts from the crisis in which the country trembles in suspense. What I write is in a spasm—a single burst of passion—hope, or scorn, or rage or exultation."[46] It should also be remembered that until 1861 the South, as frequently pointed out by its editors, was largely dependent upon the North and Europe for the writing and production of the books and periodicals its people read. The psychological effect of this dependence upon the outside was a handicap which thoughtful Southerners strove diligently to overcome. While certainly not of the best quality, the total amount of publishing accomplished in the face of shortages of every kind and under the stress of war is a tribute to the ingenuity and industry of the people of the South.

[45] *De Bow's Review*, XXXIV (Columbia, July-August, 1864), 98.

[46] Simms, Odell and Eaves, eds., *The Letters of William Gilmore Simms*, IV, 436.

VI

THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR ON AGRICULTURE IN NORTH CAROLINA

Cornelius O. Cathey

War makes heavy demands upon a people—testing as it does their ability to cope with manifold economic and social problems no less than their ability to win success on the battlefield. Marching armies and a civilian populace must be fed and clothed. Among the many problems that the Civil War thrust upon southern agriculturists the most urgent was that they produce enough food and forage to meet the South's war-time requirements. Pre-occupied as they were with the production of money crops—cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugar—many pre-war southern planters and some farmers had neglected to produce even their own requirements of those items, and were compelled to buy some subsistence supplies from the North. President Davis and other southern leaders recognized early that the South must become absolutely self-sufficient in agricultural productions.[1] This objective was emphasized throughout the war and generally received an enthusiastic response. For reasons indicated below North Carolina came nearer to realizing this objective than any other Confederate state.

Unlike most of the seceding states North Carolina, in 1861, was already devoted to diversified farming, and had been giving less attention to the production of money crops than any of the southern states. It was predominantly a farming rather than a planting state. The number of land owners with holdings in excess of five hundred acres equalled only about 2 per cent of the total.[2] In 1860, there were 121 planters and 85,198 farmers in the state.[3] More than 70 per cent of the farmers owned no slaves at all, and the average holding was only 9.5 slaves.[4] The above is not to suggest that production of the staple crops was unimportant or neglected in the economy of ante-bellum North Carolina, but to emphasize the fact that the state's agriculture was already devoted primarily to self-sufficing farming, and well organized to produce the requirements of a people at war.

Although the planting of the 1861 cotton crop was almost finished at the outbreak of war in April, the acreage devoted to that crop was

[1] James D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy* (Nashville, 1905), I, 81-82, 123, 136; *Southern Cultivator,* XIX (May, 1861), 152.
[2] *United States Census of 1860* (Agriculture) (Washington, 1864), p. 210.
[3] *Ibid.* (Population) (Washington, 1864), pp. 362-363.
[4] *Ibid.* (Agriculture), pp. 235-236.

considerably less than in previous years. Several factors had influenced this reduction. Large crops in the four years ending in 1860 had gradually created a surplus in the markets, both domestic and foreign, which resulted in a decline in price in the Liverpool market even lower than the prices prevailing in southern cotton ports.[5] Editors of agricultural journals began to urge the planting of larger acreages in grain crops, "as a measure of prudence," even before the attack on Fort Sumter.[6] After that event, this advice became more urgent and was preceded by such captions as: "War! War!! War!!!"; "War! But Not Famine!"; and, "Some Seasonable Words to Our Agricultural Friends."[7] As a result, the 1861 cotton crop in North Carolina was about one-fourth less than that of the previous year and continued to decline each year as the war was prolonged.[8] Both the state and Confederate governments joined in recommending that less acreage be devoted to the cultivation of cotton and tobacco, and that more emphasis be placed on the production of subsistence crops.

Controversy soon arose as to just how much, if any, cotton should be produced in the South during the war. Planter reaction to this problem ranged all the way from a willingness to see the planting of cotton prohibited by law to the position that each planter had the right to do as he pleased.[9] The editor of the Fayetteville *Observer* doubted the wisdom of abandoning the crop, "as a means of punishing the yankees, who require 600,000 bales a year for the use of their factories."[10] "In the first place," he said, "it would punish England and France, whom we wish to make our friends, more than it would the yankees, as England and France need four times 600,000 bales a year."[11] Fears were also voiced that if peace should come within the year the South would have no cotton to sell; it would instigate a hostile feeling throughout the world against the South; and, would set all the world to devising ways and means of dispensing with the use of cotton altogether.[12] Undoubtedly, there were those who continued planting as much cotton during the war as their available labor supply would permit, but much the larger number of farmers considered such a course "unwise," "disloyal," "traitorous," "insane," and heeded the often repeated admonition: "Plant Corn and be Free, or Plant Cotton and be Whipped!"[13]

[5] *Rural Register,* II (December, 1860), 168; *Southern Cultivator,* XVIII (December, 1860), 369-371, 391.

[6] *Southern Cultivator,* XIX (January, 1861), 27.

[7] *Ibid.,* XIX (May, 1861), 152, (June, 1861), 184; *Rural Register,* II (May, 1861), 337.

[8] Reprint from the Wilmington *Journal* in Raleigh *Register,* August 7, 1861.

[9] Fayetteville *Observer,* November 18, 1861; Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* March 21, 1862; *Southern Cultivator,* XX (March & April, 1862), 69.

[10] November 18, 1861.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* March 21, April 17, 18, 23, 1862; Joseph G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin* (Raleigh, 1918), III, 306-307.

Statistics as to the production and consumption of cotton in the state during the war are either lacking or of doubtful accuracy. The best estimate is that thirty thousand bales were consumed in North Carolina during the year ending August 31, 1860, from a total crop of 145,514 bales.[14] The necessities of the times undoubtedly caused a considerable increase in this rate of consumption at the same time that the crop was being greatly curtailed.[15] Cotton cards became not only an important item of local manufacture, but, also, of import through the blockade.[16] Governor Vance collected sixty thousand pairs of hand cards and distributed them to the people of the state. The resultant increased local consumption of cotton, coupled with the amounts run through the blockade, and sold to Confederate purchasing agents, perhaps, left very little cotton in private hands by war's end as one editor expressed it, "to tempt (the yankees') cupidity and to reward their search!"[17]

Between 1840 and 1860 the culture of tobacco in North Carolina experienced rapid expansion, particularly in the counties of the northern Piedmont, where there was a remarkably "strong disposition" among farmers to try the crop.[18] The product increased 100 per cent in those twenty years.[19] This increase was paralleled in the other tobacco producing parts of the nation with the result that production ran ahead of demand, and, except for certain types of leaf, prices were trending downward at the time the war started. Many North Carolina farmers refused to sell their tobacco at the lower prices, and entered the war holding most of two crops to which a third was soon added.[20] This fact coupled with the pressing necessity for producing provisions crops, arrested the further expansion of tobacco culture in the state and severely reduced the acreage devoted to the crop. One prominent planter was advised by his overseer: ". . . i think it would be a good thing if there was nun raised during the War if the saim land was put in bred stuff. . . ."[21]

[14] *Southern Cultivator,* XVIII (December, 1860), 370-371; *United States Census of 1860* (Agriculture), pp. 105-111.

[15] *Southern Planter,* XXI (January, 1861), 58-63; J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy,* I, 136; Fayetteville *Observer,* December 14, 1863.

[16] See advertisement in Fayetteville *Observer,* September 5, 1864; Clement Dowd, *Life of Zebulon B. Vance* (Charlotte, 1897), p. 489.

[17] Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* March 21, 1862. Lewis S. Williams, of Charlotte, was appointed by the Confederate Government as Chief Agent for the purchase of cotton in North Carolina. Sub-agents were appointed by Williams in different parts of the state. Patriotic citizens were urged to take advantage of this opportunity "to aid the Government by selling to it their Cotton rather than to private, capitalists." Payments were made in either cash or 7 per cent Confederate bonds. Fayetteville *Observer,* September 24, 1863, April 18, 1864.

[18] *North Carolina Planter,* I (February, 1858), 57.

[19] *United States Census of 1860* (Agriculture), pp. 105-111.

[20] Nannie May Tilley, *The Bright-Tobacco Industry, 1860-1929* (Chapel Hill, 1948), pp. 358-359.

[21] J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin,* III, 222-223.

Paul C. Cameron, one of the most prominent planters in the state, planted only enough tobacco for his own use "and those who beg a quid of me. . . ."[22]

Consumption of tobacco, however, increased during the war—as it always has. Some were led to indulge in its use as an escape; some because of the absence of family restraints; and others just to follow the crowd. The effect of tobacco on soldier morale was recognized early in a proposal that each man be issued a tobacco ration. The Confederate Congress adopted this proposal in February, 1864.[23]

Farmers generally responded favorably to appeals to curtail the production of cotton and tobacco in the interest of producing a "superabundance" of provisions crops. Even though the farmers were often handicapped by a scarcity of labor, inexperienced management, and an inadequacy of implements, the weather circumstance was favorable, and their efforts were rewarded throughout the war with good yields. Maximum effort in this direction was advised constantly by the farm press, the government, and the farmers themselves.[24] In 1860, North Carolina equalled or exceeded the national per capita production or ownership of the following farm products: sheep, swine, dairy cattle, oxen, corn, Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, peas, peanuts, beans, and honey.[25] Although reliable statistics are not available, the increased emphasis on self-sufficiency in these and other subsistence items, undoubtedly, was reflected in greatly increased harvests. Where there was suffering for want of food by either man or beast in North Caolina during the war it was not due to an inadequate production of provisions.

President Davis spoke of the 1861 grain crop in the South as "the most abundant known in our history. Many believe the supply adequate to two years' consumption of our population."[26] Governor Vance observed in 1862 that much land in North Carolina previously planted in cotton and tobacco had been planted in corn and other grains, and the supply was sufficient "to feed the people and provide a surplus for the army." Also, "immense" crops of peas, potatoes, fruits, and other crops had been harvested.[27] Crop reports for 1863 were equally encouraging.[28] Reports from almost all parts of the state brought "cheer-

[22] *Ibid.*, III, 306-307.

[23] Joseph C. Robert, *Story of Tobacco* (New York, 1949), pp. 119-120.

[24] One editor said that failure to raise their own supplies would indicate that, "*. . . we are not only a blockaded but a block-headed people.*" Reprint from the Edgefield, S. C., *Advertiser* in *Southern Cultivator,* XX (January, 1862), 13. To conserve supplies of grain, North Carolina passed a prohibition law in 1862.

[25] *United States Census of 1860* (Agriculture), pp. 104-111.

[26] J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy,* I, 123.

[27] Quoted in Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* November 22, 1862.

[28] Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* March 17, 27, June 6, 18, 1863; Fayetteville *Observer,* November 2, 1863.

ing accounts" of crop conditions in 1864.[29] "But the most cheering aspect is," one reporter wrote, "the soul stirring confidence of our people in an overruling Providence—that 'the Heavens will not be as brass, nor the earth as iron.' "[30] Preparations for the 1865 crops were already being made when the scene of conflict was extended in the fall and winter of 1864-1865 to include North Carolina. This development severely disturbed the community, greatly accentuated the labor shortage, and brought some farming operations to a standstill. In some places, no wheat was sown in the fall of 1864.[31] Only in the more remote parts of the state could anything like normal farming operations be carried on in the spring of 1865.

General Sherman wrote from his headquarters in Goldsboro in March, 1865, that his army for some time had been living off the country which he found to have "more corn and forage than I had expected."[32] Governor Vance quoted General Joseph E. Johnston as saying that at the time of his surrender to General Sherman, "he had in depots in North Carolina, gathered in the State, five months supplies for sixty thousand men, and that for many months previous, General Lee's army had been almost entirely fed from North Carolina."[33] Private sources indicate that there was a sufficiency of provisions in the state at war's end.[34]

Production of sorghum and sugar cane in North Carolina during the war was expanded more than any other crop. Molasses made from the juice of these plants became a very important and popular item in the diet. Described as "a comparatively new article of food, and a luxury truly," immense quantities of molasses were made and consumed.[35] "Nearly every family has from 20 to 200 gallons," reported a Chatham County observer, "and some much more."[36] Fortunately, this crop could be grown in all parts of the state. Iron rollers for pressing out the juice replaced most of those made from wood during the war. Molasses mills, operated usually on a toll basis, were located in nearly every community.[37] Many experimented with molasses in efforts to make sugar.[38]

At the same time farmers were being urged to plant more grain crops they were also urged to increase their production of meat. "Under any circumstances," they were told, "grain is never lost, if unsaleable; it

[29] Fayetteville *Observer,* May 16, 1864. See also crop reports in *ibid.,* June 6, 23, 30, July 7, 18, August 18, 1864.
[30] *Ibid.,* July 7, 1864.
[31] *Ibid.,* November 7, 1864.
[32] *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman* (New York, 1891), pp. 316-317.
[33] Clement Dowd, *Life of Zebulon B. Vance,* p. 490.
[34] Cornelia Phillips Spencer, *The Last Ninety Days of the War in North Carolina* (New York, 1866), pp. 240-241.
[35] Fayetteville *Observer,* November 2, 1863, September 5, 1864.
[36] *Ibid.,* November 2, 1863.
[37] *Ibid.,* September 24, November 2, 1863.
[38] *Ibid.,* September 5, 1864.

may be converted into meat."[39] Generally, farmers followed this advice in a continuing effort to supply this important item in the diet.

Several factors contributed, however, towards making meat a scarce item. For several years just prior to the war diseases, particularly cholera in swine and milk sickness in cattle, had caused great losses to stock raisers.[40] Losses from these causes continued throughout the war.[41] For example, Judge Thomas Ruffin lost eighteen of his best hogs in a cholera outbreak in Rockingham County in 1864. ". . . it seems to me," his overseer wrote, "that we have had more providential calamertys in these days of truble that we ever had before."[42]

Prior to the war, too, North Carolina farmers had neglected to produce adequate supplies of forage for their livestock. This shortage was accentuated during the war. The Confederate Government used certain counties in the northwestern part of the state as a rest area for broken down cavalry horses. These animals and their attendants made such heavy demands on the available forage and other supplies that Governor Vance threatened to call out the militia and drive them from the state.[43] Jonathan Worth wrote in 1863: "I have never been so beset with difficulties . . . I have not a bundle of fodder or lb. of hay on hand and it is doubtful when I can get any even at $30. per cwt."[44] Two years later, he wrote: "It is becoming extremely doubtful whether I can get feed to keep my cattle alive."[45] Despite the efforts made to improve the situation, forage for livestock continued in short supply throughout the war.

Shortages of salt in 1861 and 1862 severely handicapped farmers in preserving their meat products. The extortionate prices demanded for this commodity drew forth advice on how to recover salt from the floors of smoke houses, and how to cure bacon with less salt.[46] New sources of salt were developed and the supply of this item more nearly met the demand in the last years of the war.[47]

There was a strong tendency among farmers to keep their meat product "under lock and key," and to retain control of it as long as possible. It represented considerable value per unit of weight. When properly "saved" it could be consumed at leisure. Agents of the gov-

[39] *Southern Cultivator,* XIX (January, 1861), 27.
[40] *North Carolina Planter,* I (August, 1858), 254; *ibid.,* II (August, 1859), 227; *ibid.,* III (September, 1860), 300.
[41] Joseph G. deR. Hamilton, *North Carolina Since 1860* (Chicago, 1919), p. 48.
[42] J. G. deR. Hamilton, (ed.), *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin,* III, 427.
[43] C. Dowd, *The Life of Zebulon B. Vance,* 78.
[44] Joseph G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth* (Raleigh, 1909), I, 221.
[45] *Ibid.,* I, 346.
[46] Fayetteville *Observer,* November 25, December 2, 1861; J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin,* III, 223.
[47] J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth,* I, *passim.*

ernment bent on impressing and foragers from the armies laid heavy hands on the meat supply. Then, too, the times were so unsettled, particularly in the last years of the war, that heavy losses of meat were suffered to thieves and vagabonds.[48] These factors, along with the unsatisfactory money situation, discouraged farmers from bringing their meat products to market or even acknowledging that they had a surplus. Poor distribution, for whatever cause, rather than inadequacy of supply should be offered in explanation for the suffering experienced for want of meat.

Keeping the ranks of the army filled presented a constant drain on the labor supply of North Carolina farms. Initially, volunteers and the militia were relied upon, but, as returns proved inadequate from these sources, resort was had to conscription. In all, the state furnished 125,000 men for the uniformed forces—a larger number than its voting population. Only about nineteen thousand of this number were drafted.[49] As enacted, the draft act exempted one person on each farm or plantation "upon which there are now. . . , 15 able-bodied field hands, between the ages of 16 and 50, upon the following conditions."[50] The stated conditions committed the exempted person "to employ in good faith, his own skill, capital and labor exclusively to the production of grain and provisions to be sold to the Government and the families of soldiers at prices not exceeding those fixed at the time for like articles. . . ."[51] Under this provision, 228 persons were exempted from the draft in North Carolina. In addition, 15,617 farmers were exempted from military service for physical and other reasons.[52] When the man from a non-slaveholding farm family volunteered or was drafted, management and the work of the farm fell to the lot of the housewife and minor children.[53]

Both the state and Confederate governments used slaves and freed Negroes on public works of all sorts. By an act passed in December, 1862, the Government was authorized to compel the services of any number of slaves to build fortifications and defenses. Each owner was required to furnish a proportionate number of slaves in the counties in which the projects were located. The state furnished rations to such slaves, paid the owners for their services, and provided compensation in case of death or loss of a slave.[54] Conscription of labor under this

[48] Robert D. W. Connor, *North Carolina: Rebuilding an Ancient Commonwealth* (Chicago, 1929), II, 186; J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, I, *passim*.

[49] Hugh T. Lefler and Albert R. Newsome, *North Carolina: The History of a Southern State* (Chapel Hill, 1954), p. 430.

[50] Reprint in Fayetteville *Observer*, July 4, 1864.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] Fayetteville *Observer*, November 24, 1864.

[53] R. D. W. Connor, *North Carolina: Rebuilding an Ancient Commonwealth*, II, 219-220.

[54] *Laws of North Carolina* (1862), pp. 24-25.

authorization, particularly in the eastern part of the state, seriously reduced the number of workers available for agricultural purposes. Governor Vance declined the request of the Confederate Government in February, 1863, to impress slaves to work on the railroad from Greensboro to Danville. "For many months past," he replied, "the eastern part of this State has been furnishing labor upon all the public works from Wilmington to Petersburg, and no less than twenty counties are so employing their slaves."[55] Hardships imposed upon freed Negroes who were conscripted under this act drew forth petitions in their behalf.[56]

Despite the tragic turn of events for the South, and the nearer approach of war to North Carolina the slaves, generally, remained steadfast in loyalty to their owners and performed their duties as well as could be expected.[57] The experience of Doctor J. B. Jones, of Chapel Hill, although perhaps unusual is informative. Doctor Jones had fifty-one slaves on his plantation near Kinston. When Federal troops threatened to overrun that plantation, the slaves, "with one exception, who may have straggled off, packed up their bundles, formed in line, and took up the march to the residence of their master; a distance of one hundred miles."[58] They arrived safely at their destination.

The shortage of farm labor called forth frequent complaint, and, caused reduction in the farm output. Sometimes, crops rotted in the fields for want of hands to harvest them. This was the experience of both large and small operators.[59] Although freeing of slaves became an objective of the North in the war, slave prices rose rapidly.[60] Action was taken in several towns to make it unlawful for a slave to open a shop or place of business, or to buy and sell articles.[61]

The labor situation was made more critical from 1862 onward by the presence in the state of increasingly large numbers of deserters and draft dodgers. These people were given refuge and welcome in those parts of the state where loyalty to the Confederacy was weakest. In one county they organized a regiment for self-defense.[62] Such persons posed a constant threat to law and order in the communities in which they were to be found, and seriously interfered with the conduct of normal farming

[55] C. Dowd, *The Life of Zebulon B. Vance,* p. 77.

[56] J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth,* I, 229-230.

[57] For example, see Charles Smallwood *Diary* (MS., Southern Historical Collection, Library of the University of North Carolina), November 13, 1861.

[58] Reprint from Raleigh *State Journal* in *Southern Cultivator,* XXI (January and February, 1863), 28.

[59] See Charles Smallwood *Diary, passim;* Fayetteville *Observer,* June 6, November 7, 28, 1864.

[60] Fayetteville *Observer,* November 9, 1863, June 30, 1864.

[61] *Ibid.,* July 7, 1864; Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* January 28, 1864.

[62] R. D. W. Connor, *North Carolina: Rebuilding an Ancient Commonwealth,* II, 186.

operations.[63] Although a special military district was set up to hold these deserters in check, Governor Vance considered them as only "absentees" and did not vigorously seek to discipline them.[64] A Randolph County observer, who advocated making terms with the "better class" of deserters, wrote: "There is not a day or night passes but what some one is robbed of all the parties can carry away. They are in bands in nearly all parts of the County unless it is stopped we shall be utterly used up."[65]

In other respects, too, farming was carried on under handicaps. The trend towards reform and improvement in the conduct of agriculture, which was very obvious in pre-war North Carolina, was arrested by the outbreak of hostilities. Of the two purely agricultural journals being published in the state, one, the *Edgecombe Farm Journal,* suspended publication in March, 1861, and the other, the *North Carolina Planter,* published only one issue after Fort Sumter. Publication of such journals became "peculiarly trying," as one editor expressed it. "It is really a shame," he wrote, "that a nation of Farmers and Planters should be so backward in their support of the Agricultural Press. . . ."[66] In all the South, only two agricultural journals continued publication after 1862.[67]

Likewise, the war brought a sudden lessening of interest in agricultural societies and fairs.[68] The North Carolina Agricultural Society, which had been very successful in promoting the farming interest during the 1850's, resolved in 1861 to maintain its organization, but because of the "state of public affairs" discontinued the holding of the annual State Fair.[69]

In so far as the situation permitted, the more intelligent farmers continued to employ in their farming operations the "improved" or "scientific" methods which were rapidly coming into vogue between 1840 and 1860.[70] Importation of Peruvian guano was cut off with the outbreak of war, although large orders had been placed for that item in the previous months.[71] Farmers were compelled to rely on home produced fertilizers—something the reformers had been urging for decades. The necessities of the times, too, called into existence manufacturing con-

[63] Fayetteville *Observer,* 1862-1865, *passim;* Hillsboro *Recorder,* 1862-1865, *passim;* J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin,* III, *passim;* J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth,* I, *passim.*

[64] R. D. W. Connor, *North Carolina: Rebuilding an Ancient Commonwealth,* II, 186-189.

[65] J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth,* I, 348.

[66] *Southern Cultivator,* XIX (July, 1861), 216.

[67] *Ibid.,* XXI (January and February, 1863), 25. These were *Field and Fireside* and the *Southern Cultivator.*

[68] Wayne C. Neely, *The Agricultural Fair* (New York, 1935), pp. 83, 86-87.

[69] Fayetteville *Observer,* November 25, 1861.

[70] For example, see Charles Smallwood *Diary.*

[71] *Rural Register,* II (February, 1861), 232, 248.

cerns to produce farm implements previously obtained from the North.[72] The Charlotte Foundry and Machine Shop announced its readiness in 1863 "to fill all orders" for agricultural implements of all kinds "with dispatch." Significantly, this concern offered at the same time to buy old iron, copper or brass castings or "take in exchange for job work."[73] The Western North Carolina Railroad added a department in its shop in Salisbury to make farm implements.[74] The output of such concerns plus the products of community blacksmiths failed to meet the farmers' requirements of implements.[75] Many farmers were reduced to the extremity of Weldon N. Edwards who wrote, in 1863: "I want Iron, steel, Hoes, axes and Ploughs and know not where to get them."[76]

The Confederate Government's failure during the war to solve adequately the currency problem led to an absurd inflation of prices, violent and unpredictable changes in price levels, speculation, hoarding, and much suffering among the people for want of the necessities of life.[77] Some farmers, despite the example offered by more patriotic neighbors and the pressure of public opinion, refused to sell their products for Confederate notes. Such refusal to sell was severely condemned by one editor as "unwise," "unpatriotic," and "suicidal." "The success of our cause is now dependent upon the currency question."[78] Farmers, too, voiced the hope that "some good and safe" means might be found to reduce the currency and bring down prices. One from Richmond County wrote: "I for one do not like to charge them nor pay them."[79] Unfortunately for the South, this problem, too, was never solved.

Prices of agricultural products in North Carolina climbed to dizzy heights as the cause of the South faltered. According to Professor Hamilton: "Bacon ranged in price, between September, 1862, and March, 1865, from 33 cents to $7.50; corn, from $1 to $30; eggs, from 30 cents to $5; molasses, from $3 to $25; wheat, from $3 to $50; flour per barrel, from $18 to $500; potatoes, from $1 to $30, with other supplies on a similar scale."[80] With price changes coming so fast, and generally rising, persons with surpluses were confused as to when to sell. "I have been trying to buy pork but find no one ready to say what he will sell at. . . ." is typical of remarks to be found in all newspapers published

[72] J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy,* I, 136; Fayetteville *Observer,* December 14, 1863.
[73] Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* January 5, 1863.
[74] Reprint from Salisbury *Watchman* in Fayetteville *Observer,* October 27, 1864.
[75] Governor Vance succeeded in importing a large number of scythe blades through the blockade. Fayetteville *Observer,* July 18, 1864.
[76] J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin,* III, 310-311.
[77] J. G. deR. Hamilton, *North Carolina Since 1860,* p. 48.
[78] Fayetteville *Observer,* October 5, 1863.
[79] *Ibid.,* November 2, 1863.
[80] J. G. deR. Hamilton, *North Carolina Since 1860,* p. 48.

in the state during the war.[81] "G. P.," of New Hanover County, complained to the Fayetteville *Observer* that in response to an advertisement appearing in that paper offering flour for $28 a barrel, he sent for a barrel and had to pay $228. "Our correspondent must recollect," the editor replied, "that in these days prices scarcely remain fixed long enough for the ink to dry on the newspaper which reports them."[82]

This situation had the effect of preventing the normal flow of farm products to market, and brought forth severe condemnation of those farmers who were withholding their surpluses. One editor, who claimed that the supply of provisions in the state was adequate, wrote: "We would most earnestly remonstrate against such a course. It is unpatriotic, inhuman, and must in the end prove injurious to their own interest, for it will necessarily lead to some steps, of legislation or otherwise, to remedy the evil and prevent starvation."[83]

The above remonstrance would have been unnecessary if the law of the state had been properly enforced. As early as December, 1861, the state passed a law prohibiting the engrossing of all sorts of provisions for speculative purposes, or withholding the same from the market, and preventing their "passing into the hands of the people."[84] This law remained on the books for the duration of the war, but was widely ignored despite the favorable press reaction to it, and frequent condemnation of speculators and extortioners by the Governor and Legislature.[85] The Raleigh *Standard* promised in 1861 to keep a "Roll of Dishonor" of the speculators and to publish it after the war.

To lessen speculation, the Governor proclaimed an embargo, in 1861, upon shipments out of the state of a long list of provisions except for use by the state or the Confederacy.[86] This embargo was modified and extended several times during the war.[87] In December, 1862, an act was passed appropriating $500,000 for use by the Governor, or agents appointed by him, in purchasing corn, bacon, and other provisions and storing them in safe places for sale, "at such prices as will cover the cost and expenses," to county courts for the poor or the families of

[81] J. G. deR. Hamilton (ed.), *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth,* I, 201. One editor said: "The man who refuses to take Confederate money is manifestly a public enemy, and ought to pack up and go to Lincoln's dominions. Fayetteville *Observer,* October 5, 1863.

[82] June 6, 1864. In answer to an earlier complaint on this problem, the editor said it was impossible to keep up with the market prices "even from hour to hour. Things go up or down with little apparent reason, and very suddenly." *Ibid.,* November 9, 1863.

[83] *Ibid.,* November 9, 1863.

[84] *Laws of North Carolina* (1861), pp. 22-23.

[85] Joseph G. deR. Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina* (Raleigh, 1906), pp. 76-77; Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* April 24, November 22, 1862; Raleigh *Register,* October 25, November 15, 1862; Fayetteville *Observer,* September 24, 1863.

[86] J. G. deR. Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina,* pp. 76-77.

[87] Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* January 5, May 14, 1863.

soldiers in the service.[88] This authorization was renewed from time to time during the war. An act was passed in 1863 making it a misdemeanor for anyone to purchase provisions falsely claiming that they were for use by the army, the state, or the Confederacy.[89] The state also resorted to price fixing in its efforts to combat speculation and extortion.[90] Commissioners of Appraisement were appointed and prices were fixed for all farm products at a level which would give owners "just compensation" for property impressed for the use of the government. These prices, of course, were far below prevailing market prices, and were generally ignored in private transactions.[91] Changes in price schedules were announced each sixty days.

Resort to impressments by the Government led to resentment, but probably helped prevent prices from rising even higher. One editor wrote: "There is no more delicate operation of the government than that of impressing private property. People can stand taxes . . . But impressments are partial . . . we exceedingly doubt the policy, the justice or the necessity. . . ."[92] It was alleged that impressments would tend to encourage farmers to withhold their products from the market and cause prices to rise.[93] The practice of government agents, however, was to pay "fair valuation" prices and to resort to impressment only when owners refused to sell at such prices.[94]

The tithe law passed by the Confederate Government in 1863 had more direct impact upon farmers than any other enacted during the war. Under this act, the farmer was permitted to reserve for his own use a total of 20 bushels of peas and beans, 50 bushels of sweet potatoes, 50 bushels of Irish potatoes, and 100 bushels of corn or wheat, and required to pay to the Confederate Government one-tenth of the remainder of his bacon, grain products, potatoes, forage, cotton, wool, molasses, sugar, peas, and beans. This tax was to be paid as soon as the crops were ready for market, and delivered to some depot "not more than 8 miles from the place of production."[95] Tax agents were appointed and collection points were designated throughout the state. Farmers making deliveries more than 8 miles were granted "liberal compensation."[96]

Reaction to this tax in kind varied considerably. "A. Farmer" wrote

[88] *Laws of North Carolina* (1862), pp. 23-24.
[89] *Ibid.*, (1863), p. 20.
[90] J. G. deR. Hamilton, *North Carolina Since 1860*, p. 50.
[91] Fayetteville *Observer*, October 12, 1863; J. G. deR. Hamilton, *North Carolina Since 1860*, p. 50. A mass meeting in Warrenton resolved that a 30 per cent write-up for resale should be the maximum allowed. Fayetteville *Observer*, November 2, 1863.
[92] Fayetteville *Observer*, October 12, 1863.
[93] *Ibid.*
[94] *Ibid.*, September 5, 24, December 22, 1864.
[95] *Statutes at Large, Confederate States of America, Third Session, First Congress* (Richmond, 1863), pp. 115-126.
[96] Fayetteville *Observer*, September 24, 1863.

that it was the "best law ever passed by Congress . . . I am satisfied that the majority of tax payers believe it an impartial necessity. . . ." A Richmond County correspondent stated that the tithes would be paid in that county "without a murmur." From Anson County came the word that, "Our people are paying and preparing to pay their 'tithes' cheerfully. Occasionally there is a grumbler, but upon the whole the law is probably as satisfactory as any that could have been framed to meet the emergency." A Warren County mass meeting unanimously resolved, "To deliver promptly the tenth of our products as required by law."[97] One person called the tithe law "one of the most righteous laws ever enacted by man."[98] On the other hand, a subscriber from Yadkin County wrote: "I can assure you I have yet (if ever) to see the first man who does not condemn it with all his might. It is a most odious law."[99] Objections to the tithe were based on charges that it effected accumulations of provisions at inaccessible places; it would be evaded; it would cause farmers to withhold products from the general market; it was wasteful; and, it necessitated a vast increase in the number of government officials. "Its tendency will be to make the war unpopular with the masses," one critic said, "smells too strongly of monarchial principles, and finally to *perjure* a great portion of the people of the Confederate States."[100] The "potatoe clause" was also thought to be a weakness in the law.[101]

Very incomplete returns from North Carolina indicate that the Confederate Government collected from the tax in kind by June 1, 1864, 41,000 bushels of potatoes, 613,000 bushels of corn, 767,000 bushels of wheat, 88,000 bushels of oats, 6,000 bushels of rye, 7,000 bushels of peas, 2,800,000 pounds of bacon, large amounts of hay, and other produce.[102] Collections from this tax in North Carolina were greater than in any of the Confederate States.[103] Taxation in all forms imposed a heavier and heavier burden on the people as the war was prolonged.

There was some suffering for want of food in North Carolina during the war, despite the many indications that the supply was adequate, and the substantial contributions of the state and benevolent organizations to relieve the needy. Speculation, extortion, and hoarding, along with depreciation of the currency gradually pushed the price of necessities, as Governor Vance expressed it, "beyond the reach of the poor."[104] There

[97] *Ibid.*, October 19, November 2, 1863.
[98] *Ibid.*, November 30, 1863.
[99] *Ibid.*, November 9, 1863.
[100] *Ibid.*, October 5, November 9, 1863.
[101] *Ibid.*, October 19, 1863.
[102] Reprint from Wilmington *Journal* in *ibid.*, July 7, 1864. The Norfleet Papers, referred to previously, contain copies of forms used in paying this tax and receipt forms.
[103] J. G. deR. Hamilton, *North Carolina Since 1860,* p. 52.
[104] Charlotte *Daily Bulletin,* November 22, 1862.

can be little wonder that thievery was common in the state. Sometimes, too, shortages of labor, and inadequate communication and transportation led to loss of crops and spoilage of supplies. Families of soldiers and persons on salaries were hardest hit. Laborers were a little better off because wages rose faster than salaries.[105]

In conclusion, it may be stated that the Civil War stimulated agriculture in North Carolina as it had never been done before. Adjustments to meet the requirements of war had to be made quickly. Particularly, the state must produce its own food and forage, and surpluses of each for use by the army. This was the major objective to which farmers' attention was directed. In accomplishing this objective, significant developments occurred in the state's agriculture. Production of the staple crops, cotton and tobacco, became increasingly less important. Likewise, the trend toward reform of agriculture, so noticeable in pre-war North Carolina, suffered a set-back. Interest in agricultural societies, fairs, publications, and "scientific" farming declined as farmers devoted more and more of their time and resources to meet pressing wartime needs. Production of food and clothing was adequate. Unfortunately, for reasons generally beyond the farmers' control, conditions made for a faulty distribution of their products.

[105] Fayetteville *Observer,* November 2, December 14, 1863.

BUSINESS LEADERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH CAROLINA, 1865-1900[1]

By J. Carlyle Sitterson

The years between the end of the Civil War and the opening of the twentieth century witnessed a remarkable industrial development in the region south of the Potomac. It has become so fashionable among Civil War historians to rationalize the sectional conflict as the great dynamic force in the creation of modern America that southern history is too often seen only in terms of the war—a war that ended the "Old South" and that unleashed the forces that would create a "New South." Thus the industrialization of the postwar South is contrasted with the staple crop agriculture of the ante bellum South. The implication, clearly evident even when not expressly stated, is that the cataclysmic impact of the Civil War was responsible for the industrial growth of the modern South. The continuity of economic development and business leadership in North Carolina, at least, suggests that this assumption should be re-examined.

Many a dejected Southerner in the dark postwar years could see only a dismal economic future for the South. "This country will do nothin' til we have some Northern men and capital" was the sentiment of many. Yet, under the leadership of a remarkable group of business men, the South experienced a significant industrial growth in the generation after the war.

North Carolina played a leading part in the industrial awakening of

[1] This study is based upon the careers of 120 business figures distributed among industries as follows: textiles, 37; tobacco, 13; furniture, 8; banking and finance, 12; transportation, 10; other, including mercantile, insurance, brokerage, etc., 40. The principal source was Samuel A. Ashe, ed., *Biographical History of North Carolina,* 8 vols. (Greensboro, N. C., 1905-1917), which contains sketches of 112 of the persons under study. In view of the importance of the furniture industry, it was deemed advisable to add six representatives from that industry on which data were readily available. Also, two additional textile leaders who were not in Ashe were added because of their importance and because biographical data were available. In addition to Ashe, a large number of additional sources were used some of which are indicated in the footnotes. However, since the intent is to appraise the quantitative significance of generally accepted data, no attempt has been made to delve deeply into a wide variety of primary sources. Because business figures were included in Ashe, there is no assurance that they were *the most important* figures in their industries, and a few of secondary importance may well have been included. In general, the names of the leading figures in the three major industries were included. With only three or four exceptions, these men were all born between 1820 and 1860. Although a few attained business prominence prior to the Civil War and continued to be important after the war, the great majority first attained success after the war and played a significant role in the economic development of postwar North Carolina.

the region and with little help from either northern men or capital. Despite the recognized importance of business leadership in the rise of industry, it is strange that one searches in vain among the writings of historians of the South for any comprehensive study or appraisal of the role of leadership in the economic development of the region. Where historians touch upon the business leaders they either give a few illustrations of the careers of well-known figures or generalize on the basis of a small number of cases. Thus John Spencer Bassett, usually a careful historian, in a biographical sketch of Washington Duke wrote: "If one will trace the histories of the successful men now [about 1900] in any Southern community he will see that a majority of them have come up out of those who in the old *régime* were not the most prominent. The new time in the South has been the day of him who was the small farmer of the old time."[2] But is this a statement of fact or only part truth that with time has become an unquestioned tradition?

Certainly an important factor in the history of North Carolina was the leadership provided by its business men. Who were they? North Carolinians or outsiders? Did they stem from upper, middle, or lower class economic origin? What were the religious, educational, and economic factors in their formative years? The most striking fact about the men who provided the leadership for the economic upbuilding of the state in the difficult post-Civil War period was that they were North Carolinians. Although data is not at hand for other states, it is hard to believe that any state has drawn more heavily on its own people for its economic development. In textiles, tobacco, furniture—the state's leading industries—and in the important auxiliary fields of banking, finance, trade, and transportation, with few exceptions the notable figures have been native North Carolinians. The few exceptions—R. J. Reynolds and George W. Watts in tobacco, the Cones, Daniel C. Tompkins, and Simpson Bobo Tanner in textiles, among others—were for the most part born in other southern states.

TABLE I

*North Carolina Business Leaders: Place of Origin**

	Percentage	Number	Percentage Pop. of N. C. Nativity, 1890
North Carolina	88.3	106	96.51
Other Southern States	8.3	10	
United States, outside South	.83	1	3.26
Other	2.5	3	0.23
Total Cases	99.93	120	100.00

* Place of birth has generally been used to determine place of origin. In several instances where business leaders were brought to North Carolina as young children, North Carolina is designated as the place of origin.

[2] Ashe, ed., *Biographical History*, III, 84.

What happens to the tradition that an influx of industrial-minded leaders from the northeast played a significant role in the rise of southern industry? In North Carolina, at least, the remarkable fact is the almost complete absence of such persons. Not a single person from the northeast played a decisive role in the building of North Carolina industry in the era, 1865-1900. Moreover, in many cases the business leaders came from families that had been in the state for several generations. In tobacco such families as the Dukes, Carrs, and Hanes, in textiles, the Battles, Cannons, Fries, Holts, Moreheads, and others, in furniture, the Lambeths and Wrenns, in transportation, A. B. Andrews, Wm. J. Hawkins, Robert R. Bridgers, and the Pages, had either been in North Carolina for generations or had come from a neighboring state, generally Virginia.

Another tradition that has gained widespread credence is that America's business leaders generally rose from low economic status; in other words, they were self-made men. For the nation as a whole, the falsity of this notion has been effectively demonstrated elsewhere.[3] Nor does North Carolina appear to have deviated to any great extent from the national trend. The striking fact, when compared with the "rags to riches" dream, is that a mere 4.2 per cent of the state's business leaders in the period under study came from the lowest economic class. This is even more striking when one considers that more than one third of the state's population was Negro (almost all in the lower class) and an additional large percentage of whites would have to be denoted lower class on an economic basis. In other words, more than one half of the state's population produced less than 5 per cent of its business leaders.[4]

TABLE II

Family Status (Economic and Social Status of Parents) of North Carolina Business Leaders

	Percentage	Number
Upper	49.2	59
Middle	37.5	45
Lower	4.2	5
Undetermined	9.1	11
	100.0	120

[3] C. Wright Mills, "The American Business Elite: A Collective Portrait," in *Tasks of Economic History,* V (December, 1945) supplement to *Journal of Economic History.*

[4] It is possible that this percentage would be increased somewhat but not substantially if data were available for the remaining eleven business leaders. Exact quantitative data on economic status for this period are not available. Although data determining class status are sometimes lacking and frequently not sufficient to differentiate between upper and middle class, no great difficulty was encountered between lower class and middle class. It is not believed that any substantial number of those classified as middle class could under any reasonable appraisal be placed in the lower economic group.

Equally striking is the fact that about 49.2 per cent of the business leaders were born into the upper economic class and accordingly had the usual advantages associated with such status.[5] When the number born into middle class families is added, the data become overwhelming that the North Carolinian born in the period 1820-1860 who was most likely to attain business leadership in the postwar era came from a family of some economic substance.

North Carolina's economy in the pre-Civil War period was predominantly agricultural. It is, therefore, not surprising that many future business leaders were born the sons of planters and farmers. In view of the limited amount of industry in the state, the interesting fact is that the fathers of 40 per cent of the future business leaders had themselves at one time or another had substantial business experience. Indeed, more than one fourth of the total number of fathers gained their livelihood from business exclusively. Many of the state's most notable tobacco and textile figures in the postwar era were born into families already well established in these fields prior to the Civil War.[6]

TABLE III

North Carolina Business Leaders: Occupations of Fathers

Occupation	Percentage	Number
Agriculture (40 agri. only)	33.3	63
Business (34 business only)	40.0	52*
Profession (Profession only, 6)	15.8	19**
Unknown	10.8	13
	99.9	

* 48 includes agriculture too.
** Includes agriculture and business also.

Of the three leading North Carolina industries, textiles, tobacco, and furniture, only in the latter which did not exist in the state prior to the war did the leaders in the postwar era represent essentially pioneers in a new field. In textiles and to a lesser degree in tobacco the pioneering really preceded the war.

In the textile and tobacco industries particularly, there was no sharp break between the prewar and postwar eras. The textile industry of modern North Carolina came directly from the well-established industry of the ante bellum period. Not only did many of the owners of the prewar factories continue in control through the war, but they took the

[5] Where there was doubt as to upper or middle class, the person was placed in the middle group. If anything, the percentage of upper class is conservative.

[6] Elizabeth Yates Webb traces the history of many of the leading textile families in "Development of the Textile Industry in North Carolina" (M. A. thesis, Brookings Institution, n.d.). Nannie M. Tilley, *The Bright Tobacco Industry, 1860-1929* (Chapel Hill, 1948), is the best source for this industry. Since Tilley is not concerned primarily with the leaders *per se*, this should be supplemented with J. D. Cameron, *A Sketch of the Tobacco Interests in North Carolina* . . . (Oxford, N. C., 1881) and H. V. Paul, *A History of Durham* (Raleigh, 1884).

lead in founding new factories generally in the central and western counties where the earlier mills had been built to take advantage of the water power of the Piedmont. Of the forty-nine mills in the state in 1880, at least twenty were old ones that had run more or less continually since before the war, fifteen were built by men who had been connected with the prewar mills, and several additional ones were built by men who had married into families of prewar entrepreneurs and been taken into the business.[7]

Several illustrations will suffice to indicate the continuity of family ownership and direction of textile enterprises. Michael Schenck built a small yarn mill in Lincoln County in 1813. Although his son did not continue in manufacturing, his grandson, Henry F. Schenck, built a small cotton factory in Cleveland County in 1873. His daughter married Thomas J. Ramseur, stockholder and later treasurer of the firm who was also associated with other mills in Lincoln County. John F. Schenck, the eldest son, abandoned a professional career to join his father and brother-in-law in the textile industry. Three of his sons became cotton manufacturers in Cleveland County in the present century to extend the Schenck management of textiles for five generations.[8]

In Edgecombe County, where Joel Battle and Henry Donaldson built the Rocky Mount Cotton Mills at the falls of the Tar River in 1817, the Battle family furnishes a similar example. Joel's cousin, James Smith Battle, bought the mill in 1848, and his son, William Smith Battle, managed the mill through the vicissitudes of the war and postwar era. Near the end of the century his son, Thomas Hall Battle, assumed the active management and the mill still remains in the family.[9]

In Forsyth, where Francis Fries entered the textile industry in 1836, three of his seven sons became prominent mill men. In time through marriages, members of the Fries, Patterson, Morehead, and Bahnson families became associated in various mill enterprises.[10] Equally notable was the Holt family in Orange and Alamance counties. Edwin Michael Holt initiated the enterprise in the 1830's when he built a mill on Great Alamance Creek, then in Orange County. Not only did all of Holt's sons follow him into the textile industry, but marriages of various Holt daughters and nieces brought the Williamsons and William A. Erwin into textiles. So extensive was the influence of the Holt family that in 1900 at least thirty-five mills then in operation had been largely established by the Holts and their connections and had been under their management.[11]

A similar continuity of family direction and marriage connections existed in the Leaksville-Spray area in Rockingham County among the

[7] Webb, "Textile Industry in North Carolina," Part V, 1-5.
[8] *Ibid.*, Part V, 6-8.
[9] *Ibid.*, Part V, 8-9.
[10] *Ibid.*, Part V, 10-12.
[11] *Ibid.*, Part V, 12-14.

Leak, Spencer, and Tanner families. The Cedar Falls Mill established in the Deep River section of Randolph County in 1836 became a training ground for a number of prominent textile families including the Worths, Coxes, Bransons, and Odells. John Milton Odell who was born near Cedar Falls in Randolph County in 1831 was employed in the 1850's as a salesman in the company store. After the war he became business agent of the mill; in 1877 he became an active owner and manager of a mill enterprise when he joined Paul Barringer and his son-in-law, John Phifer, in the purchase of the old MacDonald mill at Concord. Odell married Phifer's daughter and the two families along with R. W. Allison, another son-in-law, and Robert S. Reinhardt became associated with a number of mills. Odell so extended his operations that within a period of thirty years prior to his death in 1912 he was instrumental in organizing and was president of at least nine mills located in four counties and had joined the Cannons, Phifers, Holts, and Erwins in textile ventures extending from Cabarrus to Durham counties.[12]

Although the major textile figures of postwar North Carolina had the advantage of upper or middle class economic status, there were several who typify the self-made man and rose from poverty to wealth, power, and influence. Mark Morgan, born in Cumberland County in 1837, began work at the age of seven as a bobbin boy in the Rockfish Mill. A twelve hour work day with starting pay of 50 cents a week left him with neither the means nor the opportunity to acquire a formal education. Nevertheless, he learned the mill and its workings with such thoroughness that he became an expert textile mechanic. In 1867 he was made superintendent of Thomas M. Holt's Granite Mills at Haw River. But after several years he was forced by failing health to give up his position. He was sufficiently recovered by 1872 to lease from Charles Malloy the old Laurel Hill Mill in Richmond (now Scotland) County. Morgan was now well on the way to a position of leadership in the textile industry. He and Malloy became partners in the Richmond Cotton Mill. As was the case with so many other textile families, Morgan's son and son-in-law found the road to business leadership as mill excutives much easier than that trod by the founder of the enterprise.[13]

George Alexander Gray, born in Gaston County in 1851, followed his father in cotton mill work. He began work at the age of ten as a sweep boy in the famous Woodlawn or "Pinhook" factory that Caleb Lineberger and Moses Rhyne, both progenitors of famous textile families, had built in 1847. With only an elementary school education and without economic means, he nevertheless advanced steadily. At the age of

[12] *Ibid.*, Part V, 15-20; S. A. Ashe, "John Milton Odell" in Ashe, ed., *Biographical History*, II, 315-319.

[13] Webb, "Textile Industry," Part V, 24; Maxcey L. John, "Mark Morgan" in Ashe, ed., *Biographical History*, II, 286.

nineteen, he became assistant mill superintendent. In 1878 he was engaged by Oates Brothers and Company to equip and put into operation Charlotte's first postwar cotton factory. After an association of several years with R. Y. McAden in its management, in 1888 Gray cut loose and became the key figure in a new mill development. With R. C. G. Love, J. D. Moore, and others he organized the Gastonia Manufacturing Company, the town of Gastonia's first cotton mill. With G. W. Ragan and T. C. Pegram, Gray organized the Trenton Cotton Mills and in 1896 with J. F. Love, the Avon Mills. In 1900, Gray was the leading figure in the formation of the large Loray Mills in Gastonia, capitalized at $1,000,000 and operating 75,000 spindles. At his death, George Gray who had begun as a mill sweep boy on the eve of the Civil War was president of sixteen mills.[14]

The continuity of family ownership and direction of textile mills in the post-Civil War era was of great significance in shaping the North Carolina textile industry, although that problem is beyond the scope of this study. Certain factors, however, are obvious. The postwar mills, since they were generally continuations of prewar factories, were small and the small unit remained a characteristic feature of North Carolina textiles long after it had been outmoded economically. Mill managers and executives who had more or less "grown up" in the family business and who knew their workers and their families naturally had a paternal and personal interest in them.

Many of the leading tobacco manufacturers were formerly tobacco farmers. With the rise of tobacco manufacturing in postwar North Carolina the Dukes, Hanes, R. J. Reynolds, and others moved quickly into this occupation. The fact that so many of the tobacco leaders came from farm families and were not of the large ante bellum planter group made it easy to establish the tradition that they came from small farmer background, the implication being a background of poverty. Thus Washington Duke wrote of his own beginnings: "I began life in Orange [County] as a country boy with nothing. I never inherited a dollar. Up to the breaking out of the war I had been farming thirty years . . . by close economy I had bought and paid for my farm and had stocked it well."[15] Washington Duke was largely a self-made man, but even he could hardly be said to have been "born in poverty." His father was a captain of a militia company and deputy sheriff in Orange County and was "as prosperous as most of his neighbors."[16] By the time of the birth of his sons, Benjamin N. Duke and James Buchanan Duke, in 1855 and 1856, Washington Duke was a substantial farmer and his sons

[14] Webb, "Textile Industry," Part V, 20-22; Marshall DeLancey Haywood, "George Alexander Gray" in Ashe, ed., *Biographical History,* VII, 115-121.

[15] Washington Duke in Raleigh *News and Observer,* April 5, 1896.

[16] John Spencer Bassett, "Washington Duke," in Ashe, ed., *Biographical History,* III, 84-93.

were the beneficiaries of an academy education at the New Garden School in Guilford County.

Pleasant H. Hanes, one of the pioneer tobacco manufacturers in Winston-Salem, was likewise the son of a substantial farmer. Richard Joshua Reynolds was the son of Hardin W. Reynolds, one of the largest landholders and slaveholders in Patrick County, Virginia. In R. J. Reynolds' case, his father had already begun the manufacture of tobacco along with his farming operations in the 1850's. Thus, in a sense, he followed in his father's footsteps.[17] While Reynolds possessed a rough and unpolished personality and occasionally boasted that he had "studied little and learned less," in fact he attended Emory and Henry College, although he did not graduate, and Bryant and Stratton's Business College in Baltimore.[18]

Julian S. Carr, one of the key figures in the rise of the great "Bull Durham" tobacco company in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, is called by his biographer a self-made man whose success was due to his "own energy, intelligence and enterprise rather than to the accidents of birth."[19] There is no doubting Carr's energy, intelligence, and enterprise, but he was not without good fortune in his birth. The son of a Chapel Hill merchant, he attended the University of North Carolina at a time when college attendance was exceptional for any but members of the upper economic group. After the war when liquid capital was so scarce in the South his father in 1870 purchased for him one third interest in the W. T. Blackwell Company in Durham for $4,000, thereby making possible Carr's later fabulous career in tobacco, banking, textiles, and diverse economic enterprises.

Indeed, among the major figures of the rising North Carolina tobacco industry, one can find only two or three illustrations of the "rags to riches" thesis. Perhaps the best such example is that of William T. O'Brien. Born in Lynchburg, Virginia, in 1854, the son of an Irish immigrant, after an academy education he became an apprentice in a machine shop. After working for seven years as a machinist in cities in various parts of the country, he returned to Lynchburg, where in 1884 he was employed as a machinist by the Bonsack Cigarette Machine Company. Shortly thereafter he was sent to Durham to erect a Bonsack machine at the W. T. Blackwell Company. J. B. Duke found that his Bonsack machine did not work satisfactorily and employed O'Brien to work on it. O'Brien made certain alterations in the machine and so

[17] In 1860, Hardin W. Reynolds owned 23 slaves over twelve years of age, had personal property valued at $24,900 and operated a farm of 2,300 acres, with 500 improved, appraised at $11,500. Joseph C. Robert, *The Story of Tobacco in America* (New York, 1949), 127-128.

[18] W. A. Blair, "Richard Joshua Rynolds," in Ashe, ed., *Biographical History*, III, 334-340.

[19] S. A. Ashe, "Julian Shakespeare Carr" in Ashe, ed., *Biographical History*, II, 51-59.

impressed the Dukes that he became superintendent of the American Tobacco Company's Durham factory. With his savings, O'Brien invested in various other local enterprises and became a director in a number of companies, a benefactor of the Catholic Church in Durham, and a prominent figure in the state Republican Party.[20]

In the newer furniture industry which was established in the 1880's and 1890's, the story is much the same. The leaders were North Carolinians generally of middle class origin. Of eight such figures, only two had less than an academy education and five attended college or business school. Like the early tobacco figures, they came largely from farm backgrounds. And like their contemporaries in other industries, once they attained success they frequently invested their savings in varied local enterprises.

As would be expected in a state so predominantly Protestant in religion, the business leaders were largely of the various Protestant sects. Of those for whom definite church affiliation could be ascertained, only two were Jewish and two Roman Catholics. In contrast, thirty-four (28.3%) were Methodists and twenty-eight (23.3%) Presbyterians. Although the Baptists were the most numerous sect in North Carolina, only seven business leaders (5.8%) claimed such church affiliation. This is less surprising when coupled with the fact that business leaders came largely from the upper and middle classes among whom the Baptists did not bulk large.

TABLE IV

Church Membership of North Carolina Business Leaders

Denomination	Percentage	Number	% Dist. of Church Membership, 1890
Methodist	28.3	34	40.34
Baptist	5.8	7	45.37
Presbyterian	23.3	28	5.27
Episcopal	12.5	15	1.19
Roman Catholic	1.66	2	.39
Jewish	1.66	2	
Unknown	16.6	20	7.43
Other Protestant	10.0	12	
	99.85	120	99.99

In a period of American history in which only a small minority of the population attended college, the educational level of North Carolina business leaders was remarkable. Of the 120 studied, thirty-five (29.16%) were college graduates and an additional twenty-six attended college but did not graduate. The percentage with no formal education was negligible. That so many had an opportunity for higher education

[20] S. A. Ashe, "William T. O'Brien" in Ashe, ed., *Biographical History*, III, 303-307.

merely confirms the fact established earlier that the business leaders generally came from families of substantial means.

TABLE V

N. C. Business Leaders: Highest Educational Level Attained

	Percentage	Number
Negligible	1.66	2
Attended Grammar School	21.6	26
Attended Academy or High School	22.5	27
Attended Business School	2.5	3
Attended College	21.66	26
College Graduate	29.16	35
Unknown	.83	1
	99.85	120

Possessed of considerable education, some economic means, and frequently an opportunity to begin their business careers in their parents' or some relative's business, it is not surprising that those who attained success were well on the way at an early age. More than one half of all those studied had become the owners or the principal executives of a business before reaching the age of thirty and 88.3 per cent had arrived before reaching forty.

TABLE VI

N. C. Business Leaders: Age on Becoming Owner or Principal Executive of Business

	Percentage	Number
Under 30	55.8	67
30-40	32.5	39
Over 40	8.3	10
Unknown	3.33	4
	99.93	120

It is not the province of this study to appraise the subsequent careers of these builders of modern North Carolina. If the limited available data on such matters may be regarded as indicative of the group, certain aspects of their careers are interesting. A large percentage affiliated with the Democratic Party and took an active part in politics either in the party or in office holding. In numbers, membership in the Republican Party was negligible.

TABLE VII

N. C. Business Leaders: Political Activity

	Percentage	Number
Participation in Politics (in office holding, party activity)	45.83	55
Little or no Participation	5.83	7
No Data	48.3	58
	99.96	120

Democratic Party	49.1	59
Republican Party	4.1	5
No Data	46.66	56
	99.86	120

The overwhelming majority manifested an interest in educational, religious, or other philanthropic activities and gave either of their time or their money, frequently both.

TABLE VIII

N. C. Business Leaders: Educational, Religious, or Other Philanthropic Interests

	Percentage	Number
Service	43.8	60
Substantial Financial Contributions	21.9	30
No Data	34.3	47
	100.0	137*

* Some included contributions and service, thus increasing cases to 137.

Although they were usually primarily concerned with one type of business, after attaining success they diversified their business interests, in most cases in other community business enterprises. In short, these North Carolinians who were possessed of superior opportunities took advantage of them and in their own careers contributed substantially to the further economic, social, and political growth of their state.

VIII

THE COTTON CRISIS, THE SOUTH, AND ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1914-1915

By Arthur S. Link

The outbreak of the First World War in early August 1914 disorganized international trade and commodity markets, provoked a near panic on Wall Street, and deepened a business depression that had begun during the last months of 1913. But nowhere in the United States was the impact of the war more disastrous than in the South. Since 1897 Southerners had ridden the crest of the wave of inflation in commodity prices that had brought almost unparalleled prosperity to the rural areas. Between 1897 and 1913 the production of cotton had increased from roughly 4,500,000 to 14,000,000 bales, yet prices had also steadily risen under the pressure of a seemingly insatiable world demand. We do not need to belabor the obvious consequences of this phenomenon, for cotton was still the king of the southern economy.

The happy economic world of the South fell with a crash in the late summer and autumn of 1914, as the foundations of the cotton market sagged and then collapsed altogether. The prime cause of the cotton panic was the fear of an enormous domestic oversupply, stimulated by reports of the largest cotton crop in American history, by the anticipation of a decrease in normal British purchases, and above all by the fear that the large central European market, which absorbed more than one fourth of the American cotton exported in 1913, or about 2,500,000 bales, would be closed because of the lack of neutral shipping and perhaps because of British restrictions on sea-borne commerce to the Central Powers.

Whatever the causes, the consequences of the cotton panic were dire indeed. In order to protect the brokers, the New York, Liverpool, New Orleans, and other important cotton exchanges closed within a week after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. Thus almost overnight the normal market ceased to exist, and prices fell, when buyers could be found at all, from about twelve and one half cents a pound in July to between six and seven cents a pound by mid-October 1914. For the South as a whole, this meant a potential loss of half the value of the cotton crop, or some $500,000,000, with catastrophic consequences for the merchants, factors, and bankers who financed the crop and served the rural areas and above all for the thousands of cotton growers, large and small, who were most immediately affected.

The response of the southern leaders to this, the most portentous threat to southern prosperity since the depression of the 1890's, came almost simultaneously with the outbreak of the panic. On August 3, 1914, while the European nations were still busy declaring war on one another, E. J. Watson of Columbia, Commissioner of Agriculture of South Carolina and president of the Southern Cotton Congress,[1] summoned southern governors, commissioners of agriculture, bankers, merchants, and farm leaders to meet in Washington on August 13 and 14 with members of the Wilson administration and Southerners in Congress to discuss ways and means of averting wholesale panic. "In two days the price of cotton has begun to fall startlingly," Watson warned. "Cotton is about to move to the markets; the markets are about to be curtailed by millions of bales and closed. . . . It is clear that great damage has already been done."[2] On August 4, the day following Watson's call, moreover, representatives and senators from the cotton states, led by Representative A. F. Lever of South Carolina and Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia, met on Capitol Hill to make plans for the coming meeting and to draw administration leaders into the discussions.[3]

The so-called cotton conference met in the Pan-American Building in Washington on August 24 and 25, 1914, with some two hundred southern farm and business leaders in attendance. One speaker from Louisiana demanded that the federal government offer to buy cotton at forty dollars a bale, while a Mississippi congressman proposed that Congress permit state banks to issue currency on a basis of warehouse receipts for cotton. But on the whole it was a tame affair, and the delegates listened patiently while Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo condemned such "perfectly wild and ridiculous" schemes and explained the administration's plans to meet the cotton crisis. There could be no thought, he insisted, of projecting the federal government into direct support of the market; the only feasible solution was the extension of short-term credit to enable the southern farmers to hold their surplus cotton.[4]

[1] Formed in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1911 by representatives of the National Farmers' Union, cotton growers, and southern businessmen and bankers.

[2] E. J. Watson to "the People of the Cotton Belt," Aug. 3, 1914, copy in the Papers of Daniel A. Tompkins (MS. in the Library of the University of North Carolina).

[3] New York *World*, Aug. 5 and 19, 1914.

[4] New York *Journal of Commerce*, Aug. 25 and 26, 1914; New York *Times*, Aug. 25 and 26, 1914.

McAdoo explained his relief plan in explicit detail in a public statement issued two days after the end of the cotton conference. He would, the Secretary promised, issue emergency currency authorized by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 to groups of national banks on a basis of short-term notes secured by warehouse receipts for cotton or tobacco, at 75 per cent of the face value of the notes. In this manner, he continued, southern merchants and bankers could obtain ample credit to carry the farmers through the next critical four months. *Ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1914. Studying

There was a momentary return of confidence during early September, encouraged by the "buy a bale of cotton" movement, which began in the South around September 1, 1914, and spread to the North three weeks later. "There is no reason, in my opinion, for pessimism in the South about cotton," McAdoo declared reassuringly on September 21. "The assistance which the Federal Government is extending to the banks, through the issuance of national bank currency notes secured by cotton warehouse receipts, has already greatly improved the situation, and if the banks, the merchants, and the manufacturers throughout the South will quit taking counsel of fear and will go forward with confidence, the situation will, I believe, improve still further."[5]

Yet developments in the South were generating a new and more critical phase of the cotton crisis even as McAdoo spoke. Experience soon proved that the currency machinery authorized by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act was too cumbersome and inadequate to provide any substantial credit relief. For one thing, the emergency currency authorized by this measure had to be redeemed within four months, and it was obviously impossible to move the cotton crop of 1914 within so short a time.[6] For another, the great mass of banks that served the southern farmers and merchants, the country banks, were not members of the national banking system and could not participate in the so-called national currency associations formed under the Aldrich-Vreeland Act for the purpose of issuing emergency currency. In many cases, moreover, the state banks found it simply impossible to borrow the emergency currency from the larger commercial banks. Clarence Poe of Raleigh, North Carolina, editor of the *Progressive Farmer* and one of the leading southern agrarian spokesmen, contrasted McAdoo's optimistic forecasts with reality in early October 1914:

"The facts are that we have not been able to get from the banks the help indicated by the foregoing utterances [by the Secretary of the Treasury]. . . . The State banks . . . report that they can't get additional currency from their Nationl banking correspondents. Even the offer to issue emergency currency to 75 per cent of the value of warehouse receipts was illusive. . . . In a word, the banks have fallen down on their job—not voluntarily perhaps, but involuntarily. They have been framed for serving commercial interests, and they are afraid to risk making heavy loans to agricultural interests."[7]

McAdoo's plan, a committee appointed by the Secretary at the cotton conference approved and suggested that southern banks lend to the farmers on a basis of eight cents a pound for cotton. *Financial Age,* XXX (Sept. 5, 1914), 418.

[5] New York *Times,* Sept. 22, 1914.

[6] As Governor Oliver B. Colquitt of Texas pointed out. See Colquitt and C. H. Terrell to R. L. Henry, Sept. 12, 1914, the Papers of Carter Glass (MS. in the Library of the University of Virginia); hereinafter cited as the Glass Papers.

[7] C. Poe to Josephus Daniels, Oct. 5, 1914, the Papers of Woodrow Wilson (MS. in the Library of Congress); hereinafter cited as the Wilson Papers.

As the bottom dropped out of the market when cotton began to move in large quantities during early October, a gripping fear and a demand for speedy federal action spread through the South. "It seems to me that unless we are given relief and that in short order," one South Carolina country banker wrote, "the whole south will be put into bankruptcy and ruin."[8] "Ruin [is] now running riot in the South," warned Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas. "May God in his infinite wisdom point us some path to safety."[9] "The deliberate judgment of our most capable thinkers," added a group of Austin bankers, "is [that] without prompt and substantial help from the national government, Texas will soon confront a condition of general bankruptcy. The condition grows more threatening every day."[10]

It was no time, southern leaders in all walks of life declared, for halfway measures or reliance upon voluntary solution. It was a time, they said, for bold, even unprecedented, action by the federal government, which alone could cope with a problem so enormous. On September 18, 1914, a spokesman for the National Farmers' Union offered a simple plan that promised a comprehensive solution. Let Congress, he suggested, first reinforce the market by offering to buy three or four million bales of cotton at twelve cents a pound; then let Congress give definitive relief by imposing a tax of ten cents a pound on all cotton produced in 1915 in excess of one half the crop of 1914.[11] Hailed by leaders from all parts of the South, the Farmers' Union plan at once became the region's solution for the cotton crisis.

A controversy of large proportions developed rapidly in the wake of the discussions that followed the publication of the Farmers' Union plan, as spokesmen for the Wilson administration condemned the proposal and southern leaders in Congress prepared for their first important battle with the administration. The Secretary of Agriculture, David F. Houston, attempted to halt the burgeoning movement for decisive federal action by issuing a stern rebuke to the southern leaders on September 28, 1914. The federal government, he warned, would not yield to this unprecedented demand for special privileges and an unconstitutional regulation of agriculture. "It is not a question of sympathy—the cotton growers have the sympathy of the whole world in their distress," he added, "but a question of sound business and good government."[12] Meeting in Washington the following day, a conference of southern governors, senators, and congressmen replied with a series of resolutions

[8] J. W. Hamer to Woodrow Wilson, Oct. 8, 1914, *ibid.*
[9] Sheppard to Wilson, Oct. 29, 1914, *ibid.*
[10] William R. Hamby *et al.* to E. M. House, Oct 13, 1914, the Papers of Edward M. House (MS. in the Library of Yale University); hereinafter cited as the House Papers.
[11] S. G. McLendon to Woodrow Wilson, Sept. 18, 1914, Wilson Papers.
[12] New York *Times,* Sept. 29, 1914.

demanding immediate action along the lines of the Farmers' Union plan.[13]

Thus the stage was set for the decisive congressional phase of the struggle. It opened in the first week of October, when Representative Robert L. Henry of Texas, speaking for the newly-formed cotton bloc, appealed directly to the President and the Secretary of the Treasury on October 2[14] and three days later introduced a cotton relief bill in the House of Representatives. It instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to issue $500,000,000 in currency for deposit in national and state banks in the cotton states; in addition, it required the banks to lend the money to cotton producers at 3 per cent interest against the security of cotton valued at ten cents a pound.

"Mr. Speaker," Henry declared in an impassioned defense of his bill, "the people of the South are prostrated in this present crisis. . . . What we need is . . . the strong arm of this Federal Government to be extended to the 30,000,000 people in the South who produce 15,000,000 bales of cotton. . . . *So we resort to the issuance of United States notes by the Federal Government, the only sovereignty and agency that has the power and upon whom rests the duty to supply the people with an adequate amount of currency in such crises as these.* . . . That is the proposition. I know that gentlemen will say that this is populism and amounts almost to anarchy in our financial system. . . . But I maintain that this Government was set up for the benefit and protection of the people. Sirs, in a crisis like this I have crossed the Rubicon, I have burned my bridges, and am ready to *fight for the principle that this Government shall issue its currency and preserve the progress and prosperity of the southern people.*"[15]

The battle over relief for the cotton states raged with increasing intensity in Washington all during the first three weeks of October 1914, as most of the southern agrarian representatives and senators rallied behind the Henry bill or some variation of it and the administration and its loyal spokesmen in Congress joined with the Republican minority to head off the southern revolt. There was more involved here than met the casual eye. The superficial issue was the method and form of federal relief; the fundamental issue, however, involved the larger question of the limits of federal activity in the economic field. Still imbued with the New Freedom doctrines of limited governmental activity and the New Freedom opposition to direct federal intervention in behalf of any class or interest, President Woodrow Wilson and his followers were in principle opposed to direct federal support of the cotton

[13] *Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1914.

[14] R. L. Henry *et al.*, "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT," Oct. 2, 1914, Wilson Papers; also printed as R. L. Henry to W. G. McAdoo, Oct. 2, 1914, in *Congressional Record*, 63d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 16069-16070.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 16204-16208.

market or regulation of crop acreage. The southern agrarians, on the other hand, were the inheritors of the Populist tradition and were in 1914 among the prime exponents in the United States of a program of comprehensive federal aid to agriculture and labor.[16]

We can better understand the cotton controversy when we view it in light of the political situation prevailing in 1913 and 1914. That controversy was no isolated episode; on the contrary, it was a revealing phase of a long struggle between a relatively conservative administration and a powerful pressure group, the so-called southern agrarian radicals, who, along with other advanced progressive groups, were seeking to extend the authority of the federal government into many new areas.

During 1913 and early 1914, the southern agrarians had joined midwestern Republican insurgents in successful forays to force the Wilson administration to increase the income tax imposed by the Underwood tariff bill and to accept amendments that greatly expanded the measure of public control over the banking system provided in the Federal Reserve Act. At the same time, they had struggled vainly for a large-scale rural credit system and for the exemption of labor and farm organizations from the penalties of the antitrust laws, and other such conflicts impended in the future.[17] The controversy over relief for the cotton farmers, however, revealed the ideological gulf separating the administration and the advanced progressive elements in Congress and the country more clearly than did any other episode of the Wilson era.

President Wilson, who had earlier withdrawn largely from public affairs following the death of his wife on August 6, 1914, took charge of the administration forces two days after Representative Henry introduced his relief measure. Addressing a delegation of North Carolinians who came to the White House on October 7, the President declared that the cotton crisis had to be met, not with the heart, but with the head, and "within the limitations of economic law and safe finance."[18] It was an unmistakable warning that he would veto the Henry bill if Congress approved it. The following day, October 8, moreover, Wilson told a group of Georgians that he did not favor plans to reduce cotton acreage in 1915. Such plans, he said, had to be uniform and universal in order to succeed, and he did not see how they were possible.[19]

The President's opposition was a crushing blow, but Henry and a group of Southerners prepared a new relief bill on October 7 and 8 in

[16] For a fuller discussion of the southern agrarian group and their conflict with and contributions to the Wilsonian domestic program, see Arthur S. Link, "The South and the New Freedom: An Interpretation," *American Scholar*, XX (Summer 1951), 314-324.

[17] See A. S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (New York, 1954) and *Wilson: The New Freedom* (Princeton, 1956).

[18] New York *Times*, Oct. 8, 1914.

[19] *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1914.

the hope of finding an acceptable compromise. Introduced in the House on October 9, the revised Henry bill directed the Secretary of the Treasury to raise $250,000,000 through the sale of so-called Panama Canal bonds and to deposit the money in southern national and state banks for the use of cotton and tobacco farmers.[20] On October 14, moreover, Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia, spokesman for a large group of senators from the cotton states, introduced a similar measure, which included also a provision for a prohibitive tax on all cotton grown in 1915 in excess of one half the crop of 1914.[21]

In spite of overwhelming southern popular support and of attempts by southern leaders in both houses to filibuster and prevent congressional adjournment or approval of a war revenue tax bill if some relief for the South were not forthcoming, the President and his lieutenants stood firm against all proposals for direct assistance. In the end, therefore, the southern insurgents gave up the fight and permitted Congress to adjourn on October 24, 1914.[22]

The President and Secretary of the Treasury, meanwhile, had been genuinely alarmed by the threat of economic ruin in the South and hard at work on their own program even while they stood off the southern demands for federal intervention to support the cotton market. "I have spent more sleepless nights thinking about cotton than anything else with which I have had to deal since I took charge of the Treasury Department," McAdoo wrote on October 14, 1914.[23] "The thing that is giving us the greatest concern just now," Wilson wrote the following day, "is the situation of the South in view of the tremendous curtailment of the market for her one marketable crop, the cotton. For a little while it looked like bankruptcy, and that is among the disturbing possibilities yet."[24]

To confront the problem and allay the savage criticism of many Southerners,[25] McAdoo and other administration leaders worked out a

[20] *Ibid.,* Oct. 9 and 10, 1914; R. L. Henry to Carter Glass, Oct. 9, 1914, Glass Papers, enclosing a copy of the revised Henry bill.

[21] The Smith bill provided that the Secretary of the Treasury should issue $250,000,000 in bonds, to be given directly to farmers in exchange for cotton at fifty dollars a bale. The bonds would bear interest at 4 per cent and would be payable at the end of three years. New York *Times,* Oct. 15, 1914.

[22] For running accounts of the final phase of the controversy in Congress, see the debates in the *Congressional Record,* 63d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 51, Part 16; New York *Times,* Oct. 13, 15, 17, 22, 23, and 25, 1914; and New York *World,* Oct. 18 and 23, 1914.

[23] W. G. McAdoo to J. Daniels, Oct. 14, 1914, the Papers of Josephus Daniels (MS. in the Library of Congress); hereinafter cited as the Daniels Papers.

[24] Wilson to Mrs. Crawford H. Toy, Oct. 15, 1914, the Ray S. Baker Collection of Woodrow Wilson materials (MS. in the Library of Congress).

[25] See, *e.g.,* the statement by Governor O. B. Colquitt of Texas, printed in the Fort Worth *Star-Telegram* and other newspapers on December 27, 1914. "The President," Colquitt charged, "stood in the road and condemned the South, which made him, to heavier loss and more widespread misery than it has known in three

program to save the cotton farmers without launching the federal government upon allegedly dangerous experiments. The first item was a measure written by McAdoo and introduced in Congress in August 1914, which provided for the establishment of a federally-owned and operated shipping line, in part in order to carry cotton to European neutrals and to Germany. This, the so-called ship-purchase bill, was defeated by a bipartisan conservative coalition in the Senate in the last days of the Sixty-Third Congress in March 1915. The second item in the administration's program was a measure prepared by Secretary Houston and sponsored by Representative A. F. Lever of South Carolina. It provided for a system of federal inspection and licensing of agricultural warehouses, in order to facilitate borrowing by farmers against warehouse receipts. The southern insurgents attacked the Lever bill as a poor substitute for their own relief measure; but the President applied heavy personal pressure and obtained congressional approval a few days before Congress adjourned in October 1914.

The administration's ace in the hole, however, was an ambitious plan, first proposed in early October 1914 by Festus J. Wade, president of the Mercantile National Bank of St. Louis, to mobilize private banking resources in a great cotton loan fund to be used to enable southern farmers to hold their cotton for at least one year. McAdoo and Colonel Edward M. House of Texas, the President's leading adviser, at once made the cotton loan plan the cornerstone of the administration's program for southern relief. As House explained to Wilson, "This is an emergency matter of the greatest importance. . . . If this plan goes through, . . . [Southerners] will be satisfied that the Administration has met the emergency."[26]

The story of the formation of the cotton loan fund can be briefly told. The first high level discussions began in Washington on October 9, 1914, when McAdoo and House conferred with Wade and other St. Louis bankers and businessmen and Albert H. Wiggin of the Chase National Bank of New York. Colonel House explained the proposal to the leading Wall Street bankers on October 13 and won their promise to participate. The newly-organized Federal Reserve Board gave its blessing on October 24 and, besides, agreed to administer the fund. Finally, the plan went into effect on November 30, 1914, after the completion of the subscriptions and in spite of the strong opposition of New England bankers, who had no desire to abet any scheme to help maintain the price of raw cotton.[27]

---

generations. He vindicated an obsolete theory of political economy but he mighty near ruined the country by doing it."

[26] E. M. House to Wilson, Oct. 14, 1914, Wilson Papers.

[27] The above paragraph is based upon E. M. House to Wilson, Oct. 9 and 14, 1914, *ibid.;* the Diary of Edward M. House (MS. in the Library of Yale University), Oct. 13, 14, and 17, 1914; W. G. McAdoo to E. M. House, Oct. 12, 1914,

As it was finally put into operation, the plan established a cotton loan fund of $135,000,000, two thirds of which was subscribed by banks in the North and Middle West, to be administered by a committee of Federal Reserve Board members and private bankers and distributed to banks in the cotton states by state and local committees. The local banks, in turn, might lend the money to farmers against warehouse receipts on a basis of 4.8 cents a pound for middling cotton. Such loans would bear interest at 6 per cent, would run for one year, and might be renewed for an additional six months.[28]

Launched with great fanfare as the salvation of the South, the cotton loan fund soon proved a total failure as a means of affording new credit to the hard pressed farmers. This was true, primarily, because for all their troubles the farmers could get better terms than 4.8 cents a pound on cotton through ordinary banking channels, especially through the Federal Reserve System, which went into operation in November 1914. "There is no doubt," one Texan complained, "but what the cotton loan plan is badly balled up. . . . It is a matter of common rumor in banking circles in Texas that bankers in the North and East have stated that it was not intended by at least some of the subscribers to the fund that the money subscribed should be actually used; that the condition should be made so onerous and unworkable that it would not be used, and that in this way it would serve the purposes of 'jollying the South,' without really giving them any financial relief."[29] It was true, besides, because the machinery of the plan was so cumbersome as to make it virtually impossible for the ordinary farmer to obtain a loan.[30] As a result, the cotton loan fund committee had made seven loans, totaling some $28,000, by the time it wound up its affairs and went out of business in early February 1915.[31]

All told, the cotton farmers suffered an immediate cash loss of some $300,000,000 during 1914, but somehow they struggled through the winter of 1914-1915 and managed to carry over a surplus 4,000,000 bales of cotton. And yet there were signs of returning stability even during the period of greatest despair. The cotton exchanges, for example, reopened on November 16, 1914, with cotton selling at around

House Papers; E. M. House to W. R. Hamby, Oct. 14, 1914, *ibid.;* S. R. Bertron to Wilson, Oct. 13, 1914, Wilson Papers; W. G. McAdoo to Wilson, Nov. 6, 1914, *ibid.;* New York *Journal of Commerce,* Oct. 6, 7, and 30, 1914; New York *Times,* Oct. 9, 10, 16, 20, and 25, Nov. 18, and Dec. 9, 1914. For the opposition of the New England bankers, see Josiah Quincy to E. M. House, Oct. 28 and Nov. 9, 1914, House Papers; *Financial Age,* XXX (Nov. 14, 1914), 917; St. Louis *Star,* Nov. 16, 1914; New York *Sun,* Nov. 16, 1914; Boston *Transcript,* Nov. 19, 1914.

[28] New York *Times,* Oct. 28 and Dec. 9, 1914.

[29] Thomas B. Love to E. M. House, Dec. 13, 1914, House Papers.

[30] For an illustration of these difficulties, see the *Financial Age,* XXX (Nov. 21, 1914), 943.

[31] New York *Times,* Feb. 3, 1915.

seven and one half cents a pound. From this point on until mid-February 1915 prices slowly improved in response to increased buying. Spot prices on the New York Cotton Exchange, for example, averaged around eight and one half cents a pound for middling cotton during the last week in January and the first week in February 1915.

An important reason for the increase in prices was the strong revival of foreign purchases toward the end of 1914. Buying on the Liverpool exchange was so heavy during January 1915, for example, that by the end of the month exports were actually running ahead of exports for a comparable period a year before. To Southerners, however, the most encouraging sign of all was the renewal of the cotton export trade to the European neutrals and to Germany, following the giving of positive assurances by the British government that it had not made cotton either conditional or absolute contraband and would not attempt to suppress its shipment to Germany.[32] The Germans, like the English, did not begin buying American cotton in quantity until near the end of 1914; but by early February 1915 cotton was moving in a steady stream to Rotterdam and Bremen.

Therefore, just when it seemed that the normal world markets were reopening and that the worst of the cotton crisis was over, the war on the seas erupted in a new phase that threatened to destroy all hopes for southern recovery. Allegedly in retaliation against a British food blockade, the German government on February 4, 1915, announced a submarine blockade of the British Isles and warned that any enemy vessel within the war zone would be destroyed. Invoking the right of reprisal, the British government replied on March 1 and 11, 1915, by prohibiting *all* neutral commerce to Germany, through neutral or German ports.

It was the beginning of an all-out struggle for control of the seas that would eventually draw the United States into the war. But at least until the late autumn of 1916 the British government pursued its campaign of economic warfare with careful regard for American opinion, applying only such pressure against Germany as was compatible with retaining American friendship. That friendship, so vital to an Allied victory, could be retained only if the British blockade did not destroy American prosperity or the prosperity of a section or interest powerful enough to force the Washington government to take effective counter measures.

This was the hypothesis that governed all British policies *vis-à-vis* the United States during the period from 1914 to late 1916. As Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, afterward put it: "It was

[32] Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, Oct. 26, 1914, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement* (Washington, 1928), p. 289; Ambassador Spring Rice to the Acting Secretary of State, Oct. 26, 1914, *ibid.*, p. 290; New York *Times*, Oct. 26 and 27, 1914.

better . . . to carry on the war without blockade, if need be, than to incur a break with the United States about contraband and thereby deprive the Allies of the resources necessary to carry on the war at all or with any chance of success. The object of diplomacy, therefore, was to secure the maximum of blockade that could be enforced without a rupture with the United States."[33]

Britain's task of blockading central Europe and of channeling the huge American export trade exclusively into Allied ports without provoking a fatal rupture with the United States was not as difficult as might appear at first glance. To begin with, the great bulk of American exports, particularly of midwestern foodstuffs, went normally to the Allied countries or to areas far removed from the scene of hostilities, while strong financial ties bound the United States to the Allied world. In addition, early in the war the British removed potential sources of friction by making special arrangements with American producers of meat, copper, and oil to purchase all their exports at a generous price.

Thus by the spring of 1915 the sole remaining *economic* source of potential serious Anglo-American friction was the cotton trade. A reckless Allied policy, say, of preventing the export of cotton to central Europe without doing anything to support the cotton market, would inevitably engender a strong southern demand for retaliatory action. To the British, the gravest threat of all was the possibility that the powerful southern bloc in Congress would combine with pacifist and pro-German groups to create an irresistible demand for an embargo on the export of munitions to the Allies or for positive efforts to break the British blockade.

The British fear was by no means fanciful. Certainly the chief objective of McAdoo's ship-purchase bill was to provide bottoms to carry cotton to Holland and Germany; and by January 1915 administration leaders were talking seriously about using naval transports to carry cotton to Europe.[34] There was, moreover, such strong support in Congress for an embargo on the export of munitions in 1915 and early 1916 that a solid southern support for an embargo bill might have put it across.

The chief objective of British diplomacy *vis-à-vis* the United States in 1915, therefore, was to find a way of shutting off the export of American cotton to Germany without endangering American good will. It was an immensely difficult task, complicated by a powerful demand in Great Britain for the indiscriminate outlawing of all non-Allied cotton exports. But in the end the British Foreign Secretary and his associates

[33] Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916* (2 vols., New York, 1925), II, 107.

[34] *E.g.*, W. C. Redfield to Woodrow Wilson, Jan. 18, 1915, Wilson Papers, enclosing Redfield to L. M. Garrison, Jan. 18, 1915, and Redfield to J. Daniels, Jan. 18, 1915.

succeeded and thereby perhaps guaranteed American acquiescence in the British maritime system. Let us now see how this was done, and what the consequences were.

The first task confronting the British Foreign Office in the late winter and spring of 1915 was to prevent the collapse of the cotton market as a consequence of the inauguration of the all-out blockade of Germany. This the Foreign Office accomplished in three ways. First, it issued its blockade Order in Council of March 11, 1915, without putting cotton on the contraband list and accompanied that Order with assurances that noncontraband goods suspected of having a German destination would not be liable to confiscation but would either be purchased by the British government at the contract price or else returned to its owners. Second, the Foreign Office gave assurances on March 8, 1915, that all American cotton destined for the European neutrals or for Germany by way of neutral ports would either be given free passage or else purchased by the British government, provided the cotton left the United States before March 31, 1915.[35] Third, in order to avert the demoralization of the cotton market as a consequence of the inauguration of the blockade, the British government began purchasing cotton in large quantities on the New York and Liverpool exchanges on about March 1, 1915. The result was to push the price of spot middling cotton in New York from 8.25 cents a pound on March 1 to 9.55 cents a pound on March 25, 1915.[36]

Although these measures sustained the cotton market and forestalled a general anti-British movement in the South during the early spring of 1915, actually the most dangerous phase of the Anglo-American tension over the cotton trade impended. As the British tightened their blockade and, more important, gave signs of an intention to make cotton contraband, a wave of hysteria swept over the South during the late spring and early summer. It was stimulated by a fear that the British would suppress cotton exports to Europe altogether and begin a program of confiscation on the high seas, and that this in turn would mean a new demoralization of prices and another year of sub-depression for cotton growers already deeply in debt because of heavy losses in 1914.

"The opinion was unanimous," Representative Lever reported to

[35] *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement* (Washington, 1928), p. 189; hereinafter cited as *Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement.*

[36] Since the British Foreign Office has declined to permit the present writer to examine its archives for the period under discussion, he has no way of knowing precisely how the British officials went about supporting cotton prices at this time or how much cotton they bought on official account. There can be no doubt, however, that they did move into the market in a large way to support cotton prices.

the President at the conclusion of a conference of agricultural leaders in Columbia, South Carolina, in early July, "that the outlook in the South was far more critical and fraught with far more danger than during the season of 1914. It was agreed also that evidence was rapidly coming to light that there is growing among the people—farmers, merchants, bankers and business men, a feeling of unrest and apprehension which might easily develop into a condition of panic. It is felt that the South has never before faced so serious an economic situation and that unless some assurance for the future can be given to the people from those in whom they have confidence, the counsel of wise, conservative leaders will be swept aside by an uncontrollable hysteria such as must develop in men who find themselves facing disaster."[37]

"The marketing of the South's cotton crop this year is a most absorbing topic with her people just now," a Texan added a few days later, "and it is essential to, not only the general welfare, but also the very business LIFE of this section, that the price of cotton shall be as large as any combination of fair and legitimate circumstances can make it. . . . This is a GREAT question . . . with the Southern people, and if cotton does not bring a fair price this fall they are going to be seriously hurt financially. The great majority of them are heavily in debt already, brought over from 1914 on account of the very low price of cotton last fall and winter, and their cotton, even at the very best price attainable, will not be sufficient to liquidate that indebtedness, to say nothing of the debts contracted THIS year to enable them to make a crop."[38]

When the British government, goaded by intolerable pressure at home, moved obviously toward making cotton contraband, the reaction in the South was so violent as to imperil cordial Anglo-American relations. Senator Hoke Smith, who would soon emerge as the chief political spokesman of the planters, set off the southern campaign for retaliation on May 22, 1915, with a long statement in the press, denouncing the British blockade and warning that Congress would surely apply an arms embargo unless the British ceased their allegedly illegal depredations against the cotton trade.[39] Two weeks later, moreover, Smith appealed to the Washington administration for stern action. "It would be easy for our Government to force Great Britain to recognize our neutral rights," he wrote to Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson, for transmission to the President and the Cabinet. "Great Britain and her Allies are receiving to-day, I am assured, more than one-half of their munitions of war from this country. We need but to notify Great Britain these shipments will cease so long as Great Britain prevents

[37] A. F. Lever *et al.* to Woodrow Wilson, July 12, 1915, Wilson Papers.
[38] J. W. Madden to E. M. House, July 19, 1915, House Papers.
[39] New York *Times*, May 23, 1915.

shipments by citizens of the United States legal at the time the war began."[40]

Echoes of the Georgia senator's demands were heard throughout the South in mounting volume during June and July of 1915. Charging that Great Britain had deprived southern farmers of a market for more than 3,000,000 bales of cotton, the Georgia legislature on June 28, for example, urged the President to use every means in his power, "diplomatic if possible, retaliatory if necessary," to open the cotton trade to central Europe.[41] As the pro-British senator from Mississippi, John Sharp Williams, warned the President, so powerful was the demand for retaliation that every politician in the South had to be anti-British during that summer of alarm.[42]

The crisis reached the stage of acute tension during the last two weeks of July and the first three weeks of August 1915. Profoundly disturbed by the mounting southern campaign, President Wilson moved swiftly to avert a British declaration making cotton contraband, which action he thought would have a "fatal effect" on American opinion and would probably incite Congress to apply an arms embargo.[43] "The course pursued by Great Britain," he wrote on July 16, in a preliminary warning for direct transmission to the British leaders, "has produced widespread irritation and dissatisfaction through this country, and unless some radical change is made, the situation will become so serious politically that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a solution."[44] "Important [that the] British press used influence against action detrimental to cotton," Colonel House added in a cablegram to Sir Horace Plunkett, who was then acting as House's and Wilson's personal liaison with the British Cabinet. "Should Britain do this Congress would probably retaliate. The matter is of extreme urgency."[45]

[40] Hoke Smith to A. S. Burleson, June 7, 1915, the Papers of Albert S. Burleson (MS. in the Library of Congress); hereinafter cited as the Burleson Papers.

[41] New York *Times,* June 29, 1915. See also "Preamble and Resolution Adopted by the Board of Directors of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange," June 30, 1915, copy in the Burleson Papers; Senator J. E. Ransdell to A. S. Burleson, July 7, 1915, *ibid.;* resolution of the State Council, Farmers' Union of North Carolina, enclosed in E. C. Faires to Wilson, July 3, 1915, Wilson Papers; resolutions adopted by the Savannah Cotton Exchange, July 8, 1915, copy in *ibid.;* Officers of the Farmers' Union to Wilson, Aug. 13, 1915, *ibid.;* resolution adopted by the Texas Farmers' Union, meeting in state convention August 3-6, 1915, copy in *ibid.;* Senator Morris Sheppard to Wilson, July 22, 1915, *ibid.;* J. Thomas Heflin, to J. P. Tumulty, July 28, 1915, *ibid.;* Hatton W. Sumners to Wilson, July 31, 1915, *ibid.;* the Augusta Cotton Exchange and Board of Trade to the Secretary of State, June 25, 1915, *Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement,* pp. 191-192; the Galveston Commercial Association to the Secretary of State, July 2, 1915, *ibid.,* p. 192; and the general review article in the New York *World,* July 22, 1915.

[42] Williams to Wilson, June 29, 1915, Wilson Papers.

[43] Wilson to E. M. House, July 19, 1915, House Papers.

[44] Secretary of State to Ambassador Page, July 16, 1915, *Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement,* pp. 473-474.

[45] House to Plunkett, July 19, House Papers.

Wilson and House, however, were threatening from a position of extreme diplomatic weakness. During the summer of 1915 the United States was embroiled in a controversy with Germany over the use of the submarine against merchant shipping, one so serious that it raised the immediate danger of war between the two countries. The British leaders knew that they would never have a more favorable opportunity to settle the cotton question, once and for all, than during this period of high tension between the United States and Germany. And yet they had been profoundly disturbed by the anti-British campaign in the South; anxious to remove the chief cause of friction in Anglo-American relations, they were prepared to go to extreme lengths to reach a final comprehensive agreement with the American government. "The people who are responsible here," wrote one official from the American Embassy in London, "are greatly concerned about the cotton situation, and apprehensive about losing the friendship and good will of the people of the United States."[46] "It is quite indifferent to us how we stop the cotton. . . ," Sir Edward Grey confided to Colonel House, "but hitherto I have hesitated to declare it contraband, for fear of making the feeling in the United States worse instead of better. In any case, we are prepared to enter into any arrangement that will make the price of cotton stable and prevent its collapse."[47]

Such an agreement was possible because neither Wilson nor any responsible leader in Washington had any desire to challenge the British maritime system during this time when war with Germany seemed daily possible. "I should like to press for the utmost," Wilson explained to Colonel House, "and yet I should wish to be sensible and practical."[48] He explained what he meant about being "sensible and practical" shortly afterward: "It does not seem as if we ought to go to the length of involving the country in war and so cut off the market for cotton altogether."[49]

Meanwhile, unofficial and highly secret negotiations looking toward an Anglo-American understanding were already in progress by the time the President wrote the words quoted above. These negotiations began on July 22, 1915, when Chandler P. Anderson, a former State Department official acting as an unofficial representative of Secretary of State Robert Lansing, conferred with the British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, in Washington. His government, Spring Rice declared, was eager to do anything within reason to support the cotton market.

[46] E. G. Lowry to E. M. House, Aug. 5, 1915, *ibid.*

[47] Grey to House, Aug. 10, 1915, *ibid.* See the London *Times*, July 23, 1915, and the London *Spectator*, July 30, 1915, for editorial expressions of British concern and eagerness to find a solution acceptable to the southern people and the American government.

[48] Wilson to House, July 20, 1915, House Papers.

[49] Wilson to Morris Sheppard, July 28, 1915, Wilson Papers.

It was, therefore, willing to purchase an amount of cotton equal to the normal German and Austrian requirements, in addition to the usual British purchases; would not interfere with normal cotton exports going from the United States to the European neutrals; and would guarantee a minimum price for cotton, to be determined by mutual agreement.[50]

On July 30 Anderson had further exploratory conversations with Sir Richard Crawford, trade adviser to the British Embassy in Washington. Crawford explained that the British plan to support the cotton market had only one objective, namely, to stop the southern agitation for an arms embargo. He had, herefore, prepared a plan by which the British government would furnish £20,000,000 to a group of banks, with instructions that this money should be used to support cotton at a fixed price per pound. It would, however, be absolutely essential, Crawford continued, to make cotton contraband, in order to give the British government some legal basis for the absolute suppression of the cotton trade to the Central Powers. Anderson replied that although the American government could not officially approve any such arrangement, he would communicate the proposal informally to the Secretary of State. Speaking privately, however, he was willing to say that he thought British support of cotton prices would effectively destroy the southern movement for an arms embargo and avert any serious Anglo-American difficulties over the definition of cotton as contraband.[51]

With such encouragement—for Anderson was in fact speaking for the Washington administration—Crawford now carried his negotiations to a higher level. We lack full evidence on the final phase of these discussions. We know, however, that Crawford and Spring Rice conferred at length during early August 1915 with Colonel House, William P. G. Harding of Birmingham, a member of the Federal Reserve Board, and Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The upshot was an understanding, or agreement, concluded on about August 13, by which the British government promised to maintain the price of cotton at ten cents a pound after the staple had been put on the list of absolute contraband. The British would do this by using the plan originally devised by Sir Richard Crawford.[52]

There now remained only the task of averting a panic in the South following the issuance of the British order defining cotton as contraband. The Foreign Office issued the order on the afternoon of Saturday, August 21, 1915, after the cotton exchanges had closed. Then on

[50] The Diary of Chandler P. Anderson (MS. in the Library of Congress), July 22, 1915.

[51] *Ibid.*, July 30, 1915.

[52] Page to the Secretary of State, Aug. 13, 1915, copy in the Wilson Papers, and House to Wilson, Aug. 14, 1915, *ibid.*, describe the final negotiations and the terms of the understanding. For an even fuller account, see the New York *Tribune*, Nov. 20, 1915.

Monday morning, August 23, brokers representing the British government bought cotton so heavily on the Liverpool and New Orleans exchanges that the price increased slightly. On the same day, moreover, Secretary McAdoo, who had been forewarned of British intentions, announced that he was ready to deposit $30,000,000 of federal funds in southern banks, if that were necessary to provide ample cheap credit to enable the farmers to hold their cotton and to market it gradually.[53] At the same time, the President and Harding of the Federal Reserve Board joined McAdoo in telling Southerners that they would have abundant credit and urging them to avoid any show of panic.[54]

As a result, there was no financial panic and only a momentary outburst of anti-British denunciation in the South,[55] which was not serious to begin with and soon subsided altogether. This was true largely because heavy British purchases maintained the price of cotton at slightly above ten cents a pound during the critical month following the issuance of the order making cotton contraband and combined with predictions of a short crop in 1915 to begin a forward movement in late September, which carried prices on the New York Exchange to 12.30 cents a pound for middling cotton on October 29, 1915. From this time forward until 1920 cotton prices continued to rise.

Thus the cotton crisis passed out of sight in the autumn of 1915, and its passing was accompanied by the end of any large-scale organized anti-British movement in the region south of the Potomac. Hereafter, the President's policy of increasing resistance to German pretensions on the seas would be sustained in large measure by southern votes in Congress. And yet we should not overstate the case or be misled by the partisan support that Wilson received from Southerners on certain critical occasions between 1915 and 1917. The cotton crisis of 1914-1915 left deep scars upon the South and a residue of intense anti-British sentiment. Combined with the prevailing rural pacifism, southern resentment at the British maritime system made the South one of the chief centers of resistance to military and naval expansion and to strong diplomacy *vis-à-vis* Germany between 1915 and 1917. Like a majority of Americans, Southerners went to war in April 1917, not because they wanted to fight or loved the British, but only because they seemed to have no other alternative.

[53] New York *Times,* Aug. 24, 1915.

[54] Wilson to Harding, Aug. 23, 1915, Wilson Papers. Harding read Wilson's letter in an address at Birmingham on August 25, 1915.

[55] Hoke Smith to Robert Lansing, Aug. 26 and 29, 1915, the Papers of Robert Lansing (MS. in the Library of Congress); H. Smith. "Memorandum upon the Order of Great Britain making Cotton absolute contraband," dated Sept. 4, 1914, in *ibid.;* E. Y. Webb to Claude Kitchin, Sept. 2, 1915, the Papers of Claude Kitchin (MS. in the Library of the University of North Carolina); S. J. Tribble to Wilson, Sept. 7, 1915, Wilson Papers; A. F. Lever to Wilson, Sept. 22, 1915, *ibid.*

IX

HOKE SMITH AND THE NEW FREEDOM, 1913-1917

By Dewey W. Grantham, Jr.

Southern progressives found in the Wilson administration their first real opportunity to join in the national progressive battle. Cast in responsible roles in the leadership of an administration committed to a series of definite reforms, and superbly led by the most effective Democratic leader since ante-bellum days, they were confronted during the four years before the nation's entry into the great European war with a mighty challenge. In one sense the challenge was not peculiar to the southern liberals but was rather a test that had to be met by all members of the national Democracy. It was absolutely necessary for the new administration to take prompt and united action in fulfilling the party's pledges if Democratic control was to be more than a fleeting episode in the long course of Republican supremacy. But southern progressives faced a particular challenge in 1913, epitomized by the simple question whether they had anything to contribute to the solution of national problems or whether they were so hedged about with sectional prejudices and particularistic notions that they would be unable to provide real leadership in the very hour of their greatest opportunity.[1]

This paper will give some account of the odyssey of one of the southern progressives—Hoke Smith of Georgia—during the first Wilson administration. Smith, who was elected to the Senate in 1911, entered Congress at a propitious time in view of the recognition he had recently received as a progressive. One writer hailed him as "the most conspicuous figure in the Progressive Democracy of the South,"[2] while others referred to him as the "dam and sire" of the progressive movement in Georgia.[3] In 1905-1906, following ten years of political retirement, Smith had begun a spectacular anti-corporation and anti-Negro campaign, with the promise of numerous reforms, that was successful in overthrowing the old-line Democratic control of the state. The upheaval thus produced might have been the result, as some contemporaries contended, of the politics of the "outs" against the "ins" and of dema-

[1] See Arthur S. Link, "The South and the 'New Freedom': An Interpretation," *American Scholar,* XX (Winter, 1950-51), 314-24.

[2] Alexander J. McKelway, "Hoke Smith: A Progressive Democrat," *Outlook,* XCVI (October 1, 1910), 267-72. See also "Hoke Smith, Georgia's New Heavy-Weight Senator," *Current Literature,* LI (September, 1911), 263-65; John Temple Graves, "Hoke Smith of Ga.," *Hearst's Magazine,* XXII (November, 1912), 46-48; New York *Times,* September 17, 1911.

[3] Augusta *Chronicle,* April 3, 1914.

gogic men seeking to take advantage of the passions of the time. But the Smith administration had done a good deal more than disfranchise the Negroes; it had ushered in a number of constructive reforms. It had achieved substantial advances in the state's regulation of business practices and certain modest reforms in other directions, including closer regulation of primary elections, reductions in railroad rates, and increased corporation taxes. The Smith faction had enlisted the support of many Georgians by effecting such changes as the abolition of the convict leasing system and greater appropriations for public education. Although defeated for re-election in 1908, Smith had won the governorship again in 1910 with a reform program described as the "Progressive Democracy," so called because the Smith leaders had their eyes on the progressive movement in other parts of the country. With this orientation, the Smith men found it easy to endorse Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and, following the Democratic triumph, it was natural that Hoke Smith should emerge as one of the Wilson leaders in the Senate.

Characteristically, and in spite of his brief tenure in the Senate, Smith pushed forward after Wilson's election, eager to serve as a spokesman for the new administration and as a leader in the creation of its program. Because of his prestige as a former cabinet officer[4] and a widely-known reform governor, because he had early identified himself with the Wilson movement, and because he was not the kind of man to stand on ceremony where his own interests were concerned, the Georgian assumed an active part in shaping the party plans for the implementation of the New Freedom. He was one of the progressive Democrats who engineered the reorganization of the Senate committees in such a way that the progressives could dominate the important committees.[5] The result was that he received a number of good committee assignments and was appointed to the party's Senate steering committee.[6] A New York newspaper reported early in 1913 that ". . . among the new progressive senators the place [of administration spokesman] is tacitly conceded to Hoke Smith, of Georgia."[7]

[4] Smith had been a zealous Cleveland man in the late eighties and early nineties, using his newspaper, the Atlanta *Journal,* to rally support for Cleveland and tariff reform. So signal were the Georgian's contributions to Cleveland's nomination and election in 1892, that he was appointed to the cabinet, serving as Secretary of the Interior from March, 1893 until September, 1896.

[5] The reorganization scheme was sometimes referred to as "Hoke Smith's Plan." Atlanta *Journal,* December 30, 1912, March 6-9, 1913; New York *Times,* January 4, 1913.

[6] Smith became chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor and he was also assigned to the committees on Agriculture and Forestry, Finance, and Post Offices and Post Roads, as well as to certain minor committees. *Congressional Record,* 63 Cong., Sp. Sess., 20-21. Following the death of Augustus O. Bacon, senior senator from Georgia, Smith was appointed to the committees on Judiciary and on Rules, while relinquishing his position on the Post Offices and Post Roads Committee. *Ibid.,* 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 4596, 9838.

[7] New York *Herald,* quoted in Atlanta *Journal,* January 7, 1913.

During the first two years of the Wilson administration the original program of the New Freedom was virtually completed. Spurred on by their leader in the White House, the Democrats passed comprehensive tariff, currency, and antitrust legislation. Like most southern Democrats, Hoke Smith gave these measures sturdy support. While he was not an outstanding leader in the Senate's handling of this legislation, his influence in some respects was considerable. Having been associated with the tariff reform element of his party for many years, Smith was anxious to see the Democrats demonstrate their ability to enact a genuine low-tariff bill. But he was realistic enough to perceive that they would jeopardize their chances of success if their leaders insisted on radical reductions. As the Southerner wrote Woodrow Wilson in the summer of 1912, "I believe, myself, thoroughly in a tariff for revenue only, but it would be utterly impracticable to undertake . . . at this time, in good faith, to pass a tariff bill which sought to avoid anything but revenue."[8] As a member of the Finance Committee Smith devoted long hours to the work on the various tariff schedules, and he stood with Furnifold M. Simmons in the defense of the committee's work on the Senate floor. This is not to exaggerate Hoke Smith's part in the passage of the Underwood-Simmons bill; it was a party measure and there were few Democratic defections. Aside from his general support of the committee's version of the bill, Smith's main concern seemed to be the needs of the South.[9]

The Senator from Georgia was intensely interested in the plans for reorganizing the country's banking and currency system. He strongly supported the proposal to create as many as twelve regional banks, partly, it appears, in order that Atlanta might be selected as one of the regional banking cities, and he joined with other agrarian progressives from the South and the West in the successful demand for short-term agricultural credit.[10] He was less interested in the administration's antitrust program, which is somewhat surprising in view of his long battle against corporations and his efforts as governor to provide effective regulation of railroads and public utility companies. He supported the Federal Trade Commission bill but his major contribution to the antitrust legislation was his work on the Clayton bill as a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. In the committee he supported the

[8] Smith to Wilson, July 22, 1912, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

[9] *Cong. Record,* 63 Cong., 1 Sess., 1322, 7310; Atlanta *Journal,* March 24, 25, 30, April 2-4, 1913. For Smith's efforts to force the appointment of progressives to the Finance Committee, see Edward M. House to Woodrow Wilson, November 28, 1912, Wilson Papers.

[10] *Cong. Record,* 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 2769; 63 Cong., 1 Sess., 52, 1230; 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 14731; Atlanta *Journal,* January 5, 1914; MS. Address (1913), Hoke Smith Collection, University of Georgia.

move to exempt farm organizations from the penalties of the antitrust laws.[11]

In the realm of foreign affairs Smith was a forceful administration man in 1913 and 1914. He endorsed the President's Mexican diplomacy and was one of the most outspoken defenders of the resolution repealing the Panama tolls exemption clause, despite the fact that in doing so he was forced to reverse his position of 1912.[12]

Hoke Smith's most significant service during this early period was his work for other legislation, less prominent on the administration's agenda. He had long been a propagandist for the building of a New South through scientific farming and public education, complemented by the region's growing industrialization. He had participated in the educational crusade in the South during the early years of the century, making hundreds of speeches with an educational theme, donating public libraries, and serving as a member of the board of trustees of the Peabody Fund. He had followed with keen interest the work of the district agricultural and mechanical schools in Georgia, the establishment of which he had helped promote. Smith believed that there were "practical and sane ways" of helping the nation's farmers, "not in a sense of paternalism, not in a sense of taking from them their own responsibilities, but to stimulate them as individuals to a better condition . . . to carry individual responsibility and thus open the door of hope to many a struggling farmer and encourage many a tenant farmer to become the owner of the land he tills."[13] The Georgia Senator had a sincere interest in agricultural and educational legislation, but he was also aware of the political benefits that would be gained from his sponsorship of such measures. As a politician he was conscious of the need to compensate in his political actions for his background as a city man and a lawyer. He was not likely to forget the predominance of farmers among his constituents, and he could not afford to forget the hold that such political enemies as Tom Watson and Joseph M. Brown held on the Georgia farmers. Thus Smith came to consider himself pre-eminently as a farmer's senator.

From the beginning of his Senate career the Georgian identified himself with the proposals he thought would be of value to southern farmers. He became one of the leading advocates of a bill to establish a marketing bureau within the Department of Agriculture, and he had the satisfaction of seeing large sums appropriated for the expansion of the depart-

[11] *Cong. Record,* 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 11225, 14318, 22387; Atlanta *Journal,* June 12, 1914.

[12] *Cong. Record,* 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 5455, 5644-45, 7007-7008, 8428-37, 10158-59; New York *Times,* March 12, April 4, June 6, 1914; Atlanta *Journal,* March 25, April 16, 1914.

[13] *Cong. Record,* 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 7391. See also New York *Times,* September 17, 1911.

ment's marketing services. He had a part in the passage of the parcel post bill in 1912, he urged federal assistance in the construction of rural highways, and he was one of the champions of the federal warehouse bill. He assumed an important role in the enactment of the rural credits legislation, and he worked assiduously for the plan introduced by Asbury F. Lever and Ellison D. Smith providing for the regulation of cotton exchanges.[14]

But Hoke Smith's most notable contribution in the area of agricultural legislation was his sponsorship of the Smith-Lever bill, a measure providing for a federal program of agricultural extension work in cooperation with the states. The final passage of the Smith-Lever bill in the spring of 1914 marked the end of a movement of several years' duration and of a zealous two-year fight by Smith and Representative Lever.[15] Smith's part in the early preparation of the extension legislation was slight but, as Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston said, the southern Senator was "the real promoter of the bill in the Senate."[16] Smith was also the co-sponsor of a complementary plan to provide for federal aid to vocational training in the secondary schools on a basis similar to that established in the Smith-Lever Act. This measure, known as the Smith-Hughes bill, was the result of the work of a Presidential commission under the direction of Smith which completed its report in 1914. The Georgia Senator secured the passage of the bill by the Senate in 1916, and the House passed it the following year.[17] The Smith-Lever and Smith-Hughes bills were not originally emphasized as major items in the Wilson program, but their importance was soon acknowledged and they established a pattern of federal co-operation with the states that was often used in subsequent legislation.

The New Freedom as conceived in 1912-13 neared completion by the late summer of 1914. At that time Hoke Smith's star was at its zenith. He had just been triumphantly re-elected over his long-time rival, Joseph M. Brown.[18] He had supported all of the important legislation

[14] *Cong. Record,* 63 Cong., 1 Sess., 2049-50, 2330-32, 5941; 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 5078-79, 5530-34; 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 2940, 5325-26; 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 7391; Atlanta *Journal,* March 19, 1914, January 19, 1915. See also Hoke Smith to David F. Houston, April 12, 1913, and Houston to Smith, April 14, 1913, Department of Agriculture Papers, National Archives.

[15] *Cong. Record,* 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 831; Atlanta *Journal,* November 13, 1912; Alfred C. True, *A History of Agricultural Extension Work in the United States, 1785-1923* (Washington, 1928), 108; Joseph C. Bailey, *Seaman A. Knapp: School-Master of American Agriculture* (New York, 1945), 246-80.

[16] Houston to Joseph P. Tumulty, May 7, 1914, Wilson Papers.

[17] *Cong. Record,* 63 Cong., 1 Sess., 52, 57, 2238, 9503; 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 11870-78. Carroll S. Page, a Republican senator from Vermont who had sponsored a vocational education bill before Hoke Smith entered the Senate, lent strong support to the Smith-Hughes bill. In the House of Representatives Dudley M. Hughes of Georgia, the co-author of the measure, steered the bill to its passage.

[18] In the Democratic primary of August 19, 1914, Smith received over 135,000 votes to something over 69,000 for Joseph M. Brown. Atlanta *Journal,* August 19-23, 1914.

sponsored by the Wilson administration and had taken a leading part in the enactment of the Smith-Lever bill, as well as in the passage of several other farm measures. Smith was a man who enjoyed his own importance. Close to the President, a powerful administration leader in the Senate, and widely praised by his constituents, he could well feel expansive. Almost certainly he agreed with the estimate contained in a periodical article early in 1914 which stated that "Probably the single new Democratic Senator who wielded the largest influence is Mr. Hoke Smith, of Georgia."[19]

But the harmonious and fruitful days of the previous two years were almost over for Smith, and certain developments had already begun which were to lead to an abrupt change in the character of his work in the Senate. The most important of these developments was the European war, which began at the very moment Smith seemed most successful. The unsettled conditions produced by the war brought a precipitous decline in the price of cotton and the outlook for the huge crop of 1914 was gloomy indeed. A sharp recession moved through the farming regions of the South. Smith at once took the lead among southern congressmen in pressing a series of demands for direct federal aid to the cotton farmers. The cotton congressmen became increasingly urgent in their proposals and some of the extremists, led by the Georgian, went so far as to engage in a futile Senate filibuster late in October, 1914, in an effort to secure such remedial legislation as the authorization of emergency currency and the federal purchase of surplus cotton.[20]

Hoke Smith was busy day and night with these plans, which became a veritable obsession with him. For eighteen months his battle for the cotton producers occupied his major attention. If the New Freedom had ever meant a certain philosophy or a program of liberal reform to the Senator, it was soon abandoned as he concentrated upon what he considered to be injustices suffered by southern farmers. He protested continually against British trade restrictions that prevented cotton from reaching the markets of northern and central Europe, he badgered the administration to be more vigorous in its defense of American rights, and he arranged for the exportation of cotton to neutral and belligerent countries. He became so enraged in 1915 at British infringements that he spoke threateningly of a congressional embargo. "Throughout the

[19] Burton J. Hendrick, "The New Order in Washington," *World's Work*, XXVII (January, 1914), 319. "As a member of the steering committee," continued Hendrick, "Mr. Smith did much in shaping the Senate's organization. He bridges the present and past as does no other Democrat in Washington."

[20] Smith proposed a bill to provide for federal licensing of cotton warehouses, which the Senate passed; an amendment to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act designed to extend its application to state banks; a measure to repeal for a limited time the 10 per cent tax on state bank notes; and a bill directing the purchase by the government of five million bales of cotton at ten cents per pound. *Cong. Record*, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 16915-27, 16968-73; Atlanta *Journal*, August 13, 14, September 2, 28, October 11, 12, 24, 25, 1914; New York *Times*, October 23, 24, 1914.

long period of uncertainty and upheaval," wrote a Georgia newspaperman some years later, "cotton had in the senate of the United States at least one man who never faltered in the fight for the rehabilitation of the market and the maintenance of a price giving a fair return to the southern producer."[21] Smith soon began to differ with the Wilson administration in its attitude toward the Allies and to feel that the President and his advisers did not really appreciate the plight of the farmers. His relationship with Wilson became increasingly strained and he began to adopt a negative or wavering position on such legislation as the La Follette Seamen's bill and the administration shipping bill.

Smith seems to have miscalculated in his estimate of the support he could count on from his Georgia constituents in the cotton crusade. This is not to underestimate the angry feeling among southern cotton men at the British blockade. As Representative Hatton W. Sumners found on touring his Texas district in July, 1915, there was "a state of general apprehension and rapidly growing resentment because of England's probable attitude towards cotton. . . ."[22] But when the price of cotton increased in spite of the British violations—partly because the British began to increase their cotton purchases in the United States—southern farmers were less willing to approve criticism of the Wilson administration, especially when such criticism was hostile to the side which most Americans believed was fighting for human rights and democracy in the European war. Smith was probably led further along in his censure of the administration than he originally intended, only to realize too late that his hasty words, which had often rung harshly in administration ears, prevented a resumption of his role as an administration spokesman. In part this appears to have been the result of a simple lack of forethought; Smith was always inclined to be overly enthusiastic about a current remedy and to lose sight of an occasional relevant factor. Moreover, he was a man of inordinate ambition with a naïve but all-encompassing vanity. Perhaps he was intoxicated by the size of his overwhelming primary victory in 1914, and perhaps his promises of federal aid during the early weeks of the cotton crisis, failing as they did, turned to bitter ashes in his mouth. Perhaps the constant ridicule of such enemies as Tom Watson, who declared that his vote was always in the President's pocket, goaded him into defiance. No doubt all of these things were involved, as well as Smith's genuine feeling that the farmers were being wronged and that the administration had failed both the farmers and their congressional defenders. In after years the Senator may have regretted the fact that the cotton struggle had been followed with such single-minded purpose, in view of the manner in which it disrupted his work along other lines in the Senate, undermined old friend-

[21] Theodore Tiller in the Atlanta *Journal*, July 14, 1919.
[22] Sumners to Woodrow Wilson, July 31, 1915, Wilson Papers.

ships, and opened the door to the attacks of his political opponents in Georgia, not to mention the irritation it caused in his relationship with the Wilson administration. But Hoke Smith was not a man to look back; if he had any compunction about the course he had taken, he kept it to himself.

Although the cotton depression in the South was the immediate cause of Smith's estrangement from the Wilson administration and of his eventual frustration as a constructive legislator, there were other factors that influenced him in his course after 1914. He began to find himself opposed to some of the administration's plans as they reflected a growing concern for social legislation in 1915 and 1916. Essentially the Georgian was a political opportunist who adhered to no well-conceived political philosophy, but more than most of his southern contemporaries he believed in using the government, state and national, as an instrument to advance human progress. But as his fondest hopes of utilizing the government's power to relieve southern distress failed of realization, while the administration began to move more rapidly to achieve a large program of social legislation that was oriented toward urban and industrial problems, Smith drew back. He began to invoke the doctrine of state rights and to emphasize certain notions that stemmed from classical economics. This attitude did not prevent him from supporting measures with a distinctly Populist complexion as long as they were in the interest of the southern farmers. But the specter of government ownership disturbed him. He opposed the Alaskan railroad bill early in 1914 and later in the year he sought to restrict the Commission on Industrial Relations in its investigation.[23] He attempted to apply in limited degree the old doctrine of contributory negligence to the provisions of the employer's liability legislation and he endeavored to limit the plan providing for a bureau of labor safety in the Department of Labor. "I think we are drifting in our philanthropic purpose to serve humanity into the danger of a failure entirely to recognize the differences between men," the Southerner declared during the debate on the employer's liability bill in 1916.[24] In 1915-16 he opposed the federal child labor bill on the ground that it was an invasion of state rights.[25]

It would be a mistake to overemphasize Hoke Smith's opposition to the expansion of governmental powers. He himself pointed out more than once that he believed in a government with broader jurisdiction

[23] Smith felt that the bill to provide for the construction by the government of a system of railroads in Alaska was "utterly unwise," and that it allowed the President too broad and undefined authority in completing the project. *Cong. Record*, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 43-45, 2154, 2173, 2250, 3646-47, 11681-83, 11687-88.

[24] *Ibid.*, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 11518, 12166-67, 12888-89, 12896.

[25] *Cong. Record*, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 11681-83, 11687-88; 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 12089, 12313; Macon *Telegraph*, March 8, 1915; Atlanta *Journal*, July 24, 30, 1916; Smith to C. Strickland, July 6, 1917, Smith Collection.

than many of his Democratic colleagues in the Senate were willing to approve, and when he was seeking federal assistance for some purpose in which he was interested he apparently gave little thought to conservative inhibitions.[26] He was not so recalcitrant as to oppose all of the administration's labor proposals, voting for instance in favor of the Adamson eight-hour-day measure despite the fact that he condemned the railroad strike that led to its passage as a "horrible blunder."[27] Nevertheless, on prohibition, woman suffrage, immigration restriction, and Negro officeholding Smith adopted positions in line with dominant southern prejudices.[28]

In 1916, with the national election approaching, Smith seemed to make a real effort to close ranks with administration forces. After a long Senate speech in January, 1916 against the British trade infringements, he contented himself with an occasional protest. While he was critical of certain features of the preparedness program submitted by President Wilson in 1916, he gave it his support. He refused to endorse the Gore resolution to prevent Americans from taking passage on armed belligerent ships.[29] He hesitated for a time in the spring of 1916 when the Senate Judiciary Committee was considering the confirmation of Louis D. Brandeis—apparently because of the numerous reports of Brandeis' radicalism—but in the end he voted in the committee to confirm the appointment.[30]

The fact that by this time Smith was under heavy attack in Georgia and that his enemies there were denouncing him as a German sympathizer is another factor that helps explain the sudden moderation in the Senator's attitude toward the administration. In an editorial entitled "Hoch der Hoke!" the Macon *Telegraph* called him the "high priest and prophet" of the traitorous pro-German cabal.[31] Another newspaper indignantly declared of Smith: "He is disloyal to the American people from whom he comes in that his voice has been raised only for money, never a word as to the right or wrong of this war, never a word as to any obligation on our part to set our faces against the butchery of innocents on the high seas—only that we must move heaven and earth to get our cotton into Germany."[32] Even the Atlanta *Journal,* always his champion in the past, was critical of his course. In the light of these

[26] See, for example, the Georgian's remarks in 1916 on the proposed government nitrate plant. *Cong. Record,* 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 5711-12.

[27] *Ibid.,* 12896, 13402, 13655.

[28] *Ibid.,* 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 12003-12004; 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 10139, 10142, 10210, 12925, 12927-28; 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 1054-56, 1066.

[29] *Cong. Record,* 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 2683, 5164, 5227, 5355, 5358, 5578, 5628; Atlanta *Journal,* March 5, 1916.

[30] *Cong. Record,* 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 6972, 9032; Atlanta *Journal,* May 22, 24, 1916; Henry Morgenthau to Woodrow Wilson, May 18, 1916, Wilson Papers.

[31] Macon *Telegraph,* April 11, 1916.

[32] Augusta *Chronicle,* quoted in the New York *Times,* February 5, 1916.

storm warnings, Smith began to act as if his loyalty to the administration had never been in doubt. He campaigned for the party in several states in 1916, praised the New Freedom, and described Woodrow Wilson as the greatest leader who had occupied the White House in fifty years.[33] Later, early in 1917, he praised the President's diplomacy toward Germany and refused to go along with the opposition to the arming of merchant ships.[34] But Smith never regained Wilson's confidence.

The general direction of administration policies in foreign and domestic matters in 1915-16 had much to do with the deterioration of the once cordial relations between Hoke Smith and Woodrow Wilson, but a new irritant caused a heightening of the tension between the two men and led to harsh words and embittered feelings.[35] Early in 1917 Smith and his colleague, Thomas W. Hardwick, an outspoken advocate of state rights who at times exerted considerable influence over Smith, became involved in a struggle with the President and Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory over the appointment of a federal judge for the southern district of Georgia. When Wilson decided to appoint a man who had not secured the Senators' endorsement, the latter were furious and sought unsuccessfully to have the President appoint another man. They claimed that Wilson's choice would be interpreted in Georgia as a victory for the anti-Smith faction and that they had not been consulted about the man selected. Wilson's nominee finally withdrew his name, but the Georgia Senators were equally dissatisfied with the President's second selection and went so far as to defeat his confirmation. At this point Wilson found the conduct of Smith and Hardwick "past understanding."[36] He appointed a third man only to have this nominee treated in the same cavalier fashion. Neither side would give in, and the Senators apparently felt that they would lose face if they could not name the new judge. Smith expressed regret that he "must" pursue such a course, just at the time "when I had hoped for united support of all acts of the

[33] In his campaign addresses the Georgian emphasized Wilson's success in keeping the country out of war. Atlanta *Journal,* September 29, October 25, 26, 1916.

[34] *Cong. Record,* 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 12627-31, 12812-13, 12825; 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 1885; New York *Times,* January 27, 1917.

[35] In earlier years there had been rumors in Georgia to the effect that Hoke Smith and other aggressive lawyers in Atlanta in the early 1880's "by their unethical methods" had been responsible for Wilson's decision to abandon the legal profession. There seems to have been no basis for such accusations, at least as far as Smith was concerned. But Wilson had written an article on the Cleveland cabinet in 1893 in which he was highly critical of Smith's selection. Later, during the controversy over the Treaty of Versailles, he told Colonel House that Smith was an "ambulance-chaser." See the Talbotton (Ga.) *New Era,* quoted in Macon *Telegraph,* July 12, 1912; Woodrow Wilson, "Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet," *Review of Reviews,* VII (April, 1893), 286-97; Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal* (New York, 1945), 13.

[36] William J. Harris to Woodrow Wilson, February 12, 1917, Frank Park to Wilson, March 15, 1917, and Wilson to U. V. Whipple, May 1, 1917, Wilson Papers.

Administration, and when I know the comfort it will give those in Georgia opposing the important measures now pending."[37] "The trouble with the Senators from Georgia," Wilson observed to John Sharp Williams, "is that they have practically taken the position that I have no right to name anyone whom they have not suggested."[38] By the summer of 1917 matters had gone too far to be repaired.

Meanwhile, Hoke Smith had launched a vociferous attack on the defense measures, including the plans submitted by the administration after the declaration of war in April, 1917. As was the case in the cotton crisis, the struggle over the Georgia judgeship caused Smith to go to greater extremes in his criticism of the executive leaders than he would have gone otherwise. The conscription bill, the espionage legislation, the railroad priorities bill, and the Lever food control bill were subjected to the Senator's sharp barbs. He denounced the broad delegation of powers to the President, and he voiced his distress over the loss of individual liberty portended by such legislation, particularly the threats to the southern farmer's unencumbered operation. The priorities bill amounted to "practical despotism in the United States," he declared, while adding "I am utterly opposed to legislation which adds to the unrestricted power of one man." He quibbled endlessly over the food control bill, warning Americans that "We don't want dictators."[39]

The very fact that Wilson was able to bend Congress so completely to his will seemed to encourage Hoke Smith in his rebelliousness. His sensitiveness for his own "self-respect" and for the prerogatives of the Senate was like an open wound that was constantly being irritated by President Wilson's increasing demands for additional powers.[40] For his part, Wilson had come to consider Smith "distinctly hostile" to his administration.[41] But the Georgian would not assume the toga of an outright opponent, insisting that he was only helping to "perfect" hastily devised legislation. He approved the "general purposes" of the legislation, Smith said, "but in their details I have found them faulty and have aided to correct them and to protect the President as well as the public from some of their unwise detail provisions."[42] Whether because of his fetish for party regularity, because of the mounting pressure at home, or because of some other reason, the Senator invariably voted in the end

[37] Smith to Woodrow Wilson, April 10, 1917, *ibid.*

[38] Wilson to Williams, July 5, 1917, *ibid.*

[39] *Cong. Record,* 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 3258, 3347, 3643, 3645, 3714, 3738; 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 837-38, 1686-87, 1784, 1789, 2438-39, 2501, 2508, 2651-53, 2965, 4627-28; New York *Times,* April 17, June 1, 1917.

[40] Henry Morgenthau reported as early as May, 1916 that Smith and some of the other Democratic senators had been "nursing their discontent so long that it may become chronic—." Morgenthau to Wilson, May 18, 1916, Wilson Papers.

[41] Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters,* 8 vols. (Garden City, 1927-1939), VII, 113.

[42] Smith to C. Strickland, July 6, 1917, Smith Collection.

for the various defense measures. He would neither be an ardent advocate of administration war proposals, like Lee S. Overman of North Carolina, nor a dyed-in-the-wool opponent, like James K. Vardaman of Mississippi. According to one of his defenders, the Georgian was a senator "who thinks for himself and who votes for or against measures according to his own views of his duty to his state and his nation."[43] Nevertheless, the result was disastrous for Hoke Smith; the administration would have little to do with him and he was called a traitor at home, despite his best efforts to demonstrate his complete loyalty during the last year of the war. Thus a pattern was set for his frustration from which he was never able to escape during his final years in the Senate.

In the beginning Smith's differences with the Wilson administration grew out of his profound disappointment over the failure of the administration to come to the active aid of the depression-ridden cotton farmers and out of a personal pique that was encouraged by a number of unfortunate developments. More fundamentally, however, Smith's course in 1916-17—and during the controversial years 1919 and 1920—was the result of a deliberate effort on his part to ride out one of the frequent storms that gathered over the bitter Democratic factionalism in Georgia. He tried to follow a middle-of-the-road course between the violently anti-Wilson following of Tom Watson and the vigorously pro-administration stand he himself had taken during the first years of the Wilson Presidency. The trouble was that Smith's opponents, led by Clark Howell of the Atlanta *Constitution* and Governor Hugh M. Dorsey, seized upon the Senator's early disagreements with Wilson in a shrewd attempt to make him out as an opponent of the President, and when Smith had gone far enough in his criticism of the administration, they rapidly maneuvered themselves into position as the true administration faction in the state. At the same time they managed to maintain a tenuous alliance with Tom Watson. In short, Hoke Smith was outmaneuvered on the local scene by as astute a series of political moves as has occurred in a one-party politics.

In profile Smith's career between 1913 and 1917 can be sharply etched. At the outset there had been optimism and the promise of national leadership. For two years the Georgian had worked in harmony with the new Democratic administration, lending valuable support to the original Wilson program and using his legislative skill and his remarkable energies to help secure the enactment of important agricultural legislation. Then followed a year and a half of constant agitation in the interest of the cotton producers and a widening rift between Smith and the Wilson administration. In the meantime the southern Senator was

[43] Alexander J. McKelway to Lucian Lamar Knight, July 21, 1917, Alexander Jeffrey McKelway Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress. See also *Cong. Record,* 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 757-58, 1785, 2270-71, 5251-52.

finding it difficult to support the social legislation being promoted by the President. Despite Smith's efforts to reverse his course in 1916, the patronage struggle and his sharp attacks on the administration's early war measures led to a steady impairment of his good relations with Wilson.

It would be inaccurate to attribute Hoke Smith's failure to follow Woodrow Wilson's lead after 1914 entirely to his own limitations. Circumstances seemed inexorably to conspire against him and his political enemies in his home state never ceased in their efforts to embarrass him. If Smith was inconsistent during the Sixty-fourth Congress, so was President Wilson. But in the final analysis the Senator from Georgia was unable to meet the test of responsible leadership. At times he was a strong political leader and he proved again and again during the first two years of the administration that he could take the lead in the formulation and completion of a constructive program. An intense concern for his own vanity and some innate rebelliousness seemed to undermine his good judgment, however, and when cast on the defensive he was not able to make his criticisms—many of which had merit—in such a way as to retain the good will of administration leaders. In some ways the Georgian was a progressive, but his progressivism was too sectional to include much beyond agricultural and educational legislation that would benefit the South. He could scarcely conceive of the government as an active force in an urbanized and industrialized America.

In many respects Hoke Smith was one of the best qualified Democratic leaders in the Senate during the Wilson period. It was his own misfortune as well as that of his countrymen that he did not more fully achieve his earlier promise as a political leader. In a larger sense, his inability to rise to the occasion in the exercise of national leadership was characteristic of most southern progressives on the national level. For the sources of the Georgian's limitations as an outstanding Senate leader —an intense sectional preoccupation and a highly personalized and undisciplined political constituency—were equally applicable to many another southern liberal during the progressive era.

X

GOVERNOR EUGENE TALMADGE AND THE NEW DEAL

By Sarah McCulloh Lemmon

The American voters went to the polls on November 11, 1932, and chose 472 electors who would cast their ballots for Franklin Delano Roosevelt for the presidency. The voting contingent which resided in the state of Georgia chose, in addition, to confirm to office the governor-designate, Eugene Talmadge. Both men had been life-long Democrats; both were elected to executive office; both were re-elected three times; both were faced in 1932 with problems resulting from a great depression. In addition, Roosevelt had warm personal ties with Talmadge's native state, so that both were, at least in part, Georgians.

Nor were their campaign platforms entirely dissimilar. The national Democratic platform blamed the Republicans for the depression, with which Talmadge agreed; it promised reduction of federal spending, in which policy Talmadge heartily concurred; it declared that it would find a means of rescuing the farmer, toward which goal Talmadge had just devoted three terms as Georgia's commissioner of agriculture. But some of the national planks were contrary to Talmadge's thinking. He disapproved of direct relief, in which Roosevelt believed, because it undermined rugged individualism. He opposed any lowering of tariffs, because he held that high tariffs protected the farmer against foreign competition. Yet the similarities, and the glory of once again having a Democratic administration in Washington, obscured the few apparent divergencies of opinion.

Eugene Talmadge, born in 1884 in rural Georgia, grew up under the influence of Populism and the stirring political campaigns of the turn of the century. After studying law at the University of Georgia, he had an undistinguished career as a farmer and country town lawyer in Telfair County until 1926. In that year he challenged the apparently entrenched political machine of the commissioner of agriculture and defeated him in a spectacular campaign. Following this victory, he was twice re-elected until, in 1932, the decision of Governor Richard B. Russell to run for the United States Senate instead of seeking a second term left the gubernatorial race wide open. Talmadge entered it and defeated eight other candidates for the position of governor-designate in the first primary, an unusual victory in such a race. The election clearly revealed the solid foundation of political support which Talmadge had built up in the state during his six years as commissioner of agriculture.

Thus he entered upon his first term as governor with a majority of Georgia voters enthusiastically behind him.

Talmadge, since he was a Democratic governor in the solid South, naturally expressed his faith and hope in the new administration. Together with a train-load of Georgians he attended the inauguration,[1] returning full of praise for the new president. An official proclamation on March 8 pledged, in the name of the people of Georgia, "our undivided and unstinted faith in and support of the President . . . and our service to the utmost of our ability."[2] He reported to Georgia that the President was "ready to grapple tooth and nail with the economic problems which confront us." He hoped that Congress would "give him whatever authority he may need."[3]

The honeymoon, however, ended abruptly with the launching of the New Deal. The basic theory that spending would restore prosperity, with its accompanying phenomenon of bureaucratic centralization in Washington, violated every Talmadge principle of economy, rugged individualism, laissez-faire, and state rights. The clash of philosophies, each championed by a powerful leader of the people, shook Georgia's political structure to its very foundations and ended only with the complete rout of the weaker contender.

Talmadge's political philosophy was essentially one of Jeffersonian agrarianism. He believed in a non-service government, relying on individual initiative to provide for the social welfare of the citizens. He believed in living wthin one's means, spending less than one received, and saving money each year with which to pay off bonded indebtedness. If this meant parsimony, then parsimony it must be; if it sacrificed schools and hospitals, then the sacrifice must be made. He believed that the best way to restore prosperity was to put more money in the citizens' pockets through tax reduction and lower utility rates. He regarded the independent farmer as the backbone of America and cared little for the urban worker. He held firmly to a conviction that state sovereignty was greater than federal in domestic affairs.

The New Deal, on the other hand, was essentially Keynesian in its economic philosophy. It established a service state, creating slum clearance projects, a social security system, and electric power projects. It held that as welfare problems were national in scope, they should be solved on the national level. It believed that the best way to restore prosperity was through putting money in the citizens' pockets by unlimited spending, and the faster Harry Hopkins and Harold Ickes could spend, the more pleased was the administration. It justified national

[1] Atlanta (Georgia) *Constitution,* March 3, 1933. Edited by Clark Howell, this paper supported Talmadge from 1926 until 1935 when it broke with him over the New Deal.

[2] Executive Minutes, 1933, 67. Governor's Office, Atlanta, Georgia.

[3] Atlanta *Constitution,* March 6, 1933.

debt for such purposes. It regarded the urban worker as the backbone of the nation; and while it threw sops to the farmer and the businessman, the worker received the largest share of New Deal benefits. The New Deal strengthened the tendency initiated by the Federalist party toward centralization of power in the hands of the federal government, and the consequent derogation of state rights.

The state of Georgia thus became a battleground on which met two opposing wings of the Democratic party. One was for economy, the other for spending; one for rugged individualism, the other for a service state; one concerned chiefly for the farmer, the other for the farmer and labor; one for state rights, the other for centralization; one for Georgia, the other for the nation; one led by Eugene Talmadge, the other by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The initial phase of the relationship between Governor Talmadge and the New Deal was a brief one of cooperation. Its major motivation was to secure for the state of Georgia a share of federal funds and thus to enable the state government to balance its budget.

Federal aid was sought and secured for highway construction, maintenance of the public schools, and erection of state buildings. Initially the state was to receive $2,000,000 for highway construction, which became complicated by a quarrel between the governor and the State Highway Commission. After ousting the commission and naming a new one, Talmadge flew to Washington to aid Senators Walter F. George and Richard B. Russell in their efforts to have the money released. A conference with the President secured the desired result and the money was given to the state with the proviso that federal engineers inspect the roads after construction.[4] The receipt of $10,000,000 the following year further swelled the state coffers. It was possible then to divert state highway funds to other areas, and $1,300,000 was so diverted to meet payment on short-term loans, while $1,322,000 was diverted to aid the public schools.[5] It can be seen that federal highway funds definitely aided in balancing the state budget.

Federal money also kept many Georgia schools open. In early 1933, many teachers had received no salaries for several months, and 380 schools had been closed for lack of funds.[6] The General Assembly made no provision for securing any additional funds to clear the school debt. Talmadge exhausted all state sources in his effort to pay the teachers. He borrowed $2,000,000 from three Atlanta banks on March 15, borrowed twice from state highway funds, and attempted to apply the treasury surplus to the common schools, only to be forbidden by the

[4] *Ibid.*, June 16, July 30, September 7, 1933.
[5] Executive Minutes, 1933, 435.
[6] Atlanta *Constitution*, March 27, 1933.

attorney-general.[7] He then turned to Washington. Federal funds were made available through the Civil Works Administration for the latter half of the school year of 1934 with the assurance by administrator Harry Hopkins that the Georgia schools should not close.[8] Eight hundred thousand dollars was allocated for February and March of 1934,[9] and the next fall $69,000 monthly from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration was authorized.[10]

The aid thus received was turned to account by Talmadge, who proceeded to give priority for state equalization aid to schools receiving no federal funds.[11] Once again he used federal money to aid in balancing the state budget. However, the highway funds were more significant in this respect because of their greater size.

Another important source of public funds was the Public Works Administration, directed by Harold L. Ickes. These funds, to be used for heavy construction purposes, were partly a gift and partly a loan to the states. A difficulty existed in the acceptance of such funds by Georgia because its constitution, dating from Reconstruction days, carried a provision against long-term bonded indebtedness. Apparently without considering this, Talmadge formally applied for $1,000,000 to build a new state prison, the sum to be repaid over a fifteen-year period,[12] later expanding the request to $4,000,000 additional for the state's eleemosynary institutions.[13] Important Georgia Democrats added pressure,[14] but Ickes rejected the application because of the state's constitutional prohibition.[15] Talmadge refused to call a special session of the legislature to amend the constitution, but instead appealed directly to President Roosevelt.[16] After much discussion, a plan was adopted whereby the federal government would construct the desired buildings and lease them to the state.[17] The state accepted the plan and received thereby $500,000 as a gift, a new prison, and three large bridges.[18]

The University of Georgia then decided to avail itself of PWA funds, and requested $3,200,000 for construction purposes.[19] Talmadge did not like either the debt or the independence of the Board of Regents, and had suit brought to prevent the PWA loan from becoming effective.

[7] Executive Minutes, 1933, 79; Georgia, *Opinions of the Attorney-General,* 1933-34, 281-283, 305-306.
[8] Atlanta *Constitution,* October 1, 1933; February 9, 1934.
[9] *Ibid.,* March 29, 1934.
[10] *Ibid.,* August 17, 1934.
[11] *Opinions of the Attorney-General,* 1933-34, 274-275.
[12] Atlanta *Constitution,* August 3, 1933.
[13] *The Statesman,* August 19, 1933. Established in 1932 and published in Atlanta, this paper was purchased by Talmadge in 1933 and edited by him until his death in 1946.
[14] Atlanta *Constitution,* September 22, 1933.
[15] *Ibid.,* September 29, 1933.
[16] *Ibid.,* October 4, 1933.
[17] *Ibid.,* October 12, 1933.
[18] *Ibid.,* October 19, 1933.
[19] *Ibid.,* December 9, 1933.

He was overruled, however, by the State Supreme Court, which declared it legal for the Regents to contract a long-term loan.[20] Yet Talmadge had the last word, for in the next session of the General Assembly he sponsored a bill declaring the Regents to be an agency of the state government and hence bound by the constitutional prohibition against debt. The Regents thereupon withdrew their request for PWA funds, and were rewarded with a special appropriation of $1,000,000.[21]

Talmadge also sought a share of relief funds disbursed by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Civil Works Administration, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. As soon as he was inaugurated governor he applied to the RFC for some $197,000[22] of which he received $97,000.[23] In July he conferred with Harry L. Hopkins, the relief administrator, incidentally praising his appointment to "this difficult and extremely trying job."[24] Georgia was allocated some $10,000,000 for relief purposes.[25] In December the CWA approved the spending of $400,000 on projects in the state.[26]

As nearly as can be estimated, during the first two years of the New Deal, which coincided with Talmadge's first term as governor, the state of Georgia received $26,000,000 in federal funds, or the equivalent of an entire year's budget. It is apparent that this freed state receipts for use in paying past due obligations, enabling Talmadge to balance the budget, reduce the ad valorem tax rate, and also have a surplus at the end of his term of office. One of the basic claims to good government offered to the people by Talmadge was his economical financial management, but only federal funds made it possible for him to "pay the State out of debt" without sacrificing every service a modern government can be expected to render to its citizens.

Dissension developed early, however, between Governor Talmadge and the New Deal, and this marks the second phase of the relationship between the two. The first public disagreement came in June 1933 over the Civilian Conservation Corps. In a radio address over Station WOR, and again in a speech to an American Legion Post in Atlanta, the governor charged that the CCC had "gone a long way to helping bums and loafers."[27] All over the state arose resentment and embarrassment,[28]

[20] State of Georgia *v.* Regents of the University System of Georgia *et al.*, 179 *Georgia Reports* 210.

[21] Augusta (Georgia) *Chronicle*, January 20, 1935; Atlanta *Constitution*, March 29, 1935. The Augusta paper was anti-Talmadge.

[22] Executive Minutes, 1933, 25.

[23] *Ibid.*, 1933, 26.

[24] *The Statesman*, July 29, 1933.

[25] Atlanta *Constitution*, November 16, 1933.

[26] *Ibid.*, December 3, 1933.

[27] New York *Times*, June 15, 1933; Atlanta *Constitution*, June 24, 1933. The *Times* was pro-Roosevelt.

[28] Columbus (Georgia) *Enquirer*, June 25, 1933; Savannah (Georgia) *Morning News*, June 30, 1933; New York *Times*, July 2, 1933; Macon (Georgia) *Telegraph*,

until Talmadge was compelled to retract his statement to a hostile and somewhat skeptical public.[29]

Much more serious than this apparently thoughtless error was the quarrel between the governor and Harry Hopkins over the wage scale paid on work relief projects. Talmadge believed that the federal rate of thirty cents per hour would draw farm hands from the country to the city relief rolls because it was higher than prevailing farm wages.[30] In an editorial in his newspaper he wrote: "If the scale of wages that the CWA and the emergency relief work on roads continues the same as it is now the farmers, little saw mills, and practically all other lines of private business in Georgia will be up against it for labor."[31]

Hopkins regarded Talmadge's statement as purely publicity-seeking, and referred uncomplimentarily to the "yapping" of "that guy."[32] Ickes entered the argument with a request that the wage scale be raised to forty cents per hour,[33] and Hopkins announced that since the governor objected to the wages, all projects in Georgia would cease on February 1.[34] Instead of abandoning them, however, he removed the CWA and FERA from control by the Talmadge-appointed Relief Commission and placed them under the direction of his own appointee.[35] Some support for the governor's view developed, however, and the long controversy finally ended with a directive from the FERA to pay the prevailing local wage.[36] Talmadge was highly pleased with his victory,[37] and was probably encouraged by it to oppose other New Deal activities.

Thus far, Talmadge had not attacked any major organization of the New Deal or its philosophy of spending. Late in 1933, however, he began to criticize the National Recovery Administration, objecting to the proposed code for cotton ginners;[38] and at least one NRA official labeled him a member of the "antis."[39] Talmadge also inveighed against certain features of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, such as its plans to

July 8, 1933. The *Enquirer* was anti-Talmadge and had a reputation for forthrightness and courage. The Savannah paper became a supporter of Talmadge after he was elected governor and remained with him. The *Telegraph* was pro-Talmadge until his last term as Commissioner of Agriculture, at which time it turned against him.

[29] New York *Times,* July 5, 1933; Greensboro (Georgia) *Herald-Journal,* July 21, 1933. The *Herald-Journal* was anti-Talmadge until his second term as governor, at which time it began to support him.

[30] *The Statesman,* October 23, 1933; Atlanta *Constitution,* October 17, 1933.

[31] *The Statesman,* December 18, 1933.

[32] Atlanta *Constitution,* December 20, 1933.

[33] Macon *Telegraph,* December 21, 1933.

[34] Atlanta *Constitution,* December 22, 1933.

[35] *Ibid.,* January 6, 1934.

[36] *Ibid.,* November 23, 1934.

[37] *The Statesman,* November 27, 1934; Atlanta *Constitution,* November 23, 1934.

[38] Atlanta *Constitution,* September 10, 1933.

[39] Carter D. Poland, in Atlanta *Constitution,* December 15, 1933.

reduce acreage,[40] the processing tax,[41] the official statement that the depressed prices were caused by a surplus of farm products,[42] slowness of the federal government in paying benefits to the farmer,[43] and the plowing under of one-third of the planted cotton.[44] He ascertained from the state attorney-general that the state of Georgia was not required to pay processing taxes on cotton grown at its prison or experimental farms, and such taxes were not paid.[45]

As the New Deal rolled on, spending more and more money with no miraculous recovery to exhibit, Talmadge's criticisms increased. A note of general opposition to federal policies crept in, although the governor hastened to assure the public that he was not critical of the President. He praised Roosevelt as "a great and admired man," but blamed "ill advice from high-powered professors and cracked stenographers" for the "failure" of the New Deal.[46] He expressed a hope that the President would get out and talk to farmers and merchants to learn the truth about relief administration, the NRA, and the Bankhead Cotton Control Act.[47]

Talmadge's criticisms of certain features of relief, the NRA, the AAA, and the President's advisors mark the end of the second phase of his relationship with the New Deal. Undoubtedly aware of increasing conservative disapproval of the Roosevelt administration and recognizing that the philosophy of spending was dominant in White House circles, he intensified his opposition and launched a bitter crusade. First he fought against the Bankhead Act, then the New Deal in general, and finally against President Roosevelt himself.

Although Talmadge expressed an unfavorable opinion of the processing tax incorporated in the Bankhead Act as early as March 1934, it was not until September that he really launched his campaign. At that time he telegraphed Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture, asking him to void the act if he had the legal right to do so. Similar requests were sent by such Georgians as Senators Walter F. George and Richard B. Russell; Congressman B. T. Castellow of the third district;[48] Hugh Howell, chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee; and Commissioner-designate of Agriculture Tom Linder.[49] Through his personal newspaper and a series of speeches, the governor

[40] New York *Times,* July 2, 1933.
[41] Atlanta *Constitution,* September 24, 1933.
[42] *The Statesman,* October 2, 1933.
[43] Atlanta *Constitution,* November 12, 1933.
[44] *The Statesman,* December 11, 1933. Note the lateness of this criticism in relation to the time of the plowing under. It would seem to indicate an unwillingness at first to oppose the New Deal's agricultural policy, but a gradual accumulation of opposition which finally was released.
[45] *Opinions of the Attorney-General,* 1933-34, 332-336.
[46] New York *Times,* November 25, 1934.
[47] *The Statesman,* November 20, 1934; Atlanta *Constitution,* November 21, 1934.
[48] Atlanta *Constitution,* September 20, 1934.
[49] *The Statesman,* September 25, 1934.

urged citizens to vote against the act in a referendum scheduled for December. His main arguments were that the price of the cotton certificates constituted an enormous unjustifiable tax, that tenants would be put off their farms with the lessening of production, that prices would be higher if the processing tax was removed, and that the act was supported only by those to whom it meant a job.[50] Perhaps scenting defeat, especially in view of the fact that the entire agricultural program had meant $15,956,940 in cash in the pockets of Georgia farmers since its inception,[51] Talmadge hedged by prophesying stuffed ballot boxes in the referendum.[52] The Bankhead Act actually received a majority in Georgia of more than six to one,[53] which Talmadge rationalized in terms of "a stream of negroes voting who did not own an acre of land, or a plow, or an axe."[54] He then forecast, however, the abolition of the act with its processing taxes "in the sweet bye and bye."[55] Yet the fact remained that he had been defeated in his first real offensive against the New Deal.

Undaunted, Talmadge continued to seek the abolition of the Bankhead Act. In April 1935 he announced that he would stump the cotton belt against the processing tax, which he termed "the most damnable sales tax ever put on food and clothing."[56] He accused Secretary Wallace of deceiving the farmers by comparing the tax to a protective tariff.[57] He alleged that repeal of the tax would raise cotton prices to twenty cents per pound and those of other staples accordingly.[58] During the remainder of the summer he fought in the press, in public appearances and on the radio. He even appealed personally if unavailingly to the President to stop the collection of the tax.[59]

In August, Talmadge and others filed suit as private citizens in a Federal District Court to have the ginning tax on cotton held unconstitutional.[60] This suit, however, was dropped when the governor found a method of direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The State of Georgia filed a petition for a rule *nisi* on the ground that as a non-contractor with the federal government the state was prohibited from marketing its cotton.[61] While the case was pending, the AAA was ruled unconstitutional in the Hoosac Mills decision and Congress repealed the Bankhead Act to avoid further litigation.[62] Talmadge had

[50] *Ibid.*, November 6, November 13, November 27, December 4, December 11, 1934; New York *Times*, November 25, 1934.
[51] Atlanta *Constitution*, December 4, 1934.
[52] *Ibid.*, December 11, 1934.
[53] *Ibid.*, December 15, 1934.
[54] *The Statesman*, December 18, 1934.
[55] *Ibid.*, December 25, 1934.
[56] Atlanta *Constitution*, April 17, 1935; New York *Times*, April 17, 1935.
[57] *The Statesman*, May 14, 1935.
[58] *Ibid.*, May 28, 1935.
[59] Atlanta *Constitution*, September 12, 1935.
[60] New York *Times*, September 1, 1935.
[61] *Ibid.*, October 27, 1935.
[62] *Ibid.*, January 7, February 5, March 3, 1936.

been upheld in his contention that the processing tax was unconstitutional, and had won a victory against the Bankhead Act.

Meanwhile, Talmadge had broadened his attack. During the 1935 session of the General Assembly, he successfully used his influence against the passage of three bills sponsored by the New Deal: ratification of the child labor amendment, acceptance of the national employment system, and establishment of housing authorities for slum clearance projects.[63] His lack of sympathy with labor and his objection to a spending program account for his opposition. When the legislature passed a bill to enable Georgia to participate in the old age pension plan, Talmadge promptly vetoed it on grounds of expense and violation of the American spirit. "It is not the purpose of the state," he said in the veto message, "to support its people."[64] Later he boasted publicly that he had put the "must" bills from Washington in a "dark desk drawer," and that when one got by and was passed, he vetoed it.[65]

The pro-labor policy of the New Deal was also contrary to Talmadge's way of thinking. Absorbed as he was in the farmer and rural problems, he had little understanding of the needs of the city laborer. In addition, he had gained powerful support from important Georgia corporations because of his reduction of the ad valorem tax rate. Hence he inclined, consciously or unconsciously, to the employers' point of view. Attention should be called to large advertisements in Talmadge's newspaper, *The Statesman,* by the "Cotton Mills of Georgia,"[66] immediately after the governor had used the National Guard to break textile strikes; and also to an endorsement of his anti-strike actions passed by the Georgia Cotton Manufacturers Association.[67] The manufacturers cleverly linked the welfare of the farmer with that of the mills, calling him "an innocent victim of the textile strike." This probably indicates Talmadge's own line of reasoning as well.

The strikes themselves were three in number, with the most serious occurring in September 1934. Part of a southwide effort to unionize the textile industry, this strike called out some 44,000 of Georgia's 60,000 workers.[68] Although the initial violence had largely ceased, on September 14 the governor issued a proclamation of martial law,[69] under which about two hundred men and women were arrested and placed

[63] General Assembly of Georgia, *House Journal* (1935), 489, 912, 1302; General Assembly of Georgia, *Senate Journal* (1935), 1185. The Columbus *Enquirer* deplored the fact that whereas eleven New Deal bills recommended by Washington were being sponsored in Alabama by Governor Bibbs Graves, Talmadge opposed them; January 26, 1935. The same paper later referred to Talmadge as having blocked New Deal legislation in Georgia; May 12, 1935.

[64] *Senate Journal* (1935), 1963-1964.

[65] Atlanta *Constitution,* September 20, 1935.

[66] *The Statesman,* October 9, October 23, 1934; April 16, 1935.

[67] *Ibid.,* October 9, 1934.

[68] New York *Times,* September 15, 1934.

[69] Executive Minutes, 1934, 233A-234A.

in detention camps.[70] It should be noted that in the Democratic primaries on September 12, Talmadge was renominated, tantamount to election, for a second term as governor; two days later he issued his proclamation of martial law. Apparently unwilling to antagonize a large bloc of voters, he was anxious nevertheless to see the mills reopened quickly and advantageously to the owners. The strikes were successfully broken by the 23rd,[71] but martial law was not revoked. Under the same authority, Talmadge sent five hundred militiamen to Rome in October to quell the second strike, which occurred in a foundry there. This was accomplished in two days.[72] Martial law was revoked on March 2, 1935, only to be reissued two days later.[73] Under this new authority, troops were sent in April to LaGrange to break a strike in the big Callaway mills.[74] Finally in June martial law was dissolved.[75] Labor leaders and liberals throughout the nation condemned the settlement of strikes with guns,[76] and the taxpayers of Georgia bore the cost to the amount of $97,153.83.[77] Yet the mill owners had every right to be grateful, and it must be kept in mind that other governors also called out the National Guard in the great textile strikes of 1934.

A new symptom of disagreement with the New Deal was the outbreak of fresh quarrels with Hopkins, Ickes, and Wallace, resulting in a permanent estrangement from Talmadge. A request from the governor for funds to finish out the school year of 1934-35 was rejected by Hopkins because Georgia had "done nothing to help itself."[78] Indignantly Talmadge demanded that Hopkins resign, to which the regional FERA director retorted that Talmadge must call a special session of the legislature to increase school appropriations or there would be no aid.[79] Although Hopkins temporarily relented,[80] the critical issue still remained: Had the state done all it could for the schools? Appropriations for the common schools had retained the average under the past two governors,[81] but as the General Assembly had adjourned its 1935 session without passing an appropriations bill, there was therefore no increase in funds. To this extent Hopkins was correct when he said that Georgia had done nothing to help itself. The President was dragged into the quarrel, where he upheld Hopkins, in spite of charges by Talmadge, Representative Braswell Deen, and the Atlanta *Constitution*

[70] Atlanta *Constitution*, September 21, 1934.
[71] *Ibid.*, September 23, 1934.
[72] *Ibid.*, October 3, October 6, 1934.
[73] Executive Minutes, 1935, 17-19.
[74] Atlanta *Constitution*, April 30, 1935.
[75] Executive Minutes, 1935, 92.
[76] Including William F. Green, Will W. Alexander, Frank P. Graham, and E. McNeill Poteat, to name a few. Atlanta *Constitution*, April 7, 1935; New York *Times*, January 14, 1935.
[77] Executive Minutes, 1934, 347; 1935, 59, 81.
[78] Atlanta *Constitution*, April 6, 1935.
[79] *Ibid.*, April 6, April 11, 1935.
[80] *Ibid.*, April 21, 1935.
[81] *Ibid.*, August 25, 1935.

that he had been misinformed.[82] In addition to the school fund difficulty a crisis arose over relief funds. Hopkins cut off all relief money from Georgia as of June 1, on the basis that the state had made inadequate contributions from its own funds.[83] Washington was experiencing ever greater difficulties in getting along with Talmadge.

At the same time Ickes declared that Talmadge had reneged on a promise to secure legislation legalizing the hypothecation of county highway certificates as collateral for federal road money.[84] Ickes never forgave Talmadge, and even referred to him in his diary as "one of the most contemptible figures in public life."[85] The argument with Wallace involved the withholding of some $25,000,000 in federal road funds, previously allocated to Georgia, unless the State Highway Commission made certain changes in its staff and procedure.[86] A chorus of protests arose over this invasion of state rights,[87] and Talmadge found many voices lifted in his behalf. After detailed negotiations and the intervention of *Constitution* editor Clark Howell and Secretary of Commerce Daniel C. Roper, the federal roads bureau surrendered $19,000,000 to Georgia with no strings attached.[88] In addition, a Jefferson Day speech by Wallace in Atlanta brought forth scorching criticism from Talmadge, who demanded to know by what right Wallace presumed to speak on the man who said, "The least governed people are the best governed people."[89]

There is at least a good possibility that these three crises over federal funds were not unrelated. Talmadge was becoming one of the most violent critics of the New Deal although he was not backed by a majority of Georgians. Financial pressure on the state might insure the defeat of Talmadge. If such were the motive, however, the move was unsuccessful, as witness the general wrath against the federal roads bureau and the ultimate victory of the state. It would take something more than this to discredit Talmadge with most Georgians.

Perhaps emboldened by these successes and believing that he had correctly gauged the attitude of the people, Talmadge embarked on a speaking tour of the North and East, addressing audiences increasingly composed of Republicans.

Speaking in such widely scattered places as Sioux Falls, Chicago, Washington, New York, Philadelphia, and Providence, Talmadge

[82] *Ibid.*, August 11, August 13, September 12, 1935.
[83] Macon *Telegraph*, April 20, 1935.
[84] *Ibid.*, April 20, 1935.
[85] *The Secret Diary of Harold D. Ickes* (New York, 1953), 675.
[86] Atlanta *Constitution*, May 23, June 26, August 16, 1935.
[87] Atlanta *Journal*, June 30, 1935; Atlanta *Constitution*, May 26, June 14, June 27, June 28, July 27, August 2, 1935; Savannah *Morning News*, June 30, 1935; Columbus *Enquirer*, July 1, July 25, 1935; Calhoun (Georgia) *Times*, July 4, 1935. Both the *Journal* and the *Times* were anti-Talmadge papers.
[88] Atlanta *Constitution*, August 28, August 29, September 5, 1935.
[89] *The Statesman*, April 9, 1935.

flayed the New Deal spending program, its control of agriculture and business, its abandonment of the Democratic platform and philosophy, and its left-wing tendencies. He urged the reduction of federal taxes by 25 per cent and a return to "honesty, hard work, and saving."[90] He ridiculed the use of relief funds to teach "aesthetic dancing" and to survey the basin of the Mediterranean Sea,[91] activities which he labeled "picnics and follies."[92] He plead for a return to laissez-faire and the abandonment of crop reduction and artificial scarcity, which actions alone, he believed, would restore prosperity.[93] He charged that the President was no longer a Democrat, but had betrayed the principles of his party and was destroying both state rights and the Constitution.[94] Beginning with the issue of May 14, 1935, *The Statesman* carried in a box on the front page these italicized works: *"Americanism must be restored in America."* Talmadge flung charges of communism at the New Deal,[95] and in an excess of zeal called Roosevelt "the forgotten man."[96] He declared that the renomination of the President would be a "national calamity";[97] and held that the next president would be the opposite of Roosevelt.[98]

What the New Deal had been unable to accomplish by financial pressure, Talmadge brought upon himself: the loss of a large segment of his support. As applause greeted his ears in Chicago and Philadelphia, the home folks became annoyed at his "perambulating" up East.[99] Some even wondered where the money for these trips came from.[100] Support of Roosevelt and opposition to Talmadge was expressed by various groups: the Georgia Press Association, Meriwether County (the location of the Little White House), a Richmond County farmers' meeting, editors of South-east Georgia, the Fulton County grand jury, the Georgia Congressional delegation, the Georgia Federation of Labor, the Savannah chapter of United Sons of Confederate Veterans, and the post office employees in convention at Macon. Phrases such as "uncalled for," "humiliating," "political apostasy," "hysterical," "excuseless, baseless and malicious" appeared in the press. Talmadge was even hanged in effigy on the Capitol lawn.[101]

[90] *Ibid.*, June 11, 1935.
[91] *Ibid.*, April 16, 1935.
[92] Atlanta *Constitution*, April 16, 1935.
[93] *The Statesman*, April 30, May 21, 1935; Atlanta *Constitution*, May 8, May 22, 1935.
[94] Savannah *Morning News*, July 5, 1935; Atlanta *Constitution*, September 18, September 19, 1935; *The Statesman*, July 2, July 16, 1935; New York *Times*, August 25, 1935.
[95] Atlanta *Constitution*, May 19, August 6, October 9, 1935.
[96] New York *Times*, August 30, 1935.
[97] Atlanta *Constitution*, April 23, 1935.
[98] *Ibid.*, August 2, 1935.
[99] Columbus *Enquirer*, May 19, 1935; Augusta *Chronicle*, February 15, 1936; Atlanta *Constitution*, May 3, 1935; February 5, 1936.
[100] Calhoun *Times*, December 5, 1935; Columbus *Enquirer*, February 21, 1936.
[101] Calhoun *Times*, June 27, 1935; Eastman *Times-Journal*, May 2, 1935; Columbus *Enquirer*, December 1, 1935 and February 20, 1936; New York *Times*,

In spite of his vociferous opposition, or perhaps because he regarded it as a challenge to a good scrap, Talmadge put out feelers to see how he would be received as a presidential candidate. As early as April 1935 he predicted a third party in the coming campaign.[102] When asked in an interview if he would be a candidate, Talmadge replied that he "could not answer," but he was sure his principles would win.[103] In June the formation of three Talmadge-for-President clubs was announced,[104] but no record of additional ones has been found. In July he declared himself to be the only presidential possibility "outside the gimme crowd,"[105] and he made a casual reference to "If I were in the white house (*sic*). . . ."[106] During a Talmadge speech at Vidalia in August, one of the crowd yelled, "Why don't you run for president?"[107] Knowing that the governor frequently planted questioners in his audiences, one suspects that this question was so inspired. A Georgia contractor and Talmadge beneficiary, John Whitley, announced his belief that the country needed Talmadge because he would cut taxes.[108]

One of the New Deal's opponents was Senator Huey Long of Louisiana. Although he favored additional spending, while Talmadge opposed, the two men both wanted to stop Roosevelt's renomination. At least some discussion was held relative to cooperation toward this end,[109] but Long's assassination removed him from the scene. Among others, Gerald L. K. Smith and Talmadge sought to fill the gap, encouraged by the reactionaries who would have liked nothing better than a split in Democratic ranks.[110]

In December 1935 Talmadge announced that an anti-New Deal convention would be held in Macon under the auspices of the Southern Committee to Uphold the Constitution.[111] Attended by such men as John Henry Kirby, a wealthy Texas businessman; Gerald L. K. Smith; Ewing Y. Mitchell, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce under

---

April 20, April 21, April 22, 1935; Augusta *Chronicle,* April 20, April 28, July 7, 1935; Atlanta *Constitution,* April 19, April 26, April 28, May 4, May 5, May 15, August 3, September 21, October 19, 1935. The Eastman paper, located in the county next to Talmadge's home, was anti-Talmadge.

[102] Atlanta *Constitution,* April 19, 1935.

[103] *The Statesman,* April 23, 1935.

[104] *Ibid.,* June 18, June 25, 1935.

[105] Atlanta *Constitution,* July 28, 1935.

[106] *The Statesman,* July 23, 1935.

[107] Atlanta *Constitution,* August 2, 1935.

[108] *Ibid.,* September 2, 1935.

[109] Hamilton Basso, "Our Gene," *New Republic,* LXXXVI (February 19, 1936), 36; "Gene and Junior," *Time,* XXVIII (September 7, 1936), 10; New York *Times,* April 9, April 10, August 30, 1935.

[110] Basso, "Our Gene," *New Republic,* LXXXVI (February 19, 1936), 36-37; Atlanta *Constitution,* January 25, 1936; New York *Times,* September 18, December 12, 1935.

[111] Atlanta *Constitution,* December 7, 1935; New York *Times,* December 16, 1935.

Roosevelt; W. C. Bradley, chairman of the Columbus, Georgia, Coca-Cola board; George Lanier, president of the third largest textile mill chain in the South; Thomas L. Dixon, author of *The Clansman;* H. D. Pollard, president of the Central of Georgia Railroad; and financed by men like John J. Raskob, Pierre duPont, and Alfred P. Sloan of General Motors, the convention met on January 29, 1936.[112]

As a convention, it was poorly run. While seventeen states were invited, there was no allotment of delegates and no system of credentials. It resembled a mass meeting more than a nominating convention. Many attended either from curiosity or for amusement. While some substantial citizens were present, many who came were Klansmen, lily-whites, pension-preachers, and in general members of the "lunatic fringe."[113]

The platform adopted reaffirmed faith in Jeffersonian democracy and in the Constitution; pledged support to the economy-minded Democratic platform of 1932; supported and praised the Supreme Court for its anti-New Deal decisions; favored "all reasonable aid" to agriculture and labor, but condemned the scarcity program as unreasonable; expressed its belief in individualism and opposed regimentation; urged the government to get out of business at the earliest opportunity; and advocated a constitutional limitation on federal taxes. The final flourish was to nominate Talmadge for the presidency.[114] That this platform represented an essentially Republican position is apparent. Talmadge had aligned himself with the elements which were then called the Liberty League and which in 1948 were known as the Dixiecrats. This constituted the conservative wing of the Democratic party. Atlanta members of the Liberty League who supported Talmadge included three of the Candler family and Preston S. Arkwright, president of the Georgia Power Company.[115] Arkwright, in fact, wrote a lengthy letter to William Chamberlain of the United Light and Power Company in Chicago recommending Talmadge for high office.[116] William Randolph Hearst also was one of those suggesting Talmadge for national office, in this case for vice-president on a third party ticket with former gov-

[112] Special Senate Committee to Investigate Lobby Activities, Hearings. *Senate Documents,* 74th Congress, 1st Session, 1981-2014; Benjamin Stolberg, "Buzz Windrip, Governor of Georgia," *The Nation,* CXLII (1936), 318; New York *Times,* January 27, January 29, 1936.

[113] New York *Times,* January 28, 1936; Columbus *Enquirer,* January 30, 1936; Walter Davenport, "The Shouting Dies," *Collier's,* XCVII (May 2, 1936), 33.

[114] New York *Times,* January 30, 1936.

[115] Atlanta *Constitution,* April 21, 1935.

[116] P. S. Arkwright to William Chamberlain, May 20, 1935. Original in the possession of Zack D. Cravey, State Capitol, Atlanta; copy in possession of the author.

ernor Alfred E. Smith.[117] Talmadge was also named, along with Carter Glass, Harry F. Byrd, Millard Tydings, and Lewis Douglas as a possible Republican presidential candidate.[118] He was ahead of his time, however, for the majority of conservatives were still enjoying the perquisites of power and were not willing to risk the loss of the White House so soon. The rank and file Democrats were pro-Roosevelt, and thus it was hopeless for Talmadge to believe that he could defeat the President. His chief support came from the Liberty League Democrats who followed Al Smith and had broken with Roosevelt, and from the Republicans.

The Governor made a strong effort to obtain a state delegation pledged to vote for him at the Democratic national convention. The Roosevelt forces quickly organized for fear of an attempt to take them unawares with an early date for a presidential preferential primary.[119] But the strategy of the Talmadge forces, led by Hugh Howell, the chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee, was to adopt a stalling policy in the hope of securing a Talmadge delegation without the risk of failure in a primary.[120] Two counties, becoming impatient, called their own primaries, and returned an overwhelming majority for Roosevelt,[121] although there are grounds for believing that a degree of fraud was present.[122] Faced with defeat, Talmadge withdrew his name from the Whitfield County primary,[123] and the State Democratic Executive Committee authorized a state-wide primary on June 3. Playing now for an uninstructed delegation, they set the entrance fee at $10,000 to discourage the Roosevelt supporters from entering his name.[124] But Georgians "got on the honor roll" and quickly oversubscribed the amount.[125] Talmadge failed to enter, and a Roosevelt delegation was chosen without opposition.[126] Talmadge did not even attend the national nominating convention although he was national committeeman from Georgia, and he was replaced in this position by Clark Howell, a staunch Roosevelt man.[127]

Yet Talmadge still had a strong following on state issues; and banking on this, on July 4 he announced his candidacy for the junior

[117] Atlanta *Constitution,* August 30, 1935; Augusta *Chronicle,* September 4, 1935.

[118] Atlanta *Constitution,* May 23, 1935.

[119] *Ibid.,* January 17, 1936.

[120] *Ibid.,* February 11, February 12, 1936; Valdosta (Georgia) *Times,* February 11, 1936. The latter was also anti-Talmadge.

[121] Atlanta *Constitution,* March 5, March 12, 1936.

[122] Harris County, one of the two involved, had a population of 11,140, of which 69 per cent was Negro. This left 3,454 white people of all ages. Assuming that one in five was a registered voter, then approximately 700 people could vote. As 1,025 ballots were counted, some one must have stuffed the ballot box. Charles S. Johnson, *Statistical Atlas of Southern Counties* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1941), 355.

[123] Atlanta *Constitution,* March 13, 1936.

[124] *Ibid.,* April 16, 1936.

[125] *Ibid.,* April 28, 1936.

[126] *Ibid.,* May 17, 1936.

[127] New York *Times,* June 23, 1936.

senatorship against the incumbent, Richard B. Russell. He based his appeal for election chiefly on economy and tax reduction rather than on a general diatribe against the New Deal, although elements of Jeffersonian construction of the Constitution were also present. He pledged that he would not be a "rubber stamp" senator but would consider on its merits every measure brought before the senate.[128] However, Russell would not wage the campaign on his opponent's choice of issues, but constantly hammered home the governor's opposition to New Deal measures which had put money into the pockets of Georgians, and reminded the public of Talmadge's Republican proclivities.[129] While minor issues were also involved, such as Talmadge's responsibility for the failure of the General Assembly to pass an appropriations bill, his apparent unexplained affluence, the race issue, and the use of the National Guard at Talmadge rallies, the main issue was the New Deal.

It was hammered home to the voters that the New Deal had spent $305,000,000 in Georgia; that farm income in 1934 was 88 per cent above that of 1932; that the Home Owners Loan Corporation had lent $30,802,000 to save Georgia homes; that 440 banks and industries had been refinanced; that 1,108 schools, 50 hospitals, and 325 other public buildings had been constructed.[130] It was further pointed out that hog prices had increased 6.5 cent per pound, tobacco prices 7.59 cents, and cotton about 8 cents.[131] The President telegraphed that he felt sure Georgia would prove true to the faith that was in her,[132] which vague statement was taken as an endorsement of Russell.

The campaign level was generally low. Both sides gave big shows at their rallies, with bands, flags, choruses, barbecues, and full page crowd photographs in the newspapers. Ridicule was levied at red suspenders—the Talmadge trade mark—, the "one-gallus" boys, and pants held together with a ten-penny nail. The Augusta *Chronicle* ran a clever purported correspondence between a "Tousle Haired Gent" and his "Baldheaded Candidate" for the governorship. Money was spent freely on both sides, and for that period the campaign was an expensive one.[133] While Talmadge had been conceded a good chance for victory in July, he was early placed on the defensive for the first time in his life, and he was not a good campaigner in this role. In the primary on September 9, Russell won by 251,425 votes to Talmadge's 131,629. Not only this, but all Talmadge-supported candidates for statehouse offices were also defeated.[134] For the first time in ten stormy years, Talmadge was rejected at the polls.

[128] Atlanta *Constitution*, July 5, 1936. [129] *Ibid.*, July 10, 1936.
[130] Atlanta *Journal*, May 2, November 10, December 5, 1935; May 19, 1936.
[131] Atlanta *Constitution*, August 5, 1936.
[132] Macon *Telegraph*, August 19, 1936.
[133] Comptroller-General's Office, Campaign Expenses, 1936.
[134] *Georgia Official Register* (1933-35-37), 33.

Governor Talmadge's opposition to the New Deal was politically significant. Georgia was a traditionally Democratic, southern, agricultural state; and because the governor of such a state opposed the national administration, his career was watched closely by party leaders in Washington. His defeat encouraged and pleased them. However, while his principles were defeated in 1936, he was a fore-runner of the deeper and wider division in the Democratic party which gradually emerged in the later years of the New Deal and during the administration of President Harry S. Truman. For himself, Talmadge had lost the election because of the New Deal; but he was later twice elected governor when local rather than national issues were at stake. His opposition to the New Deal temporarily placed him in the national limelight; but his defeat relegated him permanently to a state role. Had he been politically prominent either earlier or later, he might have been able to achieve the senatorship and a position of some national prominence. As it is, his principles, his career, and even his red suspenders are gradually fading from the memory of man.

THE JAMES SPRUNT STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

(Continued from inside front cover)

Vol. 19, No. 2. Studies in Hispanic-American History. Edited by William Whatley Pierson, Jr.

Vol. 20, No. 1. North Carolina Newspapers Before 1790. By Charles Christopher Crittenden.

Vol. 20, No. 2. The James A. Graham Papers, 1861-1884. Edited by Henry M. Wagstaff.

Vol. 21, Nos. 1 and 2. The Democratic Party in Ante-Bellum North Carolina, 1835-1861. By Clarence Clifford Norton.

Vol. 22, Nos. 1 and 2. Minutes of the North Carolina Manumission Society, 1816-1834. Edited by Henry M. Wagstaff.

Vol. 23, No. 1. The Presidential Election of 1824 in North Carolina. By Albert Ray Newsome

Vol. 23, No. 2. The Secession Movement in North Carolina. By Joseph Carlyle Sitterson.

Vol. 24, No. 1. Jeffersonian Democracy in South Carolina. By John Harold Wolfe.

Vol. 24, No. 2. Guide to the Manuscripts in the Southern Historical Collection of the University of North Carolina.

Vol. 25, No. 1. North Carolina Boundary Disputes Involving Her Southern Line. By Marvin L. Skaggs.

Vol. 25, No. 2. Ante-Bellum South Carolina: A Social and Cultural History. By Rosser H. Taylor

Vol. 26, No. 1. The Prohibition Movement in Alabama, 1702 to 1943. By James Benson Sellers.

Volume 27. Prohibition in North Carolina, 1715-1945. By Daniel Jay Whitener.

Volume 28. The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890. By Vernon Lane Wharton.

Volume 29. The Whig Party in Georgia, 1825-1853. By Paul Murray.

Volume 30. The South in Action: A Sectional Crusade Against Freight Rate Discrimination By Robert A. Lively.

Volume 31. Essays in Southern History. Edited by Fletcher Melvin Green.

Volume 32. South Carolina Goes to War. By Charles Edward Cauthen.

Volume 33. Revolutionary Justice: A Study of the Organization, Personnel, and Procedure of the Paris Tribunal, 1793-1795. By James Logan Godfrey.

Volume 34. The Political Liberalism of the New York *Nation*, 1865-1932. By Alan Pendleton Grimes.

Volume 35. War Labor Boards in the Field. By Allan R. Richards.

Volume 36. The Raleigh Register, 1799-1863. By Robert Neal Elliott, Jr.

Volume 37. Constitutional Development in Alabama, 1798-1901: A Study in Politics, the Negro and Sectionalism. By Malcolm Cook McMillan.

Volume 38. Agricultural Developments in North Carolina, 1783-1860. By Cornelius Oliver Cathey.

Volume 39. Studies in Southern History. Edited By J. Carlyle Sitterson

The Heckman Bindery, Inc.
N. Manchester, Ind.
JUN 1957
"Bound To Please"

H 11 Jun '57